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Since 2002 Taiwan has transformed its cultural policy, following the lead of the UK's 
creative industry discourse in particular and neoliberal policy regimes in general.  
This thesis investigates the processes through which neoliberal thinking shaped 
changing cultural policy and the impact this has had on cultural workers and practices 
in Taiwan’s cultural landscape.   
I examined policy making documents and interviewed a range of involved actors, 
including government officials and cultural workers to learn more about the policy 
process and its impact. 
The research argues that the creative economy has heavily influenced the development 
of cultural policy discourse and generally failed to promote the public interest in 
Taiwan. The results of neoliberalisation have been embodied in several salient 
characteristics such as the privatisation of public space, marketisation of public subsidy 
and investment, commercialisation of higher education, and flexibilisation of cultural 
labour market.  
I argue that cultural policy needs to be reshaped to represent the public interests and 
diversity of our cultural landscape. 
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The satellites are spinning 
A new day is dawning 
The galaxies are waiting 
For planet Earth’s awakening 
Oh we sing this song to 
A brave tomorrow. 
Oh we sing this song to 
Abolish sorrow. 
The satellites are spinning 
A better day is breaking 
The galaxies are waiting 
For planet Earth’s awakening. 
 Sun Ra “The Satellites Are Spinning” (1971) 
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1                                                                                              
Introduction 
 
 ‘[A] culture’, at its most general level (…) is never a form in which people happen to 
be living, at some isolated moment, but a selection and organization, of past and 
present, necessarily providing for its own kinds of continuity – [this] is true also, at 
different levels, of many of elements of the cultural process. (Williams, 1981, p.184)  
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the processes through which neoliberal thinking shaped changing 
cultural policy and the impact this has had on cultural workers and practices in Taiwan’s 
cultural landscape. I examined policy making documents and interviewed a range of 
involved actors, including government officials and cultural workers to learn more about 
the policy process and its impact. The research argues that the creative economy has 
heavily influenced the development of cultural policy discourse and generally failed to 
promote the public interest in Taiwan. The results of neoliberalisation have been 
embodied in several salient characteristics such as the privatisation of public space, 
marketisation of public subsidy and investment, commercialisation of higher education, 
and flexibilisation of cultural labour market. 
Alternatives to a neoliberal approach are necessary for the future development of the arts 
and culture sector in Taiwan. Ostensibly, there is no doubt that creative industry policy 
can be ‘successful’, and the spectacular results of neoliberal reform can seem 
tantalisingly glamorous. In reality, however, the situation is more nuanced. According to 
official data, creative industries generate employment and export income. For example, 
the news media never stop telling great stories about the contribution of creative 
industries to the UK economy (Conlan, 2016 & Kampfner, 2017, news article in the 
Guardian). The public sector has celebrated the achievements of Britain's creative 
industries for nearly a decade as a fastest-growing part of the economy. Although 
government statistics reveal success and growth in the creative industries, not every 
aspect of the creative industries is thriving through this kind of neoliberal approach.  
Problems encountered include the following: overworked creative labourers, unfair 
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geographical spread, and the lack of diverse voices. Uncovering the above-mentioned 
problems could prevent the erosion of public value from being co-opted into serving a 
neoliberal agenda through a new blueprint for creative industries policymaking. 
Additionally, Raymond Williams’ ideas (1960) are still relevant to the aspiration of 
finding a more reasonable and equitable solution to new cultural policymaking: 
We can envisage a cultural organisation which would greatly extend the freedom of 
the cultural producers, by sensible application of public resources to cut out their 
present dependence on dominant but essentially functionless financial groups, and by 
forms of contract which while preserving responsibility in the spending of public 
money would give the producers control over their actual work. (p. 57) 
In Taiwan, everyone is fully aware that our mainstream media has fallen into a disorderly 
state; this is frequently observed in our daily lives. Although Taiwan is the highest ranked 
Asian country in terms of the ‘free media market’ and ‘press freedom’, the reality is that 
several problems have not been addressed, including excessive commercialisation, 
political antagonism between media partisanship, a weak public broadcasting system and 
a short-sighted culture and communication policy. Moreover, the policy of 
commercializing culture, known as the Culture and Creative Industry Project (CCIP), has 
also had a negative effect on the cultural industry. The government believed that this 
policy, which was based on that of the United Kingdom, would allow the creation of a 
new Taiwanese cultural landscape in East Asia. However, the CCIP did not ameliorate 
the situation, despite the fact that it was promoted for ten years (2002-2012). It is not 
difficult to compare the development of cultural industries in Korea and Taiwan, 
especially given their analogous political and economic situation in the 1980s. Korea has 
played an important role in cultural development by globally exporting popular cultural 
products, such as ‘K-POP’ and Korean TV series. However, Taiwanese culture was not 
exported during this period but fell into the political mire. 
How does a neoliberalised culture and media policy arise? I used to ask myself this when 
I was working on the media reform campaign. During that time, I found myself 
repeatedly having to deal with media bias through protests and criticism and I actively – 
and daily – promote our media and cultural policy recommendations. If the development 
of culture is dependent on historical context, as Williams believed, I would like to know 
how the cultural policy of the Taiwan Government was developed.  
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When I reviewed the Taiwan Culture and Creative Industry Project, I found that it was 
based on ‘The Creative Industries Task Force (CITF)’ of the British Labour Party 
(Labour Party, 1997). This led to my interest in exploring the history of creative 
industries in these two countries, within a global context. Considering that their history, 
culture, politics, and economies are quite distinct, I would like to identify what influences 
the creative industries of Taiwan. How can we understand the new global developments 
and more specifically, the media and cultural environment in a neoliberalised context? 
Therefore, my dissertation title is:  
Creative Industries Policy in Taiwan: The Effects of Neoliberal Reform 
 
1.2 Research questions 
The overarching aim of the thesis is to explore the dynamic of neoliberalised cultural 
policymaking in Taiwan. My research made a significant contribution by analysing the 
influence of neoliberalism on public policy in the communication and cultural industries 
in Taiwan, exploring the historical background of the adoption of creative industries 
policy, and figuring out the problems of the expansion. In my study, I elaborate this issue 
both conceptually and empirically using international and domestic evidence on the 
origin  and development of creative industries policymaking since the late-1990s.  
Creative industries policy development in Taiwan is geopolitically important. Taiwan 
gave more attention to the creative economy as a new economic growth engine in the 
early 2000s. Furthermore, Taiwan in not the only one country who followed British 
model, other East Asian countries such as Singapore and Korea adopted the British 
creative economic model as a new possibility of economic growth in early 2000s.  
In this thesis, I have explored the dynamic of neoliberalised cultural policymaking in 
Taiwan. I wanted to immerse myself in this topic for several reasons. First, my working 
experience in the media reform group has inspired me to explore the history and 
contradictions of cultural and communication policy in Taiwan. Second, neoliberalised 
cultural policy, particularly the creative industries policy, has severely changed Taiwan’s 
cultural landscape and therefore seemed worthy of in-depth study. Finally, it is important 
to analyse how Taiwan has appropriated the discourse of creative industry policies from 
its British counterpart, particularly in terms of the neoliberalised global market.  
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The central research questions here regard the neoliberal communication and cultural 
policymaking perspective and the approach of taking the critical political economy of 
communication as the main tool for analysis. The thesis explores the following issues 
and examines the neoliberalised cultural landscape in which policymakers operated in 
Taiwan. Figure 1.1 shows the process for formulating the major research questions. 
The research questions are:  
(a) what influenced the development of Taiwanese creative industries policy, and to what 
extent was it driven by the adoption of the British model?  
(b) What has been the result of the rapid expansion of creative industries under 
neoliberalism? 
(c)  How does the legal/regulatory structure of creative industries reflect neoliberalism?  
(d) What are the creative workers’ survival mechanisms in the neoliberal marketplace?  
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What’s actually happened in 
the process? 
Where does it come from? And 
why? How could we explain it 
historically and theoretically? 
The dilemma of Taiwanese cultural and 
media landscape:  
The privatisation and commercialisation of 
public services and deregulated 
(unprotected) flexible labour markets 
                        Figure 1.1 Process of formulating the research questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical context:  
How and why did Taiwan adopt 
the British creative industries 
model?  
How does neoliberalism 
dominate cultural policymaking 
in Britain?  
What is neoliberalism?   
Progress:  
How and when does 
Taiwanese creative 
industries policy develop? 
What is the result after the 
rapid expansion of creative 
industries under 
neoliberalism?  
How does the 
legal/regulatory structure of 
creative industries reflect 
neoliberalism?  
What are the creative 
workers’ survival 
mechanisms in the 
neoliberal marketplace? 
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1.3 Structure  
The structure of this thesis is visualised in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2. As Chapter 2 explains, 
the critical political economic approach was adopted to deal with these research questions. 
Qualitative research methods such as documents collections and analysis, and qualitative 
interviews and interpretation were used. These helped me to discover the process of 
Creative Industries (CI) policymaking and to explore creative labourers’ working 
conditions and attitudes. The historical development of neoliberalism is retraced in 
Chapter 3. It provides a critical perspective on the problems of deregulation, privatisation, 
and outsourcing in the global context; it explores in particular how naturalised ‘common 
sense’ (the usage of neoliberalised language) has defined the contours of the new age. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the neoliberal process of culture and communication policymaking 
in Britain, especially the new project in late 1990s – creative industries. After the UK’s 
development of the creative industries policy, its rhetoric became a significant dimension 
of neoliberal globalisation. Therefore, Chapters 3 and 4 form the main crux of theoretical 
and historical background in my research regarding neoliberalism.  
Chapters 5 through 9 provide a historical account of the process of neoliberal influence 
on Taiwan’s cultural policy, based on my research. It shows that this dynamic leads to a 
reversal of neoliberalised cultural policy. The increasingly thriving ‘creative industries’ 
project is one the government wants the public to see. More specifically, Chapter 5 
represents a transition period as – the Taiwanese government adopted and promoted CI 
policy in 2000 and 2002. It reveals the turning point of Taiwan’s cultural policymaking 
as it adopted British CI policy. This was influenced by CI policy experts, consultants and 
scholars from Britain who advocated CI development in Taiwan. Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 
trace the process of CI expansion through legalisation – a new act for developing CI; 
privatisation of cultural clusters; commercialisation of higher education; and 
individualised creative labourers. For example, the higher education system has seen 
almost 70 university departments dedicated to the ‘creative industries’ set up over 10 
years in a phenomenon fuelled and supported by the mainstream media system and some 
‘successful’ celebrities of the ‘creative class’. Therefore, most graduates are optimistic 
about their job prospects, not knowing they are about to enter a flawed jobs market. 
Finally, in Chapter 10, I argue that in order to prevent further erosion of public value, we 
need new cultural and communication policies within a social democratic system of a 
new blueprint for creative industries policymaking.  
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     Table1.1 Table of Contents 
Chapters Titles 
1 Introduction 
2 Methods 
3 What is neoliberalism and why does it matter? 
4 British Case: Neoliberalised Cultural Policymaking 
Process 
5 After the Adoption of British Model in Taiwan: The 
Transition to a Creative Economy in Cultural 
Policymaking (2000-02) 
6 Neoliberal legislative process of creative industries 
policy (2004-) 
7 Neoliberalisation of Public Space – from Cultural 
Clusters to Creative Industries Park (2004- ) 
8 How the Creative Industries Project Expanded 
(2008-2013) 
9 The developing creative workers’ survival 
mechanism: in the neoliberalised creative 
industries market 
10 Conclusion 
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                        Neoliberalised process 
Figure 1.2 Structure of Chapters 
 
Explains the subject and its background and the 
research methods used to access this subject  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Taiwanese case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: cultural industries and public benefit 
as objectives for cultural policy  
 
 
Ch1 
& 
Ch2 
 
 
 
Ch3 
& 
Ch4 
 
 
 
 
Ch5 
 
 
 
 
Ch6, 
Ch7, 
Ch8 
&Ch9 
 
 
 
 
Ch10 
 
Adopting British model & 
following neoliberal logic 
to develop creative 
industries project in 
Taiwan 
Cultural & communication 
policies 
Creative industries policy: 
one of the most significant 
case: British model 
• Neoliberal legislative process of creative 
industries policy (2004 –) 
• Neoliberalisation of Public Space – from 
Cultural Clusters to Creative Industries Park 
(2004 –) 
• How the Creative Industries Project Expanded 
(2008 – 2013) 
• The developing creative workers’ survival 
mechanism: in the neoliberalised creative 
industries market 
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1.4 Conclusion 
Some studies have represented neoliberal problems in the field of cultural policymaking 
from regional to national and international perspectives. For example, Caust (2003) 
questions the effect of neoliberalism on public cultural policy in Australia, describing 
how it has been captured, in effect, by economic reason and marketing (McGuigan, 2004, 
p.3). McGuigan’s book Culture and the Public Sphere (1996) already discuss how public 
cultural institutions were put under enormous pressure to conform to managerialist and 
marketing imperatives during the 1980s. Following McGuigan’s ideas, Stevenson (1999) 
analyses the transition of cultural practices in Germany and believes that, in contrast to 
the neoliberal cultural policy discourse, ‘the sociocultural movement still represents a 
vital and important experiment in autonomous cultural expression and revitalised, 
participatory cultural citizenship’ (p.74). Particularly, ‘these achievements have in turn 
become benchmarks of legitimation for cultural politics and the construction of cultural 
citizenship as a whole’. However, the commercialised cultural consumption model has 
narrowed these achievements which could ‘become firmly ensconced as concrete models 
of autonomous and transformative cultural politics’ (p.74). Flew (2012) also points out 
that media and cultural policy in the 2000s was dominated by discourses of neoliberalism, 
particularly as they relate to the rise of policy discourse around the creative industries. 
Oakley and O’Connor (2015) elaborate that ‘the creative industries agenda has done more 
than simply reduce cultural value to the economic or instrumental’ (p.9). A new type of 
public cultural policymaking could in turn be seen as a basis for cultural citizenship; it 
should challenge the neoliberal ideology. It could be said that culture should not be 
valued only on the basis of earnings, employment and exports, but also in terms of the 
social value of culture itself and the possibility of fulfilling work for cultural workers 
(Banks, 2017). 
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2                                                                                                    
Methods 
 
I still have my hands. I still have my mind. […] I still have my allergies. I still have 
my philosophy. (Monk, 1981, track A2) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This research deploys two main methods to investigate neoliberalised cultural 
policymaking and the development of creative industries in Taiwan. These methods 
include interviewing and document methods. In this chapter I explain why and how I 
adopt these methods in my study as well as their limitations. Finally, I explicate research 
ethics involved in this project. Through examining how these research methods are used 
collectively to counteract their individual limitations, this thesis provides methodological 
value for researching the processes of neoliberal cultural policy and practices of cultural 
workers in Taiwan’s cultural landscape. 
2.2 The critical political economic approac 
This thesis adopts the critical political economy approach to problems of communication 
and cultural analysis and this chapter is not only about methods. Researchers have 
explored many methods for answering research questions. Therefore, some background 
is appropriate before describing the methods used in this section. This chapter includes 
an overview of theoretical perspectives – critical political economy, an outline of the 
main arguments of the research – that dictated the glasses I wore; the path I walked; the 
questions I used and confused; the tools I chose/abandoned; and the perspective I believe. 
It also explains my methods, and rationale for using certain methods over others. I 
explore first the theoretical background, and its importance to readers’ understanding of 
my methods in this chapter. Overall, this study examines the influence of neoliberalism 
on public policy in the communication and culture industry in Taiwan.  
The critical political economy perspective reveals some essential questions related to the 
development of culture, mass communications, capitalism, and democracy. Murdock and 
Golding (1973, 1974, and 2016) have suggested the importance of the political economy 
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approach in examining macro-structural efforts. It helps reveal myth-busting answers to 
issues such as privatisation of telecommunications and neo-liberal cuts in public services. 
‘We need to ask, “How is the political economy of the communications system shifting 
under the impact of market-led convergence and what are the consequences of this 
movement for patterns of corporate control and popular use?”’ (Murdock & Golding, 
2002, p.113). This theoretical position is essential for revealing the neoliberal ideology 
at the root of many policy-making problems in the creative industries. The critical 
political economy approach provides a lens through which the wider economic situation 
and the structure of cultural production can be examined as historically situated processes. 
Murdock and Golding (2016) suggest that the critical political economy approach 
uncovers and illustrates the essential questions of mass communications and culture.  
How is public culture produced and how far are particular modes of production 
equitable rather than exploitative and ecologically sustainable rather than 
destructive? Second, how far does what is produced deliver the diversity of 
information, analysis, debate and insight into the lives of others required for 
effective participatory citizenship on a basis of respect and tolerance, and are 
these resources available on an equitable basis without significant social 
exclusions? (Murdock & Golding, 2016, p. 768) 
Nixon (2016, p.260) states that ‘critical theory relies on a critical method, and a critical 
method for Marx is a historical materialist dialectical method’. This can be a critical 
theory of the production of culture and the production of consciousness via exploring the 
contradictions in capitalism. Nixon (2012) elaborates that academics following this 
approach are those ‘who wish to be similarly critical to be self-conscious of their method 
of theorising as much as they are self-conscious of their political-economic theory and 
its concepts so that those concepts, and even the theory itself, do not become static but 
instead remain perpetually critical’ (2012, p.440). Furthermore, ‘it is dialectical, which 
means that each new contribution relates to older contributions and sublates them in a 
constructive manner. A critical theory is therefore not a closed universe, but an open 
endeavour that cross-references other critical approaches’ (Fuchs, 2016, p.3). Example 
of issues at the core of the critical political economy of communication in contemporary 
capitalism’s ideological structures include; the intensification of neoliberalism (Davies, 
2016; Fuchs, 2016; Harvey, 2005); the exploitation of freelancers in cultural industries 
(Lee, 2011; Oakley, 2011); neoliberal policies of media deregulation and the crisis of 
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public services (Hesmondhalgh, 2005; Murdock ＆Golding, 1989 2016); the alienation 
and exploitation in audience commodification (Nixon, 2015); and commercialisation of 
contents, audiences, and labour(Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2010; Hewison, 2014; Oakley, 
2009). 
These fundamental questions provide the basis for this study and help to raise further 
research questions. For example, how does the ideology of neoliberalism influence 
cultural and media policy? The critical political economy approach to communication is 
employed to analyse the neoliberal cultural landscape in which policymakers have 
operated in Taiwan.  
First, this study traces the historical development and dynamics of neoliberalism (after 
WWII). In addition, the neoliberal process of cultural policymaking and the expansion 
of creative industries in Taiwan (2002-2014) are analysed. Finally, contemporary public 
values concerning cultural and media policymaking are explored. Empirical research 
methods are employed to address these issues. Major research questions are mainly 
focused on the following questions and issues: how has policymaking in culture and 
communication changed through the processes of neoliberalism? In particular, how has 
the policy discourse in the creative industries been globally adopted from the British 
model? Important characteristics of neoliberal reform have shaped cultural and 
communication policy and the creative industry landscape in Taiwan. However, as the 
public sector sought to adhere to these neoliberal principles, reforms have undermined 
vital public service values while posing vital questions of public interest. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the map of my theoretical position, research topic, and methods. It is 
also my thesis framework, articulating the critical political economy approach and the 
problems of neoliberalised cultural policymaking in Taiwan. The critical political 
economy of communication and culture is the starting point for exploring the historical 
process: the discourses of the popular and creative culture industries have become 
overwhelmingly powerful in the development of the cultural and communication 
policymaking process. Then, historical document analysis and interview analysis are 
mainly practical methods for elaborating the topic: Creative Industries Policy in Taiwan: 
The Effects of Neoliberal Reform. Empirical research requires a clear articulation of the 
theoretical frameworks. It could also be said that these research questions (chapters) rely 
on my theory of knowledge – epistemology approach, which is based on critical 
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theory/critical political economic approach. As Mason points out, however, there are 
limits to ‘whether and how social phenomena can be known, and how knowledge can be 
demonstrated. Different epistemologies have different things to say about these issues, 
and about what the status of knowledge can be’ (2002, p.16). 
The following three sections provide detail on sources, data, and research processes. First, 
the choice of documents and interviews as source material is explored, together with the 
rationale for using them. Next, the process of sample selection and data analysis is 
outlined in detail. In addition, ethical issues are reviewed in detail. Finally, the research 
process is elaborated on, by further reflecting on the nature and influence of the 
underlying theories.  
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 Figure 2.1 The map of the theoretical position, research topic, and the 
methods 
 
Theoretical framework  
and position 
 
 
 
Neoliberalisation of 
 the policymaking  
 
 (Qualitative 
research 
methods) 
mixed-method 
approaches 
Chapters                                                                                         
  
 
 
 
                                                                                 Method: interviews 
 
Method: literature  
review, 
 
 
Method: documents analysis and interviews 
Dissertation topic:  
The Cultural Public Sphere under 
the waves of neoliberal reform:  
Rethinking Communication and 
cultural policies in Taiwan 
The main approach: 
 The critical political economy of 
culture, communication, media, and 
information 
The history of 
Neoliberalism   
The history of 
cultural policy in 
Britain 
(neoliberalised 
process) 
 
The neoliberalised 
legalisation of 
creative industries 
law 
 
After the rapid 
expansion: the 
neoliberalised 
result 
The history of the 
creative industries 
development: 
2000- until now 
 
The creative 
workers’ survival 
mechanism and 
the neoliberal 
market 
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2.3 Methods and rationales 
The following chapters address research questions regarding the neoliberal 
communication and cultural policymaking perspective. Table 2.1 is an outline of the 
methods used to address specific research questions. Data collection in qualitative 
research involves a variety of techniques, including in-depth interviews, document 
analysis, and unstructured observations (Jankowski & Wester, 1991, p.59). This study 
relies primarily on document analysis and interviews. Data was collected from different 
sources, including policy documents, meetings minutes, news and official gazette reports, 
and internal annual reports (see Table 2.1).  
First, the literature review of neoliberalism and the British model is a basic building block 
for exploring consistent underlying features of the Taiwanese industry. Neoliberal 
ideology comprises political and economic practices, but it also influences cultural policy 
and the structure of the mass media system. These systems evolved along with neoliberal 
development policies. Second, documentary analysis and interviews are the main 
methods for revealing this evolution. Four main areas of exploration – through interviews 
and document analysis – form the main crux of my research. These are:  
1. The history of the adoption of the British creative industry model in Taiwan 
(since 2002- ) 
2. The rapid expansion of creative industry policies for neoliberal reform (since 
2008- ) 
3. How neoliberalism has brought out the worst in creative and cultural labourers’ 
working conditions 
4. The interactional exchange through interviews with creative labourers 
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Table 2.1 The linking for research questions and methods  
Research questions 
(chapters) 
Main data sources 
and methods 
Justification  
1. What is neoliberalism?    
 
Literature review 
Review of the 
historical background 
is necessary to 
demonstrate the 
phenomena of 
neoliberal cultural 
policy discourse  
2. How does neoliberalism 
dominate cultural 
policymaking in Britain? 
3. How did Taiwan adopt 
the British creative 
industries model? And 
how does Taiwanese 
policy develop? 
 
 
 
Document analysis: 
policy documents, 
official meeting 
records, news reports, 
official gazettes, and 
creative industry 
annual reports 
Interviews with civil 
servants 
 
 
 
These data sources 
will provide the 
historical dynamic 
between the public 
sector, the private 
sector, and public 
opinion 
4. What is the result after 
the rapid expansion of 
creative industries under 
neoliberalism?  
 
5. How does the 
legal/regulatory 
structure of creative 
industries reflect 
neoliberalism?  
 
6. What are the creative 
workers’ survival 
mechanisms in the 
neoliberal marketplace? 
Interviews with 
cultural workers 
Explores different 
working conditions 
and attitudes  
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Analysing documents is significant in my research because of my epistemological 
grounds. These written words, texts, and documents are meaningful in the context. It 
could be said that these documents ‘act as some form of expression or representation of 
relevant elements’ in the process of creative industry policymaking (Mason, 2002, p.106). 
According to these records, ‘we can trace or ‘read’ aspects of the social world through 
them’ (p.106).  
2.3.1 Document collections and analysis  
Document analysis is one of the most common methods in qualitative research 
(Jankowski & Wester, 1991; Mason, 2012; Silverman, 2014). Text-based documents are 
essential historical material for tracing the history of public sector creative industry 
policy development. How does creative industry policy influence broader 
communication and cultural policymaking? What are the characteristics of neoliberalism 
in these processes? Who will benefit from these new policies and who will be left out? 
The process of unearthing and collecting documents may help to reconstruct the historical 
context. The documents provide not only texts, but comprise ‘the meaningful whole’ 
(Larsen, 1991, p.122). Researchers, however, need to dig deeper to uncover a purposeful 
disorder. According to Mason (2002), ‘the excavation metaphor implies the retrieval of 
solid factual information which is naturally occurring’ (p.110). 
In addition, analysing of documentary sources is a dominant method of social research, 
one which many qualitative researchers see as meaningful and appropriate in the context 
of their research strategy (Steinke, 2004; Mason, 2012; Silverman, 2014). Silverman 
points out that ‘the practical merits of written texts are their richness, relevance and effect, 
natural occurrence, and availability’ (2014, p.276). Wolff (2004) alludes to the 
importance of document analysis. ‘As these various materials are accumulated, particular 
phenomena become transparent from many different perspectives’ (Wolff, 2004, p.50). 
Researchers depend on this approach to grasp the unique dynamic that occurs, in every 
qualitative study, between the issue, the research questions, and the methodological plan 
(Steinke, 2004, p.187).   
An exploration of policy documents, official gazettes, government annual reports, 
meetings records, government online archives, and news reports (see Appendix I), 
provides a path through the maze of the creative media industry in Taiwan. Two main 
works are the focus of the document collection and analysis. First, the sampling frame is 
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explained in more detail (see Appendix I. Mainly documents collections, p.243), since it 
represents what kinds of documents were collected, and why certain documents were 
included or excluded in the research. Second, a qualitative content analysis was adopted 
to analyse the documents in connection with the research questions and appropriate 
methodological approach.   
According to Bryman’s Social Research Methods (2012, p.542), there are several 
different kinds of documents: for example, personal documents (diaries, letters, 
autobiographies, and visual objects), official documents deriving from the state, official 
documents deriving from private sources, mass-media outputs, and virtual documents. In 
this research, three main documents – official documents deriving from the state, official 
documents deriving from private sources, and mass-media outputs – were collected. 
Official documents deriving from the state include, for example, the Creative Industries 
Project (CIP) (2002), National Development Plans that support the CIP, and Creative 
Industries Annual Reports (2003-present). On the other hand, official documents 
deriving from private sources include, for example, creative industries conferences 
records, booklets, and pamphlets. Relevant databases were searched using the term 
“creative industries” to collect sources for mass-media outputs (see Appendix I). 
The development of the CIP can be investigated through these official and open data 
sources. Documents reveal that the term ‘creative industry’ is borrowed from British 
policy discourse in the late 1990s, after the New Labour government under Tony Blair 
and the Taiwanese government adopted the term for the first national new economic 
project in 2002.  Additionally, documents- mass media output were found by tracing back 
through news report databases. Initially, the search involved finding any mention of the 
term ‘creative industries’ in the mainstream media. However, new types of data and 
material were uncovered. Many British ‘creative industry’ experts attended several 
international creative industry conferences in Taiwan in the early 2000s, before the 
creative industry policy announcement. The British Council in Taiwan played a 
significant role by recommending that the British creative industry experts come to 
Taiwan before the official creative industry policies were launched. By using the official 
name of the conference as a search term, additional conference records were discovered, 
such as attendance lists, speech topics, and meetings transcripts. These materials provide 
a rich source of early history of the creative industries in Taiwan.  
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Furthermore, four assessment criteria of document collection and analysis are noted by 
Scott (1990): authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. Table 2.1 
illustrates the correspondence between the collected documents and their assessment 
criteria. Generally, official documents from the state and private sources have a higher 
authenticity. Conversely, authenticity is frequently an issue in mass-media outputs (e.g. 
tabloids). 
Table 2.2 the document collection and its assessment criteria 
       Type of 
documents 
Assessment    
criteria 
official documents 
deriving from the 
state 
official 
documents 
deriving from 
private sources 
mass-media 
outputs  
Authenticity  + + It is sometimes 
difficult to 
ascertain in the 
case of mass 
media outputs 
Credibility It raises the issue 
of whether the 
documentary 
source is biased; it 
can be interesting 
precisely because 
of the biases they 
reveal. (p.550) 
+ It is frequently an 
issue, but in fact, it 
is often the 
uncovering of 
error or distortion 
that is the 
objective of the 
analysis. (p.553) 
Representativeness It in a sense 
unique, and it is 
precisely their 
official or quasi-
official character 
that makes them 
interesting in their 
own right.(p.550) 
+ It is not the issue 
here 
Meaning  + + + 
Recourse: reconstructed from Scott’s (1990) and Bryman’s (2012) 
+: reliable quality 
 
Bryman (2012) has explained the limitation of individual documents collection: for 
example, the purpose of governmental documents is sometimes to promote their policy 
achievements. Mass media, then, functions as a form of judge in a politically neutral 
approach. However, these obvious shortcomings are interesting perspectives to extend 
the explanation. In my research, policymaking in the creative industries can be tracked 
through a comparison of these documents. Indeed, a diachronic history of creative 
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industries’ policymaking can be obtained through official annual reports, including years 
of official investigation and tendency. The media outputs, particularly from the databases 
of news and newspaper sources, can help determine when people began using the term 
“creative industries”. Interestingly, for example, I read a short news report in 2000 about 
British creative industries experts who were invited to Taiwan to introduce the new idea 
of “creative industries” at several conferences. From these reports, I obtained several key 
words and extensive background information to search the record of the conferences 
(official documents deriving from private sources) and uncover more information. As 
Bryman (2012, p.551) has explained, “documents cannot be regarded as providing 
objective accounts of a state of affairs. They have to be interrogated and examined in the 
context of other sources of data”. While these documents represent divergent 
interpretations, it is important to note that different groupings of issues and processes 
were compared and analysed in the process. 
It is a useful approach to discovering dominant social and structural dynamics to explain 
the process of policymaking. In my research, most of the documents were administrative 
records, collections of documents containing mainly factual information compiled in a 
variety of ways (Hakim, 1997, p.131). For research on the policy process, documents 
such as creative industries’ policy documents, official gazettes, government annual 
reports, meetings records, and government online archives are part of ‘the reality being 
studied, rather than being regarded as a poor substitute for data that would ideally be 
obtained in other ways’ (Hakim, 1997, p.134). Documents may be subjected to an 
analytical reading, as illustrated by analyses of political ideologies (Hakim, 1997, p.140). 
Data analysis in most qualitative research begins during data collection (Ezzy, 2002, 
p.60). It is consistent with the theoretical position and it emphasises the dialectical 
relationship between theory and data. Ezzy (2002, p.61) also elaborates that researchers 
will have missed many valuable opportunities if the data analysis begins only after the 
data has been collected. This means that we could generate knowledge from documents 
collection and analysis at the same time through critical reading. The process of analysing 
documents is not only ‘to read them’ in a cursory way; the facts will not display 
themselves directly: the process is more like an excavation. Mason (2002) also explains 
that ‘the process of reading, understanding, translating and interpreting documents, 
selecting them, comparing them, and so on adds a further dimension of construction as 
well as reflexivity here’ (p.110). Owen (2014) quotes Caulley’s (1983) argument, which 
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is that ‘the documents cannot exist in a pure form; they are always refracted through the 
mind of the recorder’, particularly ‘the facts we find in documents ‘have been selected 
by the recorder’ (p.10-11). 
Therefore, I was confronted with important decisions as to which documents are more 
important and/or relevant than others as I entered the field to gather documents related to 
creative industries policy. For selecting appropriate documents, Caulley’s general rules 
(1983, p.23) help us to realise that documents differ as to their purpose. For example, we 
can recognise that an official annual report might overemphasise its policy achievement; 
or the records of the official question time between legislators and the cultural sector 
might indirectly disseminate the former’s policymaking thought and debating positions. 
In addition, government or news media produce contradictory and, as with all other 
sources, sometimes self-contradictory – documents. Comparisons between public 
opinion and news reports in mainstream media and government documents were 
interwoven. Throughout this process, the document analysis was geared toward capturing 
ideas and questions about neoliberalised cultural policymaking as new documents 
emerged and understanding changed. I would be faced with several inevitably 
contradictory documents as sources of fundamental data. For example, some media news 
reports and public sector pronouncements might claim success in urban reconstruction 
for new creative industries development via outsourcing; simultaneously, some cultural 
workers might argue the problems of the same urban renewal programme in newspaper 
comments columns. 
Discourse analysis is the main tool for dissecting the issues. Firstly, different documents 
not only represent various aspects of social reality, but are themselves a focus of enquiry 
(Gill, 2000; Bryman, 2012). Indeed, “discourse is a way of constituting a particular view 
of social reality” (Bryman, 2012, p.530). It is important to compare discourses from both 
the state and private sectors, as they tend to reflect the nature of the person/organisation 
responsible for their promoting For these documents, the initial overview document was 
analysed in order to outline the basic context, while more critical reading was employed 
in exploring the higher levels of abstraction involved in identifying the connection 
between creative industries’ policymaking/thought and neoliberalisation. The practices 
of neoliberalised cultural policymaking were embedded in confrontation, contradiction, 
and conflict. Furthermore, some documents may not be always reflecting authentic and 
genuine information. ‘They are embedded in or constitutive of social or cultural relations, 
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rather than revealing facts about them’ (Mason, 2002, p.111). The understanding of 
cultural as much as economic influences in this process of embeddedness provides a 
context for the analysis findings. In particular, many of these are policy documents with 
a double significance: (a) as a record of the views of policy makers and the wider 
discursive environment, (b) as causally consequential in their own right – tools in the 
process of implementing these policies. These examples suggest that the research 
questions and the document collection are dynamically intertwined, and will always 
inspire researchers to excavate the past in various ways. 
2.3.2 Qualitative interviews and interpretation 
Interviews are one of the most commonly used tools for collecting data (Jensen, 1991; 
Mason, 2002; Silverman, 2014). Interviews are a form of interpersonal communication, 
where language is both the tool and the object of analysis (Jensen, 1991, p.32). 
Furthermore, in-depth interviews are frequently employed as elements of an open 
research strategy. The dynamic between the interviewees and the researcher can produce 
more interactions ‘in every construction of textualised and textualizable versions of the 
world which are thus rendered accessible to social science’ (Flick, 2004, p.93; Edwards 
& Holland, 2013). 
Researchers use several interview strategies in qualitative research. Silverman (2014, 
p.166) mentions four types: structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, open-
ended interviews, and focus groups. This study employs semi-structured interviews to 
examine the dynamic process of how different creative labourers’ working conditions are 
related to their identities. For this thesis, the main goal is to recognise the influence of 
creative industry policy on the experience of cultural workers, and how their survival 
mechanisms in the workplace involve conceptual shifts during the neoliberal 
policymaking process.  
The adoption of empirical, interview-based data reflects the researchers’ ontological 
position, as one explores the meaningful properties of social reality from ‘people’s 
knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, experiences, and interactions’ 
(Mason, 2004, p.63). In line with the conventions of semi-structured interviews, I 
prepared a list of questions about cultural workers’ working experience and the 
influences of creative industries policy. These questions were treated as an interview 
  
23 
 
guide, and the interviewees have ‘a great deal of leeway in how to reply’ (Bryman, 2012, 
p.471).  
Qualitative interviewing is more useful than other qualitative methods in this research, 
because “research methods like qualitative interviewing are flexible and are less 
disruptive of the work and personal lives of both researchers and research participants” 
(Bryman, p.465). This method enabled me explore the contextualised dynamic of the 
creative industries’ development (the structure) and cultural workers (agents). Moreover, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted in my research (Wengraf,2000; 2001), 
because “the relatively unstructured nature of the semi-structured interview and its 
capacity to provide insights into how research participants view the world is important 
to researchers” (Bryman, 2012, p.471). 
There are several advantages of qualitative interviewing, including the fact that the 
researcher is able to “see through others’ eyes” during the interview process. With regard 
to this research, the “others” refer to the cultural and creative workers and government 
officials who are embedded in this process. Since a researcher’s prolonged immersion in 
qualitative interviewing makes them “better equipped to see as others see” (Bryman, 
2012, p.494), it is unsurprising that interviewing those who worked on creative projects 
in the public sector provided me with much more detail. Indeed, the cultural workers 
influenced by the CI policy and new funding application experienced far more than what 
is depicted in the annual reports and news reports. Furthermore, the allowance for 
unexpected communication and the flexibility of this interviewing method also help to 
obtain rich and complicated results in the data-collection process (Wengraf,2000; 2001). 
Unexpected topics or issues are commonly uncovered through this form of question and 
answering.   
Sometimes, the list of questions does not accord with interviewees’ answers. However, I 
observed each moment/situation to determine whether the next question should follow 
the original script or veer from the main topic of discussion towards a new sub-topic. 
Such scenarios can provide inside understanding from participants in the events being 
studied. Moreover, they provide evidence about the variety of participants’ perspectives 
on these events, but they do not provide direct access to reliable facts because 
interviewees may colour their comments, e.g. to make themselves look better, or to 
conform to what they think the interviewer wants. The interviewer can try to minimise 
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these distortions by avoiding ‘leading’ the interviewee. Although interviews are not 
100% reliable, when similar themes emerge across several interviews, this generally 
gives us good quality evidence (Bryman, 2012). They may even provide indirect 
evidence and information regarding situational and contextual interactions. Mason (2004) 
believes that qualitative interviewing ‘produces situated knowledge about process and 
experiences “outside” or indeed “inside” it’ (p.64). Researchers have to be flexible and 
sensitive to each specific dynamic. Therefore, the ongoing dialogue between the 
interviewees and the researcher is a highly organic method for capturing, understanding, 
responding, and reacting in different situations. 
The sampling frame  primarily focuses on Taiwanese cultural workers in film and TV 
industries. The main reason for this is because the film and TV industries are key projects 
in the creative industries policies in Taiwan. Moreover, the increase in public funding in 
the film and TV industries is indicative of a new economic project (see Chapter 5-7). 
Additionally, it was important that the interviewees be multi-generational to include the 
younger generation (who have worked in these industries for 3-5 years), the experienced 
cultural workers (who are substantially influenced by the new policy), and the immigrant 
cultural workers (who are going to a bigger market). Interviewing these cultural workers 
revealed the dynamic development of the creative industries in Taiwan. Initially, I knew 
of very few younger cultural workers and independent film makers. However, these few 
introduced me to their friends (i.e. other workers in this field), and I soon had a larger 
pool of interviewees. This phenomenon, in which “initial contact with a small group of 
people” helps find a large number of suitable interviewees “who are relevant to the 
research topic” is known as snowball sampling (Bryman, 2012, p.716). I travelled to 
Taiwan and China to visit all of the interviewees in person. I spent between 1.5 to 2.5 
hours with each of them in face-to-face interviews. The advantage of the face-to-face 
interview is that it is possible to engage with the context of the conversation, have more 
interaction, and build a stronger sense of trust. I believe that the 12 interviewees reflect 
the social reality of cultural workers’ situations and decisions. It could partly explain the 
problems with the neoliberalised CI development. Of those interviewed, two are cultural 
workers from the younger generation (A1 and A2), three are experienced cultural 
workers (B1, B2, and B3), five are migrant cultural workers who work in China (C1-C5), 
and two work in the public sector (D1 and D2). An analysis was conducted on the 
recorded and transcribed interviews. Through several thematic analyses, it was possible 
  
25 
 
to obtain a bigger picture of the development of the creative industries and their influence. 
However, there are different ways to explain these policies and working conditions. The 
diverse data were classified and interpreted carefully with regard to each theme, since 
interview analysis “can take some effort and perseverance to create a smooth flow to the 
text” (Bryman, 2012, p.485). For example, a complaint about the working conditions and 
new subsidy system in the interview data represents the reality of exploitation of cultural 
workers and the problems with outsourcing the public funding system. It is very 
important to listen to the interviewees’ real feelings and situations; In particular, their 
words provide more details about the conception and theories. Also, it verified the 
problem and contradiction within the creative industries’ system. 
 The interviews with persons from diverse backgrounds (cultural public sector, cultural 
workers, artists, artist unions, film and TV workers) are focused on how different agents 
practically premeditate, determine, evaluate and experience creative industry policy (See 
Table 2.3). 
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    Table 2.3 Interviewees and their background  
Code 
number 
Age gender Job title/Background 
A1 30 Female production assistant/  
Media and film degrees, now is a 
freelancer in Taiwan 
 
A2 27 Female  production assistant/ 
Mass media degrees, now is a freelancer 
in Taiwan 
 
B1 51 male independent film director 
B2 46 female independent curator 
B3 52 male independent stage director, artist 
 
C1 48 male production company, founder/ 
ex-national TV station director, now works 
in China 
 
C2 52 male production company, founder/ 
in senior advertising jobs over 15 years in 
Taiwan, now works in China 
 
C3 46 male ex-TV photographer in Taiwan, now a 
freelance photographer in China 
 
C4 32 Female now works in a foreign advertising 
company in China 
 
C5 33 male animator, now works in animation studio 
in China 
 
D1 54 Female Worked in the Council for Cultural Affairs. 
    
D2 43 Female  Now works in ministry of Culture 
 
Interviews with cultural and creative industry project officials, staff members of new 
creative industry corporations, and culture industry workers and activists provided 
alternative perspectives, illuminating the dynamic tension between the agents’ situations 
and neoliberal cultural and media policies. Thus, shifts in the political environment, the 
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economy, society and the conditions of cultural production wrought by neoliberalism are 
critically analysed in the historical and theoretical discourses of the interviews.  
Questions for different interviewees from the public sector, private sector, and culture 
industries had to be specific and clear. For example, when the topic is about the 
neoliberalised media and the influences of cultural policymaking, especially within the 
framework of the Creative Industries Project, some terms were avoided in the interviews, 
such as ‘neoliberalism’. Media and cultural policy in Taiwan has adapted to the neoliberal 
terrain. However, extremely difficult problems are reflected in the increasingly insecure 
and casualised labour market following the privatisation of the original public subsidy 
system. Judging by their choices and experiences, workers have different survival 
mechanisms in the neoliberal terrain. There is much heterogeneity among these 
participants, and researchers have to fully understand their complex lived experience.  
The analysis takes us step by step from raw interview data to clear and convincing 
answers to my research questions. The analysis is based on what my interviewees have 
said. Therefore, the process of finding and labelling the concepts, themes, experiences, 
statements, and examples in my transcripts is partly in response to my research questions 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p.190). I made audio recordings of the interviews. After each 
interview, a detailed memorandum would be recorded on the same day, and typed-up 
transcripts produced as soon as possible. The interviewees’ stories and their individual 
experiences were recorded into pages of transcripts. DeVault and McCoy (2012) explain 
that researchers look at interview data as raising questions first. Then, the analysis 
involves moving back and forth between collected speech and the contexts. 
Furthermore, Rubin and Rubin (2012) provide more specific steps for analysing 
interview data (p.190). The first step is to transcribe and summarise each interview. It is 
quicker to capture more detailed information via reading transcripts. The written versions 
demonstrate that the original recordings could be more reliable and accurate than my own 
selective memories. The results might be biased without a written record. In addition, the 
memo files and notes and the summarised content assist us in ‘comparing what was said 
across interviews’ (p.192-193). Second, ‘finding and labelling the themes, examples, and 
concepts’ can help us to focus more on the differences and similarities in these 
interviewees, such as the main complaints from cultural workers, their individual 
experiences and opinions, working hours and working conditions, and job satisfaction. 
  
28 
 
‘Sometimes the interviewees don’t actually name the concept; they just describe its 
characteristics’ (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p.194). For example, some interviewees mention 
the importance of competitiveness, higher growth, and bigger corporate profits. Some 
argue about the unfairness of public subsidies. 
Therefore, we can understand that these cultural workers are facing different neoliberal 
plights via overlapping or contradictory trails. The concepts and themes are basically 
suggested by the literature. However, Rubin and Rubin (2012) remind us that researchers 
must be careful not to rely too heavily on literature as a major source (p.197). Sometimes, 
concepts and themes also emerge as you try to puzzle out line by line the meaning of 
what interviewees are saying (p.199).  
There is a connection. After I summarised the content of each file, the next stages are 
sorting the material within each file and comparing results. Then, weighing and 
combining the crystallised material are almost the final process in putting together an 
overall picture. Sometimes, interviewees overlap or report different things. Researchers 
must decide how to combine them. In addition, it is possible that one is a better witness 
than the other, therefore, we decide to rely more heavily on that witness’s report (Rubin 
& Rubin, 2012, p.206). These findings were crystallised while I completed my analysis 
and engaged neoliberalism to explain different cultural workers’ situations and the 
problems of neoliberalised policymaking. My theoretical position could explain what 
happened in the case that I have studied; it describes what caused what and what 
mechanisms were in play. However, for generalising my theoretical findings, we have 
also to examine the literature to see if the theory we worked out appears to hold in the 
settings and circumstances described by other authors(Wengraf,2000, 2001; Edwards & 
Holland, 2013). 
2.4 Ethical issues 
‘Research ethics’ in the social sciences are concerned with the relationship between the 
researcher and the subjects involved in sociological research. Generally speaking, ethical 
issues broadly include regulating the collection, storage, transmission and publication of 
sociological data, in alignment with core principles (Hopf, 2004, p.334).  
An examination of ethical issues in this study will focus particular attention on qualitative 
methods, such as interviews and document analysis, as well as the use of the critical 
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political economy approach. Ethical issues are fundamental in social science research. In 
particular, it reveals the relationship between people and society. According to Gabb 
(2010), researchers have to ‘manage multiple accounts of self and different perspectives 
on shared relationships’ while they analyse these materials (p.462). 
In interviews, a trusting research relationship is paramount (Gabb, 2010, p.468). 
Although interviewees were anonymous in this study, their statements and arguments 
may reveal their identities to the outside world (Gabb, 2010, p.468).  
Loughborough University’s Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee 
(HPSC) considers ethical issues relating to the University's research, enterprise and 
teaching activities. It produces guidance for staff looking to use human participants in 
studies, and assesses proposals for such research to ensure they meet the required ethical 
standards (HPSC, n.d., para. 1-4). Its ethical clearance checklist highlights several issues, 
including participant authority, researcher safety, methodology and procedures, 
observation and recording, informed consent, and the storage and confidentiality of data. 
Qualitative research involves essential ethical questions related to integrity and principle, 
such as ‘the question of how voluntary was participation in the investigations, the 
question of guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality, or the question of the 
admissibility of undercover forms of observation’ (Hopf, 2004, p.334). 
After obtaining ethics committee approval, ethical principles and guidelines were 
followed, including the avoidance of exploitation and misrepresentation, informing 
participants about the details of the project, making discussions anonymous, ensuring the 
participants’ right of withdrawal, and securing and destroying personal details. For 
example, interviewees were informed of their right to withdraw at any time before each 
interview. In addition, Diener and Crandall (1978, p.215-217) provide useful ethical 
guidelines for social science researchers. For example, researchers are required to 
‘protect the rights and interests of the less powerful participants’ (p.216). Cultural 
workers were assured that their responses were collective and anonymous, giving them 
freedom to express themselves. In addition, in cases where personal data was collected, 
researchers provided guarantees that all data was used for research purposes only, and 
was completely anonymous and secure. Unauthorised persons were not allowed to access 
this data. On completion of the study, data will be destroyed (Lüders, 2004).  
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Iphofen (2011) offers a reminder to researchers that they ‘should never think that once 
the box has been ticked or an adequate response to a reviewer’s challenge offered that 
their ethical decision making is over’ (p.445). The critical political economy approach 
encourages researchers to balance ethical guidelines for individual interviewees with the 
democratic public interest in media and culture policymaking. For example, if 
participants provide useful evidence and then decide to withdraw from the interview, and 
their responses were important for unearthing some key historical moment that supports 
a theoretical concept, what is the researcher allowed to do? The interviewee should be 
persuaded first. If this approach is not successful, alternative materials and interviewees 
need to be explored.  
2.5 Reflections on the research process 
Reflective practice is a dynamic process. It is not only a deliberate process of thinking 
about the methods, but also leads to insight and subsequent changes in practice. Research 
becomes stagnant without active reflection. Mason (2002) suggests that research cannot 
be a ‘one-case-fits-all’ blueprint. Strategic thinking and reflection must continue 
throughout the whole research process. Therefore, reflection is a critical component of 
professional practice. Below is a discussion of the problems faced and the experiences 
acquired during research.  
The main topic of this study is the effects of neoliberalised media and cultural 
policymaking in Taiwan.  According to the data from interviews (see Chapter 9), we 
could demonstrate that some cultural labourers suffered extreme anxiety and bad working 
conditions as a result of neoliberalism. Correspondingly, some cultural workers have 
attractive salaries and ‘good’ jobs within the same system. They believe that everyone 
was supposed to be an entrepreneur, retraining and repackaging themselves in a dynamic 
economy in the neoliberal fantasy of individualism (Mishra, 2015). It is sufficient to 
explain the dynamic process of the neoliberal market and the contradictory trumpeting 
of individualism. A reflection on the diversity of creative workers and the successes of 
neoliberal reform helps to explain the neoliberal ‘common sense’ regarding practices that 
are rooted not only in mainstream media systems, but also in the daily life of Taiwan. 
Neoliberalism has been hegemonic, and cultural workers can find themselves acting out 
contradictory impulses. More potential data sources will become available to qualitative 
researchers, while they ‘learn from each other and reflect on their own actions’. This is 
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‘essential for increasing the openness required for overcoming dogmatism’ (Fernando 
Peñaranda Correa, 2012, p.214). Banks (2017) also explains the purpose of critical social 
science and this could help us reflect the relationship between researchers, their 
judgement, and the process.  
we not only need to describe cultural objects and work but try to evaluate them 
– since the purpose of critical social science is not merely to provide a positive 
account but a normative one, also. Our research needs to contain evaluation and 
judgement in order to be effective as critique; that is, to be able to say why some 
things are better or worse than others, or indeed to argue for any kind of value 
position. (Banks, 2017, p.148) 
Researchers are to be commended when they crystallise these various materials and 
analyses while their critical reflection remains open minded and switched on. Therefore, 
the literature and data sources can be integrated during ‘dialogical and critical reflection 
on the values of practice from a practical philosophy perspective’ (Fernando Peñaranda 
Correa, 2012, p.214). In conclusion, reflective practices and the evaluation of research 
can work together and complement one another, to the benefit of the social sciences and 
the sphere of media and cultural policymaking. Finally, Alexievich’s interview in The 
Guardian that depicts qualitative researchers as portraits of real individuals, is relevant. 
‘Reality has always attracted me like a magnet, it tortured and hypnotised me, I 
wanted to capture it on paper. So I immediately appropriated this genre of actual 
human voices and confessions, witness evidences and documents. This is how 
I hear and see the world – as a chorus of individual voices and a collage of 
everyday details. This is how my eye and ear function. In this way all my mental 
and emotional potential is realised to the full. In this way I can be 
simultaneously a writer, reporter, sociologist, psychologist and preacher.’ 
(Svetlana Alexievich, who won the 2015 Nobel Prize for Literature) 
 
I claim that the success and limitations of my overall approach and chosen methods in 
the following paragraphs. Despite an evolving research programme, the main claims 
made for neoliberal impacts in cultural policymaking are supported by the materials, 
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analysis and studies gathered in this thesis. Like any carefully prepared research, its 
limitations are forthrightly presented.  
In my field research, I have designed in-depth qualitative interviews and documentary 
research. Firstly, the interviews with persons from diverse backgrounds (cultural public 
sector, creative business, independent artists, artist union, film and TV workers) have 
focused on how different agents practically prefigure, determine, evaluate and experience 
the creative industries policy. In addition, documentary work – on official annual reports, 
governmental meeting records, official data, and news reports – brings opportunities for 
wide analysis in historical context.  
The transcripts of the in-depth qualitative interviews and documentary research are the 
main resource that gave me an empirical basis on which to develop the interpretations 
and to understand them in the global neoliberal context. The interviews provided 
alternative perspectives and illuminated the dynamic tension between the agents’ 
situations and the neoliberalisation of cultural and media policies. As Murdock (2003) 
appeals that we researchers have to analyse the cultural production dynamic. 
Exploring the relationships between shifts in the array of available cultural 
forms, altered conditions of cultural production, and the reorganization of 
cultural careers, presents cultural analysis with its most testing challenge but 
also its best chance to construct a more comprehensive account of the changing 
relations between occupational biographies and cultural histories, creative 
practices and economic dynamics (p.35). 
Thus, the changes in politics, the economy, society and cultural production conditions 
wrought by neoliberalism have been critically analysed in the historical and theoretical 
discourses.  
Interviews with each of these types serve different purposes. For example, the interviews 
with cultural sector officials concentrated on the policy design for the adoption of the 
British model and the balance between industrialisation and democratisation in cultural 
value. The interviews with staff members of the new creative industries corporations 
founded from 2002 to 2012 were focused on their views of cultural businesses and the 
relationship among the government cultural sector, new creative industries corporations 
and earlier cultural industry workers and artists (especially those who once had 
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government subsidies but now must propose projects to companies which hold the 
creative industries funds). The interviews with cultural industry labourers, defined 
broadly, explored their opinions about their working conditions (e.g. neoliberalised self-
exploitation). Finally, the interviews of activists opposed to the commercialisation of 
cultural and media policy helps in understanding their complicated, sometimes 
contradictory intentions. The analysis of these different interviews reveals the dynamics 
of the agents’ cultural practices and values, which might sometimes oppose each other 
and sometimes temporarily collaborate. 
One limitation was that my fieldwork focussed on cultural workers from a limited range 
of cultural activity, including film and TV workers and people from the artists’ union. 
However, there are different cultural workers in other creative industries in Taiwan. For 
example, fashion designers, traditional craft workers and architects were not on my 
interview list. The choices I made during the research process were also following the 
analysed collection of second-hand materials such as news reports and governmental 
annual reports. These data show that creative industries project spent more funding on 
films and mass media industries (see Chapter 6) and building creative industries parks 
(see Chapter 7) in the early period. Therefore, the limitations could present potential for 
post-doctoral work to discover different creative labourers’ working conditions and the 
impact of these policies on them.  
This method chapter is important in encouraging me to consider the whole structure of 
my thesis; from the main topic to sub-issues, from the adoption of methods and theories 
to reflections on the research process. Therefore, it could be said that the writing process 
of this chapter is a process of reflection. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000, p.245) explain 
the meaning of the process: ‘Reflection means thinking about the conditions for what one 
is doing, investigating the way in which the theoretical, cultural and political context of 
individual and intellectual involvement affects interaction with whatever is being 
researched, often in ways difficult to become conscious of’.  
2.6 Conclusion  
This research deploys two main methods to investigate neoliberalised cultural 
policymaking and the development of creative industries in Taiwan. These methods 
include interviewing and document methods. In this chapter I explain why and how I 
adopt these methods in my study as well as their limitations. Finally, I explicate research 
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ethics involved in this project. Through examining how these research methods are used 
collectively to counteract their individual limitations, this thesis provides methodological 
value for researching the processes of neoliberal cultural policy and practices of cultural 
workers in Taiwan’s cultural landscape. 
This chapter discusses two main research methods utilised in this study: interview and 
document research. The application of the two research methods designed for this 
research will allow me to produce a clear map of the neoliberal reform of cultural 
policymaking in Taiwan. As Figure 2.1 shows, the interview method is used in Chapter 
7 and Chapter 8 to obtain details of practice from cultural workers. Document research 
is used in the historical background and context discussed in each chapter. In other words, 
this research adopts mixed-methods constituting a more holistic research approach. 
Through explaining what these four research methods collectively contribute to this 
research and how they supplement one another, this mixed-methods makes the position 
of my research framework clear. 
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3                                                                                                             
What is neoliberalism and why does it matter? 
 
The focus is upon the cultural features of neoliberal civilisation, that is, the dominant 
civilisation currently around the whole world. Neoliberal civilisation is the latest phase 
of capitalism’s global hegemony. (McGuigan, 2015, p.1) 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter tracks the historical development of neoliberalism and its rise to global 
hegemony since the 1970s. It is vital to explore the concept of neoliberalism at this 
moment of development. However, the term frequently refers to too many heterogeneous 
or contradictory policy dynamics, and it is sometimes alleged to be useless (Davies, 
2016). To avoid becoming an intellectual cliché, neoliberalism is dissected using a 
critical political economic approach in this chapter in order to analyse its controversial 
meaning. The following sections focus on four main areas that form the main crux of my 
research: (1) the definition of neoliberalism; (2) neoliberalism and its history; (3) 
neoliberalism and public services; (4) neoliberalised language usage and the neoliberal-
self. The chapter provides a definition, introduces the main historical process, and 
outlines the key problems of deregulation, privatisation, and outsourcing in public 
services. Finally, we explore the usage of neoliberalised language and the formation 
process of the neoliberal-self which defined the contours of the new age. The political-
economic basis and effects of neoliberal reform on public policymaking are briefly 
portrayed here and the next chapter is mainly focused on the following issues: how has 
culture and communication policymaking changed through the processes of 
neoliberalism?  
After the definition of neoliberalism, three main periods of this history are described in 
the second section. The origin of the politics and economics of neoliberalism and the 
difference between Keynesianism and Monetarism in the era of welfare capitalism are 
briefly illustrated. Then, neoliberal policies adopted to legislate into effect a new political 
settlement during the 1980s are discussed. Thatcherism and Reaganism were the first 
specific neoliberal practices on both sides of the Atlantic. Then, starting in the 1990s, 
new political discourses were fully articulated by Blair; New Labour and Cameronism. 
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Furthermore, the embrace of individualism and apparent disdain for the collective were 
growing. Neoliberal transformation of public services and the welfare system are 
depicted in the third section. Finally, the fourth section examines the neoliberal characters 
of the creative industries in neoliberal capitalism.  
3.2 Defining neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is an economic doctrine and a series of political practices. Neoliberal 
economists, wealthy elites and neoliberal politicians act with premeditated intent to build 
a neoliberal society. Under this historical dynamic of neoliberalism, people have adapted 
to the neoliberal terrain progressively, advocating for neoliberal governance such as 
austerity-driven economic policy, tax cuts, the privatisation of public services and 
liberalisation and deregulation policies; elevating neoliberal values such as extreme 
individualism, competitive self-interest, ‘sole responsibility for the consequences of 
choices made’ (McGuigan, 2016, p.27) and ‘freedom-seeking selfhood’ (McGuigan, 
2016, p.27) over the socialist ideals of collectivism, community and common good 
(O'Hagan, 2013). The young generation, especially, which has grown up more 
individualistic and less supportive of state institutions than their forebears (a social-
democratic generation), is imperceptibly accustomed to accepting neoliberal customs 
such as free-market fetishism, competition and self-improvement. McGuigan (2016) also 
argues that people are now fully immersed in neoliberal socialisation.  
A great many younger people today are compelled to make agonistic choices on 
which way to go at nodal points on their life-course trajectory, since the 
traditional pathways trodden by older generations along life’s way have been 
eroded. (Mcguigan, 2016, p.27) 
This perspective demonstrates the dynamic complexity of neoliberal hegemony. Gramsci 
raised the production of hegemony and was concerned with rethinking political strategy 
in the Prison Notebooks (1948). ‘The production of hegemony is an ongoing process that 
often requires the remaking or fixing of “common sense” around particular issues’ 
(Burron, 2011, p.1665). The discourse of neoliberalism rather than neoliberalism per se 
is meant to conjure up a naturalised system of ‘no alternative’. This neoliberal logic could 
be defined as today’s hegemonic common sense. Gramsci’s hegemony provided a 
dynamic approach for analysing economistic and political forms of particular historical 
conjunctures, for example ‘the popular legitimisation of neoliberal capitalism even 
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amongst those who are disadvantaged by such an exploitative and unequal set-up’ 
(McGuigan, 2016, p.35).  
McGuigan (2016, p.34) believes that neoliberalism ‘is also obtained – and yet more 
significantly – at the popular level by the seductive symbols and experiences of everyday 
life, which are capable of absorbing ostensibly rebellious or non-conformist sentiments’. 
A neoliberal shift of that magnitude has been achieved in ‘a sufficiently large spectrum 
of the population to win elections’ (Harvey, 2005, p.39). This is what Harvey calls 
‘common sense’.  
Common sense is constructed out of longstanding practices of cultural 
socialization often rooted deep in regional or national traditions. It is not the 
same as the ‘good sense’ that can be constructed out of critical engagement with 
the issues of the day. Common sense can, therefore, be profoundly misleading, 
obfuscating or disguising real problems under cultural prejudices (Harvey 2005, 
p. 39).  
Furthermore, neoliberal elites nowadays occupy important positions in many institutions 
such as education system, the mass media, international financial Institutions and public 
sectors. For example, many famous think-tanks (e.g. the Heritage Foundation and the 
Hoover Institute) and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are not only deeply 
influenced by neoliberal thought but also regulate global finance and trade. Harvey (2005) 
explains the neoliberalised process of our common sense understanding.  
Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse. It has 
pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become 
incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and 
understand the world (Harvey, 2005, p.3). 
These feelings (such as belief in individual freedom and free market) and stereotypes 
(such as those manifested around immigrants and ‘others’) can be mobilised to mask 
other realities. Harvey (2005) believes that ‘political slogans can be invoked that mask 
specific strategies beneath vague rhetorical devices’.  
First, neoliberals claim that limiting the capability of government (through measures such 
as deregulation and minimised public services) contributes to increased freedom and 
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effectiveness of the market. Ostensibly, they strongly oppose theories of government 
intervention and advocate a global free market, but the policy for a global free market in 
goods, services and capital has to be implemented by calling on the government to 
intervene. Paradoxically, there are contradictions between the neoliberal doctrine and its 
practices:  
The neoliberal order fosters a globalisation linked to a new ‘financial 
imperialism’ for which London has been a major site of ‘invention and 
dissemination’ and which is driven by a planetary search for new assets. 
Privatization, land speculation and spiralling markets in commodity futures all 
fuel the new circuits (to which, most recently, the UK government has added 
the ‘liberation’ of pension funds). (Blackburn, 2014, p.93) 
The public sector still has to formulate policies for the austerity measures, deregulation, 
tax reductions and privatisation of public services that neoliberals advocate. This means 
that ‘government intervention’ still plays a role in neoliberal policymaking, just in a 
different way than in the social-democratic era. Advocates of the welfare state pledged a 
more regulated market, support for public safety services and an emphasis on social 
democracy; from the end of the 1970s, the neoliberal government encouraged more open 
markets, a crackdown on welfare spending and the selling of an ideology of competitive 
self-interest and extreme individualism that relies entirely on the individual’s efforts, 
talents and responsibility. For example, protecting the capital of multinationals and 
private equity firms in the financial crisis of 2007-08 was a top priority, and there was 
less assistance for ordinary citizens. It could be said that the claim of ‘a better small 
government’ is camouflage for the neoliberal programme: ‘a smaller government is better 
for the wealthy elites but not for the peoples’ (Mathiason, 2008). The second myth is that 
the natural mechanisms of the free market are ‘the God-given right to make profits and 
amass personal wealth’ (Hall, 2011), and the state must never interfere with financial 
independence and freedom of choice for individuals. However, the deregulation initiative 
creates serious inequality that was hidden in neoliberal common-sense. The final myth is 
that everyone would benefit from the fruits of a globalised economy. Murdock and 
Golding (2002) argue that the global mass media and tele-communication system have 
become ‘vehicles for the promotion and marketing of branded goods, and of the 
communication services themselves, as they become rapidly incorporated into the 
ownership of major communication multinationals’ (2002, p.112). McGuigan (2016, p.4) 
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also elaborates that the new global landscape of coolness is ‘exemplary of global 
exploitation with a cool façade’, such as the Apple Corporation. Highly skilled workers 
might benefit from the game rules, but that does not eliminate the more lower-skilled 
jobs in the global labour market. Furthermore, not only are sweat shop workers in non-
Western countries (e.g. India) and immigrants in developed countries (e.g. Western 
Europe) in working conditions of long hours and low starting pay, but many graduates 
are being forced to take on lower-skilled jobs or do voluntary work in the face of fierce 
competition (Curtis, 2009; Carey, 2015). Neoliberal ideology and individualism have 
gradually changed the meaning of exploitation and helped to consolidate the policies of 
flexible labour markets that had already been implemented in prior decades. For example, 
people welcome cheaper products because we do not necessarily experience/witness the 
suffering of the workers. Then, our everyday experiences shaped by neoliberal ideology, 
such as going freelance in creative economy, belonging to a ‘creative class’, and 
elevating the virtues of endurance for low pay or even no pay, are naturalised. From the 
outset of Harvey’s work describing ‘neoliberalism as creative destruction’ (2007), the 
author illustrated that:  
Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices proposing that human 
well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial 
freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property 
rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade (p.22). 
It could be said that more low-priced products ostensibly benefit all of us (consumers), 
but they also create more cheap jobs, which ultimately increases inequality and alienation. 
In the global context, an uneven geographical development between different countries 
occurred in different periods: from West to East and from capitalism to communism in, 
for example, Chile, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China and India. It is not difficult 
to see the ‘extraordinary concentrations of wealth and power emerging all over the place’ 
(Harvey, 2005a, p.17) through neoliberal means. The neoliberal hegemony is not 
immutable when it comes to the historical dynamic, even though it is portrayed as the 
antidote to ‘rescue capitalism from its own contradictions’ in several crises.  
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3.3 Neoliberalism and it history  
In this section, the historical emergence and development of neoliberalism is traced in 
order to illustrate the relationship of the state, the market, and society. Neoliberalism is 
not only a doctrine but also a political economic practice, and has even become popularly 
viewed as a matter of common sense. Accordingly, the complicated, dynamic, and 
contradictory synthesis of neoliberalism is analysed. The consequences of neoliberalism, 
including inequality, changes in the public sector, labour conditions, the ruin of social 
democracy, and neoliberal culture, are explored. 
The neoliberalised shift in capitalism from the post-war period through to the 
contemporary period will be outlined, particularly focusing on the pivotal historical 
events and political practices. Three stages of the neoliberalised process are: (1) the 
historical emergence of neoliberalism; (2) an unequivocal neoliberal political climate 
since the 1980s; (3) forming the coalition network of neoliberalism.  
3.3.1 The historical emergence of neoliberalism 
In the early 20th century, the development of liberal capitalism stalled in the capitalist 
plight of periodic downturns, which ushered widespread economic dissatisfaction as well 
as the labour movement. The belief in alternatives – socialism/communism – which 
provided a better answer for creating a more equitable utopia and interrogated the 
characteristic increasing inequalities of the capitalist system, was on the rise. Harvey 
(2007) calls this stage ‘embedded liberalism’, which ‘signals how market processes and 
entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and political 
constraints and a regulatory environment’ (p.11). 
The Wall Street Crash of 1929 inspired a resistance to capitalism during the period of the 
Great Depression, which contributed to policies of state intervention – Keynesian 
policies, including economic planning, employment assistance, and public services. The 
widespread mistrust of capitalism, then, set in motion the development of the social 
democratic welfare system. In addition, capitalists lost a great deal of their capital during 
the war period, thus demonstrating, for the first time, a 20th- century reduction in wealth 
inequality (Piketty, 2014). Several factors contributed to the post-war consensus, 
including Keynesian policymaking, the social-democratic capitalist system and the 
welfare state. This seems to have balanced the contradictions between the capitalists and 
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the working class after the post-war period. However, with the crisis of capital 
accumulation in the 1970s, the multinationals and capitalists demanded an increased 
operation in the foreign, free-market hinterland, free from regulation and domestic wage 
increases. 
Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) also recognised that ‘achieving economic growth and 
improvements in the standard of life and human welfare required some form of central 
management (p.109)’ by using ‘regulation, planning, state ownership, industrial policy, 
and Keynesian fiscal management (p.109)’ as tools during the period. Keynesians 
supported the idea that the expansion of government spending could provide the solution 
to the recession. Moreover, this spending facilitated the high-growth years of the 1950s 
and 1960s, which solidified ‘the social compact between capital and labour’ in the United 
States and Western Europe (Harvey, 2005a, p.11). A principal shift of governances, 
which used Keynesianism as the foremost solution to the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
formed the basis of the contemporary welfare state. To some extent, the state has played 
a positive role in the capitalist system by adjusting market functions and improving the 
social wage. 
Friedrich Hayek, the Austrian political philosopher, founded the Mont Pelerin Society in 
1947 to spread the doctrine of neoliberalism. This group was being lavishly funded from 
a network of lobbyists (Klein, 2007; Jones, 2012). Hayek was popular with those 
politicians, entrepreneurs, financiers and people who were pro-market and anti-
government intervention. Jones (2012) points out that ‘the neoliberal movement grew out 
of such tensions in the post-war period in the United States’ (p.63). 
The Mont Pelerin Society thinkers were among the first to promote the emerging 
dominance of neoliberalism in the west. It included famous members such as Karl Popper 
(an Austrian-British philosopher), Ludwig von Mises (an Austrian-American theoretical 
Austrian School economist) and Milton Friedman (an American economist who strongly 
believed in free-market capitalism). Jones (2012) claims that ‘the market was only one 
of several aims for the open society’ and he believes that ‘in a way one has to have a free 
market, but to make a godhead out of the principle of the free market is nonsense’ (p.40). 
Popper’s celebrated book The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) opposes the approach 
of historical materialism.  
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Historical inevitability was not simply wrong, it also raised a practical problem: 
it eradicated the incentive to behave responsibly. Popper is a defender of 
individual choice and freedom. He criticised Plato, Hegel, and Marx’s historical 
approach which is reasoned hypothesis through the scientific claims of 
dialectics and historical materialism. People-individuals-must take 
responsibility for making decisions in their own lives. These decisions must not 
be left to leaders, politicians, or bureaucrats. (p.47)  
Thus, for Popper, ‘it is the potential for totalitarian tendencies in the utopian projects of 
many of those on the left that make them unacceptable and dangerous’ (Jones, 2012, 
p.62). Mises’s Bureaucracy (1944) argues that the role of ‘government ought to be small, 
with as much left in private hands as possible’ (Jones, 2012, p.52). He believes that ‘the 
incentive structure of bureaucratic administration and organisation tend to produce 
twisted results, especially through the Roosevelt administration and the New Deal’ (p.51). 
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) has more lasting political impact than Mises’s 
Bureaucracy (1944) and Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945). Hayek 
worried about the drift of Western policy toward collectivism. For Hayek, inequality of 
outcome is not the main issue because everyone has equal access to the market. Hayek 
has argued that different individuals had different capacities, which would be valued 
differently in the marketplace.  
People who lost out can use their own initiative to find new opportunity to 
success via social mobility. According to Hayek, collective endeavours had to 
be kept to a minimum so that there would be no danger of subjugating the 
individual and her various desires and values (Jones, 2012, p.64).  
The Road to Serfdom had already gained great success in the 1940s. The power of the 
big companies and business elites and radical conservatives had railed against the idea 
that the government should intervene in the economy; DuPont Chemicals, Morgan Bank, 
GM and other corporations orchestrated a backlash against Roosevelt’s New Deal. 
Hayek’s radical liberal theory was ideologically, politically, and academically left out of 
the mainstream discourse until the 1970s crisis. However, neoliberal doctrine was 
disseminated from several important centres, including the Mont Pelerine Society and 
Chicago School of Economics. Friedman and other Chicago economists developed 
neoliberalism under Hayek’s influence.  
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Starting in 1947, the Mont Pelerine Society’s key founders, among them Hayek, invited 
like-minded scholars from various fields – including economists, historians and 
philosophers – to question the crisis of liberalism and how at that time extensions of 
arbitrary power (from governments or from socialism/communism) progressively 
undermined the individual’s freedom. The Society argued for a free society based on the 
principles and practices of free market-oriented economic systems. Similarly, the 
Chicago School of Economics, founded in the 1950s, advanced neoliberal economic 
thought. This school nurtured many neoliberal talents such as the Chicago Boys of Chile, 
who received funding from foundations (e.g. Rockefeller Foundation) (Klein, 2008). 
Mont Pelerine Society’s website states that its members ‘include high government 
officials, Nobel prize recipients, journalists, and economic and financial experts’. To be 
more specific, during that period, they had already developed their bases – the Chicago 
School of Economics (1946-), the Mont Pelerin Society (1947-), the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (1955-), and the Heritage Foundation (1973-), which were subsidised 
by transatlantic business funders and entrepreneurs (Harvey, 2005a; Klein, 2008). 
Politicians work hand-in-glove with firms to disseminate monetarism. For example, IEA 
has accepted funding from British American Tobacco since 1963. The libertarian right 
wing think-tanks (e.g. IEA and ASI) are crucial players in the development of public 
policy (Doward, 2013). The key backers of neoliberalism are not only a political-
economic doctrine but also a means to restore class power; maximising capital 
accumulation requires the eradication of even the smallest obstruction to the free market. 
(Hall, 1983, 1989, 2011; Harvey, 2005, 2007, 2009; Gamble, 2001; Klein, 2008; 
Touraine, 2001). 
In that latency period, many think-tanks were founded in the US and the UK, the most 
famous of which are the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institute, the Center for the 
Study of American Business, and the American Enterprise Institute (Harvey, 2005, p.44). 
These think-tanks smoothly accelerated the ideology by subsidising students from third-
world countries, studied their knowledge system and then brought that ideology back to 
their home countries and ‘reformed’ it, as evidenced by ‘the Chile Project’ and its disaster 
(Harvey, 2005a; Klein, 2008; Jones, 2012).  
The 1973 Chilean coup d'état overthrew the socialist government of Salvador Allende 
after a programme of massive nationalisations, which was paid for dearly in the 
government’s violent downfall through General Pinochet’s bloody coup. The subsequent 
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implementation of free-market reforms transformed the Chilean economic system. Chile 
was presented as the first neoliberal country – with some defects – undergoing a complete 
transformation with the neoliberal implementation of the ‘shock therapy’ of rapid 
privatisation. There was a strong statement from neoliberals that the free market is a 
rough equivalent of the value of democracy; people can finally enjoy economic freedom 
and develop entrepreneurship. For example, ‘Mises’s conception of consumption as a 
fundamentally democratic act and the marketplace as a forum for expression’ was a 
hugely impactful idea (Jones, 2012, p.83). Even Friedman ‘constructed a radical 
individualism that saw the marketplace as the breeding ground of democratic and human 
rights’ (Jones, 2012, p.113).  
Friedman, for example, was eulogised as a pivotal reformist who ‘saw a direct, explicit, 
and unabashed connection between capitalism and democracy’ (Yergin & Stanislaw, 
1998, p.130). The authors assert that ‘free markets produced the best results, and 
economic freedom rested, in turn, on political liberty’ (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998, p.130). 
However, free markets do not bring well-being to all.  
Under Pinochet’s despotism and Friedman’s neoliberal dogma – privatisation of state 
enterprises, financial deregulation, reduction of public budgets, and liberalisation of 
foreign direct investment – Chile became ‘the first neoliberal laboratory’ in the world, 
supported at length by the US government in different ways (Harvey, 2005a; Klein, 2008). 
Less obvious are the roles of the World Bank and the IMF in the wave of democratisation, 
which have colluded in the profit of the US and, through the power of international 
consortia, have forced third-world countries to adopt neoliberal policies via 
euphemistically termed ‘freedom and democracy’. In 1980s, the IMF and World Bank 
follow ‘free market fundamentalism’ while the Keynesian influences were descaled 
(Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2008). Harvey (2005) says that the IMF and World Bank became 
the centre of neoliberal orthodoxy. Developing countries were encouraged to borrow 
through the IMF and World Bank; however, ‘in return for debt rescheduling, indebted 
countries were required to implement institutional reforms, such as cuts in welfare 
expenditures, more flexible labour market laws, and privatization’ (Harvey, 2005, p.29). 
For example, IMF and neoliberal economists played an important role during the 
Pinochet period in 1975. Harvey (2005) explains that the IMF and the neoliberals 
restructured Chile’s economy according to neoliberal doctrine. They ‘reversed the 
nationalizations and privatized public assets, opened up natural resources to private and 
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unregulated exploitation, privatized social security, and facilitated foreign direct 
investment and freer trade’ (p.8). Ironically, the slogan on the World Bank website is to 
‘end extreme poverty within a generation and boost shared prosperity’. In fact, there is a 
growing gap between the rich and the poor. In addition, resources are concentrated in the 
hands of a few, mostly the heads of a few international corporations and the local ruling 
groups. 
At the same time, the Keynesian welfare system was embroiled in a difficult situation 
during the 1970s because of the international situation (the Arab-Israeli conflict and its 
result, the oil embargo) and the domestic economy on both sides of the Atlantic, 
especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, as, the speed of capital accumulation stagnated. 
The problems of the oil crises, and the economic stagflation that followed, resulted in the 
US and UK governments throughout this period bolstering the Keynesian policy of 
increasing public infrastructure budget for full employment and to curb prices, thereby 
stopping serious inflation on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, the economic 
slowdown continued to exacerbate, although, in the beginning, neither the left nor the 
right could believe that neoliberalism – a backtracking to 19th-century liberalism and the 
laissez-faire policy – would be accepted as the next stage (Gamble, 2001, p.129). 
However, this substantial shift, as neoliberalism became accepted as the selected 
‘antidote’, had not suddenly appeared in the context of the 1970s, but had existed latently 
for a long time. For example, the Mont Pelerin Society was established in 1947 and had 
been producing neoliberal discourses before the 1970s. 
Potentially, these think-tanks, schools and capitalists combined into a new power for 
intervening in South American and African countries, laying down a doctrine, 
communicating the ideology to the audiences and lobbying policymaking. In the 1970s, 
a chaotic time, Harvey (2005) believes that the neoliberal doctrine was moving to centre 
stage, such as in the Chicago School of Economics in the US (1950s-) and the Institute 
for Economic Affairs (IEA, 1955-). The most obvious example was that the 
representatives of the neoliberal faction, Hayek and Friedman, separately won the Nobel 
Prize in 1974 and 1976, indicating that neoliberalism had broadly become an acceptable 
doctrine. Concurrently, this model was being practiced in Chile under Pinochet’s 
autocracy, supported by the Chicago Boys and their mentor, Friedman. This showed ‘the 
substantial results’ of neoliberalism in enhancing the country’s economic development, 
particularly through the rapid accumulation of capital in the hands of the few ruling elites 
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and foreign companies, while the rights of the majority of Chile’s citizens were 
completely sacrificed (Klein, 2008). 
The Keynesian model gradually collapsed. Consequently, neoliberals’ primary measures 
to protect freedom ‘threatened by the spread of creeds’ were to develop the political 
economic doctrine of laissez-faire principles and to produce methods for re-establishing 
the neoliberal rule of law and order. ‘Powerful backers’ subsidised these neoliberal 
societies and established more related think-tanks to defend their freedom and the profits 
of the private consortiums (Monbiot, 2007). 
3.3.2 An unequivocal neoliberal political climate since the 1980s  
The previous section focused mostly on theorisation of neoliberalism that took place in 
the US. In this section, the focus of analysis moves to the UK. Neoliberalism won the 
battle of ideas step-by-step in the 1980s. The neoliberals waited in the wings to enter the 
main stage, and their moment came. 
The most obvious features/results of Thatcherism were high unemployment (especially 
in the traditional northern industrial regions of England), the cuts in the budgets of public 
services, attacks on the trade union movement and a new policy of privatisation. However, 
some groups were involved in or benefited from the deregulating financial and economic 
policies, such as the middle-class and enterprises. The rhetorical promise of enterprise - 
real jobs in a new economy - was successful while Thatcher ‘played politically towards 
the floating voters in the middle in all kinds of ways which encouraged neoliberalism in 
a herbivore form’ (Erturk et al., 2008, p.6). For example, council-home sales, in 
Thatcher’s words, meant that ‘you will have the right, by law, to buy your house’. She 
encouraged working class voters to own their private properties by selling off council 
houses at discounted prices. Most of the buyers of council houses were working class 
because initially only people who were already council house tenants were allowed to 
buy them. Thatcher was trying to instill middle class values in the more stable and 
prosperous sections of the working class. Most of the welfare cuts were not implemented. 
A report by Manchester University's Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change 
(Erturk et al., 2008) has analysed how the rhetoric of privatisation and private finance 
initiatives (PFI) target the rising expectations among the middle classes:  
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Notwithstanding utility privatisation and PFI initiatives, the share of public 
expenditure in GDP could not be dramatically reduced as long as target voters 
consumed free or subsidised health and welfare and supported such provision 
for others. The main shift was therefore from progressive direct taxation to 
regressive indirect taxation which allowed higher income groups to keep more 
of what they earned (Erturk et al., 2008, p.6). 
In addition, Harvey (2005a, p.61) observes that Thatcher obtained common assent 
through the cultivation of a middle class that relished the joys of home ownership, private 
property, individualism, and the liberation of entrepreneurial opportunities. The 
Guardian’s Economics editor Larry Elliott (2013) points out the Faustian bargain 
between the Tory and New Labour governments and the upper middle-class.  
For Thatcher, the remedy was market forces and encouraging inward 
investment. Labour made a Faustian bargain with the City and the better-off 
citizens of the south-east: it allowed rampant financial and property speculation, 
using the government's rake-off to expand the size of the state's presence in the 
UK's old industrial heartlands (Elliott, 2013). 
Thatcher and Blair did more for the working rich in London and (middle-class) 
homeowners with equity than they did for unemployed steel or car workers and old 
miners (Elliott, 2013). The neoliberal turn happened in the 1980s because it was difficult 
to promote the idea of ‘the restoration of economic power to a small elite’; it would be 
easier to propagate the dream of ‘individual freedoms’ through mainstream media, 
schools, churches, families and some institutions of civil society (Harvey 2005a, p.40). 
In addition, Gamble (2001) indicates that neoliberalism emerged as the new ‘common 
sense’ in 1980s. 
The political interventions represented by Thatcherism and Reaganism 
established neo-liberalism as the new dominant common sense, the paradigm 
shaping all policies (2001, p.129). 
After ‘generations of political manipulation’, most people have accepted ‘the basic logic 
of austerity’ and ‘solidarity has [finally] come to be viewed as a scourge’ (Graeber, 2014). 
A new consumer-oriented culture, which was formed based on the open stance of free 
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trade in the Thatcher era, has resulted in more debt culture in British life (Harvey, 2005a, 
p.62).  
3.3.3 Neoliberal rhetoric of reform: New Labour as a case 
New Labour came into power in 1997 committed to the creation of a high-investment, 
high-productivity, high-wage domestic economy (Coates, 2010). This section focuses on 
the development of neoliberalism in the UK after Thatcher. New Labour claimed that it 
was not only ‘beyond Left in repudiating state socialism and old-style social democracy 
[but also] beyond Right in rejecting neoliberal Thatcherism’ (Driver and Martell, 1998, 
p.174). Blair asserted that New Labour was post-Thatcherite (Driver and Martell, 1998). 
However, he ‘shows himself to be the true son of Margaret Thatcher. Though the creators 
of New Labour were reluctant to admit it, neoliberal ideas had become the orthodoxy’ 
(Hewison, 2014, p.10).  
The Guardian asserted that Blair was Thatcher's chief successor (8 April 2013). These 
criticisms are perhaps the most significant indicators of the way in which critics appraised 
New Labour’s undertaking of the mission of neoliberalisation in the post-Thatcher era. 
New Labour adopted a new way of combining a free market economy with social justice 
usually referred to as ‘the third way’. However, there was little substantive difference 
from Thatcherite values: ‘liberty of the individual with wider opportunities for all’ 
(Mandelson & Liddle, 1996, p.17). 
Blair’s government created ‘a New Labour variant of neoliberalism’ (Hall, 2011, p.19), 
which included out-sourcing, new management, modernisation, entrepreneurial value, 
flexibility of the labour market, PFI (Private finance initiative) and a light-touch 
regulation. Therefore, if Thatcherite played the role of ‘the welfare scavenger’ (Younge, 
2014), Blair must be the ‘broker of public services.’  
Paradoxically, Cameron made Blair his role model and created ‘the Tories as a 
compassionate conservative party’ (Hall, 2013, p.22). Also, Hall (2011) observed that 
the coalition of the Lib-Dem and the Conservatives fuelled ‘the most radical, far-reaching 
and irreversible social revolution,’ and consequently inherited the mantras ‘reform and 
choice’ from New Labour (Hall 2011, p.718). The history of neoliberalism has shown 
time and again that its political practices and ideology do not comprise a single model or 
conception, such as conservatism, Thatcherism, Blairism, or globalisation. It could be 
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argued that we should first separately understand each concept, and then put these ideas 
in the neoliberal context to connect their relationship and historical elements. 
Moreover, Labour reconstructed ‘social democracy as the best shell for a New Labour 
variant of neo-liberalism’ (Hall, 2011, p.714). For instance, the New Labour government, 
implemented policies of tax cuts, privatisation and deregulation, which were meant to 
‘encourage innovation and reduce costs’, particularly with new subsidies for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises and new restrictions on unemployment benefits, all of which 
were clearly presented in Blair’s speech on welfare reform (The Guardian, 10 June 2002).  
In this new rhetoric of reform, with phrases such as ‘reaching out to the new markets that 
globalisation and technology are creating’, ‘modern public services through a 
combination of investment and reform’ and ‘a welfare state based on rights and 
responsibility’ (Blair, 2002), neoliberalism has worn new clothes, differentiating from 
the political atmosphere of the 1980s and presenting a more finely crafted image. 
3.4 Neoliberalism and public services 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, major capitalist countries on both sides of the Atlantic 
witnessed the growth of a neoliberal form of governance, which attacked the safety net 
of society, resulting in more labour flexibility, a greater unemployed domestic population 
and less social welfare and corporate social responsibility – a serious problem until the 
1990s.  
Although Blair (UK Prime Minister 1997-2007) and Bill Clinton (Democratic Party, US 
President 1993-2001) created, to a certain extent, new political discourse and social 
reform, it did not change from the Thatcher/Reagan version; for example, Hall (2011, 
p.714) indicates that Clinton ‘re-articulated social reform, free enterprise and the market’ 
successfully. In addition, the Clinton government ‘fully embraced’ the privatisation in 
1990s and sold off the public sectors (e.g. water and electricity, highway management 
and garbage collection), encouraging private-sector investment (Klein, 2008, p.288). 
Hewison (2014) also outlines the process: 
the doctrine of neoliberalism held that the market operated best without 
interference, governments withdrew from the market by selling off state-owned 
assets and utilities, and as far as possible creating markets where none had 
existed, such as within public health. Where government could not withdraw 
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completely, it delegated responsibility to agencies that it expected to behave like 
private enterprises. (Hewison, 2014, p.4) 
New Labour discarded its historical mission in the 1990s – a trade unionist and socialist 
commitment to the common ownership and nationalisation of the ‘means of production, 
distribution and exchange’ (Daunton, 1995). ‘The Third Way’ was a popular jargon 
manipulated by New Labour in Britain. It was presented as a new way far from capitalism 
and socialism; however, it was ‘a social-democratic shell for neoliberalism’ (McGuigan, 
1999, p.175). The concept of the Third Way was used to justify the transformation of the 
state’s role which was now to create a more conducive environment for enterprises 
accumulating capital even at the cost of injustice and inequality. By contrast, the welfare-
state system values equality of all citizens – ‘intervening in the economy, redistributing 
wealth, universalising life-chances, attacking unemployment, protecting the socially 
vulnerable, ameliorating the condition of oppressed or marginalised groups and 
addressing social injustice’ (Hall, 2011, p.11).  
The state also plays a pivotal role in distinctly neoliberalised history. As Ken Loach’s 
documentary The Spirit of ‘45’ (2013) and Foucault’s Lectures at the College de France 
(1978-79) posit, governments played entirely different roles in the post-war period, and 
‘a series of type of economic and social organization which assured security (of 
employment, with regard to illness and other kinds of risk, and at the level of retirement)’ 
(Foucault et al., 2008 p.216). Describing the social atmosphere and its Zeitgeist, Loach 
(2013) quoted miners discussing this moving time. 
'Labour's won by a landslide!' Tough, hard miners had tears streaking down their 
faces, black with dust. They said, 'Ray, this is what we've dreamed about all our 
lives. Public control of the railways and mines and banks, jobs and housing. We 
are going to have a health service!' (Loach, 2013) 
However, Foucault demonstrated that the central feature of neoliberal governance is what 
he (Foucault et al., 2008 p.240) calls ‘the inversion of the relationships of the social to 
the economic’. Under this system, the competitive mechanism of the market becomes the 
only authority, economising each aspect of life, including education, parenting, welfare, 
housing and social insurance. In the neoliberal process, the government does not actually 
deregulate the market and the other elements. On the surface, the state seems to decrease 
in power through deregulation of the market, privatisation and increased outsourcing; 
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however, the legalisation of laissez faire policies requires governmental intervention ‘in 
the name of a law of the market which will enable each of its activities to be measured 
and assessed’ (Foucault et al., 2008, p.247). 
3.5 Neoliberalised language usage and neoliberal-self 
One of the significant characteristics of the neoliberal trend was arguably the use of 
language; in particular, neoliberal vocabularies also changed our relationships from 
customer service to the structure of our working lives. Neoliberal language was having a 
‘devastating’ impact in modelling people’s neoliberal identities (Massey, 2003). This 
neoliberal relationship was not only fostering competitive self-interest and hyper-
individualism but also has frayed the collective experiences of compassion and solidarity 
in the welfare state. Under the naturalised use of language in the new capitalist hegemony 
– neoliberalism – people were inclined to claim that ‘I am a customer’ rather than ‘a 
worker’ or ‘part of the public’. Massey claims that the conversion of ‘our economic 
language was crucial in shifting our world-view’ (p.8).  
The neoliberal identities also pushed us to become embedded in that neoliberal structure. 
For example, the bundle of terms constructed – such as flexible employment, efficiency, 
competitiveness freelancer, and creative class – legitimised the impression that erratic 
job opportunities were a necessary process. Therefore, employees have had to invest in 
themselves in an attempt to prove to be more valuable, effective and competitive than 
others. Massey notes that ‘the existing vocabulary is one of the roots of the elite’s ability 
to maintain the horrible straitjacket we are in’ (2013, p.13). 
Fairclough (1993) also demonstrates that the marketisation of the discursive practices of 
universities in Britain is a vivid example of neoliberal discursive practices. Particularly, 
Fairclough exemplifies the ‘promotional’ culture and admissions advertising of higher 
education institutions by contrasting the change in different universities in different 
periods. Students have thus become consumers as ‘better services’ have been emphasised 
in recent admissions advertising. Moreover, representing part of the promotional 
approach in the academic field, lessons were designed for increasing productivity, 
efficiency and global competitiveness. It is thus not difficult to see the process of 
neoliberalisation in the operation of educational institutions.  
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The other prime example is the popular term ‘individual freedom’ in the neoliberal 
rhetoric, which also illustrates the dilemma of social movement in 1968. Primarily, 
conflicts were between the traditional Left, which emphasised trade unions and social 
solidarity, and students, who stood on the side of ‘individual liberties’ (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005). This raises the central question: Whose liberties? (Harvey, 2005a). 
Likewise, ‘individual freedom’ and ‘social justice’ are sometimes mutually exclusive. 
The discourse of neoliberalism merely mentions ‘individual freedom’, which easily 
extends to the popular ideas of ‘identity politics, multiculturalism, [and] narcissistic 
consumerism’; however, these concepts are segregated from the foundation of social 
justice (Harvey, 2005a, p.41). Thatcher’s famous words, ‘there is no such thing as society’ 
(The Sunday Times 1987), articulated the spirit of ‘individualism’ in the neoliberal 1980s 
and implied that the vacancy of the government’s duty would be filled by corporations. 
Fuchs (2014) said that ‘the logic of individualism, egoism, profit maximization and 
competition has been tried and tested under neoliberal capitalism, which has also 
transformed the media landscape and made it more unequal’ (p.15).  
It is part of the neoliberal project to emphasise individuals' responsibility, especially in 
the field of creative industries. Cultural and creative workers who are under pressure to 
make a success of their venture have risen rapidly (Hesmondhalgh, Oakley, Lee & 
Nisbett, 2015; McGuigan, 2015). Their ambition and desire to succeed accelerate their 
willingness to take risks. The gist of the argument is that it has been rooted in the myth 
of the heroic individual entrepreneur and some workers might easily blame themselves 
for their failures, even when they are suffering from the large number of unpaid jobs in 
the exploitation of the creative sector. ‘It is because such advocacy has a potential to 
rediscover and re-legitimise flexible labour market and support the prevailing neoliberal 
public policy under which labour has been increasingly marginalised’ (Lee, 2017, p.3).  
The conceptions of exploitation and freedom have been re-defined in the current 
neoliberal system and the individualised process. These individualised actions have 
undermined the possibility of unity and resistance as individual cultural workers compete 
with each other in a global network, struggling for their next job. This ‘creative industries’ 
discourse and ideology have been ‘guided predominantly by neoliberal policy that dis-
empowers labour and deregulates the market’ (Lee, 2016, 2017, p.4). Mcrobbie (2002), 
Gibson (2003) and Banks (2007) explain that neoliberalised and individualised work 
have tended to produce obedient (albeit autonomous) labourers. 
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The development of neoliberalism not only marked the restoration of 19th-century-style 
liberal capitalism but also introduced a new form of ideology during the crisis of the 
1970s and 1980s. The dynamic evolution of neoliberalism was driven by both changes 
in domestic governance and the rise of new international organisations. As many 
researchers have noted, neoliberalism is neither a unified concept nor an inevitable 
historical product, but a complex and dynamic set of different practices (Bourdieu, 1997; 
Brown, 2005; Gamble, 2001; Hall, 2011; Harvey, 2005a; Hobsbawm, 2012; Klein, 2008; 
McGuigan, 2009). It can be demonstrated that one idea, however, remains at the core of 
neoliberal discourse: ‘the primacy [of the] market’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001; 
Gamble, 2006; Harvey, 2005a, 2005b; Klein, 2008).  
To some extent, we can say that deteriorating working conditions, crumbling public 
higher-education systems, the threatened National Health Service (NHS), the outsourcing 
of the penal system and the generally exacerbated inequality reflect conditions spreading 
worldwide. As stated, neoliberalism has not only permeated governance but also 
thoroughly undermined the social system and the post-war consensus. Harvey (2004) 
argues that neoliberal practices represent a fraudulent economic theory in all of these 
respects. 
the claims generally made that neoliberalism is about open competition rather 
than monopoly control or limited competition within oligopolistic structures, 
turn out to be fraudulent, masked as usual by the fetishism of market freedoms. 
Free trade does not mean fair trade. (p.71) 
More specifically, neoliberal governance and its political-economic practices propagate 
obvious inequality, while the neoliberal hegemonic ideology minimises social 
contradictions though the mainstream media, which convey the new political discourse 
and inject individualism into daily life. This process is a ‘long revolution’ aimed at 
expanding the neoliberal concept from the economy to other aspects of society. It could 
be said that the doctrine of neoliberalism not only drastically influences the logic of 
governance and marketisation of policies but also thoroughly alters the social fabric. As 
Harvey (2004) states, neoliberalism ‘produces ever greater levels of social inequality, as 
indeed has been the global trend over the last thirty years of neoliberalism, particularly 
within those countries such as Britain and the United States that have most closely hewed 
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to such a political line’ (p.73-74). As McGuigan (2014) puts it in his edition of Raymond 
Williams’ work Towards 2000, ‘a short counter-revolution’ which reveals the problem 
of monopolistic ownership and control of mass media was undermining ‘the long 
revolution towards an educated and participatory democracy’ (McGuigan, 2014, p.2). 
 
3.6 Neoliberal transition in Taiwan 
There are three stages illustrating the role of the state in the historical development of 
Taiwan. It can be said that the transition in Taiwan was from an autocratic regime to 
neoliberalised capitalism. First, the nationalist KMT government and Chiang Kai-shek 
fled from mainland China and created conditions for the implementation of a single-
party regime—an authoritarian market-state in the pre-democratisation period from 
1949—in Taiwan. While democracy and social movements emerged in the 1980s in 
Taiwan and indirectly contributed to the lifting of martial law as well as the ban on 
competing political parties in 1986, the state’s authoritarian control gradually loosened 
during the second period. Some studies (Taylor 2002; Wang 2004; Laio 2008) have 
also mentioned that the first wave of democratisation in Taiwan began in 1986. 
However, Hindley, Ho & Chiu (2011) mentioned that the KMT government was a 
controlled developmental state in the early period and adopted ‘neoliberal doctrines 
and policies’ (p.19). The neoliberalised economic policies (from an authoritarian 
market-state to a neoliberal market with regulation) represent the cosy relationship 
between the KMT government, the KMT party, and ‘close’ business elites. To some 
extent, this shows how the country still thrived on cronyism and nepotism and there 
was deep disenchantment with the KMT regime. The market was open for political and 
business elites who followed KMT’s rules.  
Effectively this meant that regulatory controls over the economy and civil society 
were lifted at the same time, and much of the state’s former economic power 
was passed to (often KMT-linked) business elites (Hindley, Ho & Chiu 2011, 
p.19-20). 
Neoliberal policies were imposed domestically, and this came to be codified as 
‘structural adjustment’. Particularly, the dynamics demonstrate that the democratic 
character of the state has developed slowly and that development is still not complete. 
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The KMT government and KMT-linked business elites were among the structural 
adjustment's most enthusiastic promoters. At the very moment that a tide of political 
change was sweeping across Taiwan—when the democratisation process needed an 
unprecedented collective public response—neoliberal ideology stood in the way. 
People challenged the authoritarian state during the 1980s but are still fighting for 
equality, justice, democracy, and freedom against the neoliberal state.  
 
It can be said that the rise of a new middle class of consumers has allowed for the 
easy connection of concepts such as ‘free market’ and ‘deregulation’ from the 
authoritarian market-state to the neoliberal market-state. Although there was 
widespread rejection of the notion of using authoritarian state power for the purpose 
of democratisation, when it comes to nepotism and neoliberalism, democratisation is 
deliberately distorted in Taiwan. Kuang (2011) also argued that the process of 
Taiwan’s political democratization was influenced by ‘neoliberal ideas and the over-
optimistic liberalization policies’ (p.72). Although Taiwan faces a forbidding set of 
challenges in the democratisation process, the achievements of Taiwanese social 
movements and their ongoing struggles indicate that the problems of 
commercialisation and commodification are destructive forces for neoliberalism and 
globalisation. 
Taiwan could easily have moved from authoritarian to neoliberal capitalism 
without democratization. Likewise, the orientation of the state towards the 23 
million people comprising Taiwan’s population might simply have shifted from a 
modality of interpellation based on inculcating obedient authoritarian subjects to 
one based on fostering unthinking neoliberal consumers, atomized by the 
market and competing for wealth and status (Hindley, Ho & Chiu, 2011, p.21). 
This ideology was popularising during the period of the lifting of martial law and the 
ban on competing political parties in mid-1980s. This means conditions are now ripe 
for facing these challenges and completing what can be called the ‘deepening of 
democratization’, which is the final phase of a process strongly influenced by the 
institutionalisation of neoliberalised policymaking and a neoliberalised market.  
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Taiwan’s neoliberalised media market emerged in the 1990s. Prior to this change, the 
KMT government and a few private capital firms controlled broadcasting in a system 
that was a type of authoritarian market. The structure of television regulation was 
neoliberalised in the 1990s. In particular, the structure of the media market transitioned 
from a politically controlled free market to a de-regulated free market. Liu (2006, p.116) 
stated that, unfortunately, ‘this trend meets the interests of media owners rather than 
of the public’. Kuang (2011) elaborated the historical process of the neoliberal media 
system in Taiwan, indicating that ‘the neoliberal state apparatus of Taiwan forms a 
complex and symbiotic relation with capital, whereby political and commercial powers 
are intertwined’ (p.76). The history of both neoliberalism and democratisation in 
Taiwan has been gently called ‘liberalisation’, and the ‘neoliberal agenda’ that pushed 
for deregulation was part of this package. Considering this background, it is hardly 
surprising that a majority in Taiwan now oppose this broken system and recognise the 
need for a radical alternative to neoliberal democratization. 
  
57 
4 
The British Case: Neoliberalised Cultural Policymaking 
Process 
The historic opportunities for the left required imaginative thinking and decisive 
action in the early stages of taking power, signalling a new direction. The other choice 
was, of course, to adapt to Thatcherite, neo-liberal terrain. […] New Labour has 
adapted to neo-liberal terrain – but in a distinctive way. 
Stuart Hall (The Guardian, 6 August 2003) 
4.1 Introduction 
British creative industries have attracted significant plaudits since New Labour promoted 
Creative Britain in the late 1990s. This is one of Britain’s global success stories: the 
advocates of New Labour’s policy discourse showed that the successful creative 
economy could be a new model for the production and circulation of ‘knowledge’ which 
is driven by the post-industrial economy. The new rhetoric around ‘creative industries’ 
and the increasing focus by lobbyists on promoting this commercially driven cultural 
sector also reflect a broken cultural policy. It could be said that the theme of creative 
industries is absolutely central to New Labour’s cultural policy (Hesmondhalgh et al., 
2015, p.7). Additionally, creative industries are easily lumped together by government; 
the arts’ purposes set them apart from the other creative industries. ‘It is not the role of 
advertisers, architects, antique sellers, computer game manufacturers or fashion 
designers to challenge the way society is run. But the arts do it all the time’ (Edgar, 2012). 
The original core value was not a policy objective and therefore it has been marginalised 
and pigeonholed as the tendency towards market-oriented cultural policymaking 
increased. In a reductively economic perspective, the UK’s wider creative industries are 
expected to establish a link between new cultural policy and economic success. However, 
the gap between policy rhetoric and reality is causing a crisis. New terms have been 
accepted, such as ‘knowledge economy’, ‘information economy’, ‘creative economy’, 
‘innovation’, and ‘public service reform’. Yet beyond the rhetoric, grave doubts remain 
over policymaking in the cultural and creative industries. However, this worldwide 
rhetoric of the success of the UK's creative industries is a significant element of neoliberal 
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globalisation. British creative industries became a model globally in the early 2000s. 
Taiwan is one of the countries to adopt this policy model during this period. The 
globalised and localised processes of policymaking in creative industries and their 
influences are expounded in the following chapters. British creative industries’ policy 
and its neoliberal policymaking process are elaborated in this chapter. In addition, the 
historical context of post-war cultural policymaking in Britain could provide an 
important background for understanding the neoliberal turn of cultural policymaking in 
the 1990s. 
In particular, three stages represent the transition of neoliberalism after WWII. Before 
the post-war consensus failed in the 1970s, democratisation of culture/ cultural policy 
was promoted. Although both Thatcher and Blair remade UK politics based on a 
replacement neoliberal consensus in the second and third stages, they practiced neoliberal 
politics with different propositions. In the second stage, the Keynesian social consensus 
was dismantled in the 1970s economic crisis while neoliberal reforms – such as the free 
market and the privatisation of public assets – rolled forward. Thatcherism can be 
considered as the first representative of the sharply delineated political culture of 
neoliberalism in the 1980s.  
New Labour adapted to the neoliberal terrain in a distinctive way. New Labour’s policy 
and public service reform was marked by a clear neoliberal orientation, spawning 
projects such as the Millennium Dome. Cultural policy was not the main issue in 
Thatcherism, but ‘culture became good business’ in New Labour’s policy discourse; for 
example, ‘Cool Britain’ and ‘Creative Britain’ helped to consolidate the hyper-
individualistic, materialistic hedonism of the entire culture. The governments and policy 
makers in East Asian countries such as Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan, influenced by the 
British experience, gave more attention to the creative economy as a new economic 
growth engine in the early 2000s (Flew, 2012; Grant, 2011). UNESCO develops creative 
industries policy by promoting the principle of cultural diversity at an international level 
(Grant, 2011). It could be said that the transfer of the British approach into global-level 
policies was transferred in turn to regional-level policy programmes. 
Creative industries policy and public service reform, which cover a range of issues from 
public-private partnerships to regeneration of urban areas, are included in the neoliberal 
process. In a profound sense, neoliberalised cultural policy rhetoric is based on the 
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significant success of the UK’s wider creative industries, which feature heavily in 
government propaganda. Therefore, the global dissemination of the British creative 
industries model and its expansion is now infiltrating the mainstream in all directions. 
Taiwan is an obvious example and its situation is treated in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
In this chapter, the neoliberal trend in UK cultural policymaking is discussed, 
especially the supersession of the social-democratic model by the creative 
industries agenda. Following the three stages of this historical development, this 
chapter is divided into three chronological sections: the first two periods will feature 
in each main section; the third period (New Labour and its creative industry boom) 
will be divided into sub-sections to represent creative industry growth. 
During the first period (Labour Government, 1964–70), the first public arts grants were 
given, and the Arts Council was founded. During the second phase of upheaval from the 
late 1970s to the 1980s, the Tories accelerated privatisation in general, which 
reduced public service and strengthened the hegemonic ideologies of the 
unbounded market, individualism, and consumer sovereignty. Thatcher was once 
considered the principal offender in the cultural policies sphere; however, her 
policies appeared to follow principles of economic efficiency, such as the process of 
marketisation and privatisation. 
During the 80s, in the arts as in so many other spheres of life, Margaret Thatcher 
sought to shift power from the producer to the consumer, using the market to 
disempower the provocative (from political theatre groups to the high avant 
garde) in favour of the populist (Edgar, 2012). 
The second stage (Conservative Government, 1979–97) turned towards the 
marginalisation of cultural policy discourse; in particular, the government spent a 
significant amount of time enticing corporations and private patrons into subsidising the 
arts, but only a very small proportion of the amount came from them (Williams, 1979; 
McGuigan, 2004). Furthermore, private sponsors were lauded as major and unique 
donors, even though responsibility for arts patronage was not transferred to enterprises 
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and individual private sponsors through tax credits. The burden was, however, on artists’ 
to secure new funding from enterprises.  
The third phase (New Labour) takes up most of the chapter. New Labour modified 
cultural policymaking in this phase. Five sub-sections follow the historical process of the 
Cool Britannia campaign and unveil New Labour’s initial thinking on policy for the 
creative industries. The rhetoric of creative economy and neoliberalised cultural policies 
have linked to an increasing tendency towards market-oriented cultural policymaking in 
the UK since the Labour party was infiltrated by neoliberalism. New Labour’s cultural 
policy changes have resulted in creative workers facing deteriorating working conditions 
and in the cultural landscape becoming festivalised on a sustainable trajectory. The origin 
of creative industries policy in Britain, and New Labour’s new public service reforms 
reveal the new rhetoric of neoliberalised cultural policymaking. The new term ‘creative 
industries’ came to represent the neoliberalisation trend and the retreat from 
democratisation of the arts. Throughout the process, the relationship between the state, 
cultural policies, artists (labourers) in cultural industries, and the public (the audience) 
underwent a dynamic process of historical change. 
4.2 From Democratisation to Marginalisation: Why the Post-War 
Consensus Failed 
4.2.1 The Social Democratic Phase 
After 1945, the Labour government began constructing a welfare state in the UK. The 
most notable reforms were the creation of the National Health Service (NHS), increased 
public housing and nationalisation of major industries, particularly at ‘the commanding 
heights’. Post-war public policy also initiated the Arts Council, public arts grants and 
democratisation experiments in the arts, such as the development of regional arts centres 
like the Midlands Arts Centre in Birmingham. The short-lived Centre 42 and Institute of 
Contemporary Arts (ICA) were also significant products of policy direction during this 
period, so archival materials from these sites for the democratisation of culture are 
examined here. 
The Arts Council was established in 1946 under the Treasury. Its predecessor, the 
Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA, 1939), was funded by the 
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state and the Pilgrim Trust, a mixed-funding scenario which sought to preserve traditional 
cultures during the war. It was especially about keeping artists in employment at a time 
when theatre and venues were being shut down (especially in London) because of the 
war, and to lift morale among civilians. The Labour Party manifestos of 1950, 1964, 1966 
and 1970 reveal that its art and cultural policies were intended to increase the accessibility 
and encourage the localisation and democratisation of culture and arts. For example, the 
only paragraph in the 1950 Labour Party Manifesto ‘Let Us Win through Together’ to 
mention support for the arts asserts that ‘we shall continue to do all that can legitimately 
be done to support the Arts without interfering in any way with the free expression of the 
artist’ in the section on ‘Recreation and the Arts’. This paragraph prioritises structural 
over content regulation in the arts and it establishes the administrative nature of the Arts 
Council as a quango. The 1964 manifesto calls for the Arts Council and associated bodies 
to receive more funding. The 1966 and 1970 Labour Party manifestos (see Table 4.1) 
give more specific, detailed policies, including appointing the first Minister for Arts and 
Leisure, encouraging the arts among young people, improving local amenities, 
supporting arts education and increasing arts expenditure. The budgets for local 
authorities, the Arts Council and the BBC were increased in 1964-65 (Green & Wilding, 
1970). The higher spending sparked a public debate about whether the state should 
support the arts. The Tories contended that strong state support is not necessary for the 
arts (Green & Wilding, 1970). The Conservative position is discussed more in the next 
section. The Labour Party manifestos of 1997 and 2001 are also analysed, with special 
emphasis given to comparing and noting changes between these two periods.  
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          Table 4.1 Labour Party manifestos reference to art, culture, and leisure 
Year Main issues 
1950 Support the arts without interfering in any way with the free 
expression of the artist 
 
1964 Give much more generous support to the Arts Council, the 
theatre, orchestras, concert halls, museums and art galleries 
 
1966 1. Access for all to the best of Britain's cultural heritage is a wider 
part of our educational and social purpose. 
2. Appointed the first Minister for Arts and Leisure 
3. Substantially increased financial support for the Arts Council, 
purchasing grants for museums, and five times the support for 
younger artists. 
4. A local authority building fund has been initiated.  
5. Next year expenditure on the arts will rise by 2.5m GBP. 
 
1970 1. To make sure that enjoyment of the arts is not something 
remote from everyday life or removed from the realities of 
home and work 
2. Government spending on the arts has been more than 
doubled. 
3. Local arts centres, regional film theatres, municipally owned 
and aided theatres, national and local museums have been 
established or modernised.  
4. National Theatre and National Film School are now being 
established. 
 
1997 1. New arts and science talent fund for young people 
2. The millennium […] also provides a natural opportunity to 
celebrate and improve the contribution made by the arts, 
culture and sport to our nation. 
3. Need a new and dynamic approach to the 'creative economy'. 
4. The Department of National Heritage will develop a strategic 
vision that matches the real power and energy of British arts, 
media and cultural industries. 
2001 1. Tourism is a vital, growing industry for Britain, with 1.8 million 
employees, and links to the museums, arts and heritage that 
people want to enjoy. 
2. All our public services, […] need to be highly responsive to the 
demands of users. Where the quality is not improving quickly 
enough, alternative providers should be brought in. Where 
private-sector providers can support public endeavour. 
3. A 'spirit of enterprise' should apply as much to public service 
as to business. 
Sources: Labour Party Manifestos from 1950, 1955, 1964, 1966, 1970, 1997, 
2001 and organised by author. 
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A Policy for the Arts: The First Step (1965) also manifests the social-democratic 
approach to arts policy. One feature of this approach is the principle of market failure as 
the principal justification for state intervention through subsidy. Firstly, this White Paper 
argues that the relationship between artist and state should follow a modern, democratic 
approach which balances state patronage with ‘the liberty of even the most unorthodox 
and experimental of artists’ (White Paper, 1965, p.1). In addition, three objectives for 
supporting the arts are given: education, preservation and patronage. These activities 
required collaboration by different government departments, such as the Department of 
Education and Science (for education), Museums and Galleries (for preservation) and the 
Arts Council (for patronage). Secondly, it recognises that new cultural forms, such as 
visual arts, radio, television and popular music, which could break down the boundaries 
between the arts and the public, are important to younger generations. For example, many 
schools utilised radio and television to foster aesthetic sensibilities. Although the 
government has no direct responsibility for radio and television, these media were 
managed by public corporations, whose relationship with the government was defined 
by statute. One clear argument for the BBC's license fee in the past has been market 
failure. Commercial broadcasters, the case goes, cannot guarantee sufficient diversity or 
quality because market forces would lead to tyranny of the majority (Azhar, 2004).  
The White Paper (1965, p.16) expresses the belief that ‘radio and television have much 
to contribute to the encouragement of artistic activity and appreciation’. Mass media 
‘have enormous opportunities in the sphere of the arts’, but ‘their responsibilities to the 
nation are correspondingly great’. Television initially was expected to ‘encourage further 
experiment and development’ and ‘local artistic activity and the enrichment and 
diversification of regional cultures’. Television also approached Raymond Williams’ 
concept of a democratised broadcasting system (1975). He believed that, by a new public 
service which could be ‘controlled democratically by local communities and by those 
who work in the institutions, a new range of social possibility will have been opened’ 
(Williams, 1975, p.135). Surprisingly, the image of the broadcasting system still has 
radical, grass-roots possibilities in official documents from the 1960s. Williams (1961) 
had already warned that a certain few people manipulated the mass media (e.g. 
newspapers), new institutions challenged the BBC, and a few distributors controlled the 
film industry in Britain. It can be argued that the unfortunate change in UK mass media 
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in the late1980s reflected the need for a reform of culture, which Williams called for in 
the 1960s:   
We can envisage a cultural organisation which would greatly extend the 
freedom of the cultural producers, by sensible application of public resources to 
cut out their present dependence on dominant but essentially functionless 
financial groups, and by forms of contract which while preserving response in 
the spending of public money would give the producers control over their actual 
work. (p.373) 
In addition, some democratisation experiments in the arts, such as the Midlands Arts 
Centre, Centre 42 and the ICA, represented a new plan to eliminate the divide between 
popular and high culture. Firstly, the Midlands Arts Centre served young people and also 
focused on BAME (black, Asian or minority ethnic) artists in the Midlands’ area and was 
operated by schools, families, individuals and centre staff. Participants (parents, children, 
and teachers) in various activities, such as discussion groups and creative events, could 
disseminate ideas in the school and home, and parents and teachers could foster 
children’s experience of arts and culture. Professional groups also took part in workshops. 
However, the project still faced difficulties, including limited funding, and participation 
by immigrant populations from different cultural contexts and assimilating both middle- 
and working-class participants. Second, Centre 42 (named after Resolution 42 of the 
1960 Trades Union Congress) aimed to expand the audience for the arts, especially 
among the working class. The centre was housed in an unused railway engine shed in 
London’s Camden Town and cooperated with trade councils. However, this plan for 
democratising culture encountered practical problems: exhausted workers had difficulty 
joining in with arts activities after work; the goal of educating people to appreciate art 
was limited by traditional definitions; and funding was limited. The project for 
democratisation of culture was criticised in the 1970s; in particular, it was seen as ‘a “top-
down” elitist homogenizing approach to culture that ignored cultural expressions and 
practices outside of the mainstream canon’ (Evrard, 1997; Gattinger, 2011, p.3). Third, 
the ICA in London focused on avant-garde arts and regularly hosted exhibitions, movies 
and discussion groups. Although the ICA has the problem of precarious funding, its 
pioneering mission is to bring modern art to the British public (Massey & Muir 2014). 
Green and Wilding (1970) consider the characteristics of the ICA to fall between ‘high 
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culture’ and ‘popular culture’ and between ‘the educated middle class’ and ‘the working-
class rooted arts’ (p.54).  
In summary, the cultural policies of the1960s and 1970s had merit but encountered 
difficulties. However, A Policy for the Arts: The First Steps, was a foundation for much 
of British cultural policymaking in the subsequent half-century (Red Pepper, Feb 13, 
2018). First, in the 1960s, public subsidies for the arts were begun, and the budget for 
cultural activities was increased. Additionally, central government partially supported 
the cultural facilities and spending of local authorities. The adoption of the social-
democratic model in Britain made possible a democratising cultural project. In party 
manifestos and the 1965 White Paper (1965), the Labour government supported the 
democratisation of culture and the localisation of resources. These innovative cultural 
projects evidence the adoption of a new approach of rooted culture intended to expand 
the population of not only participants but also of audiences.  
Remarkable for the essential joy at its heart, that white paper marked a radical 
new position for culture that put people and community to the fore. It marked a 
shift from the post-war Arts Council stance that government had a singular 
responsibility to protect and promote excellence in the arts to one that was also 
about reaching new audiences: an all-inclusive access to the arts regardless of 
where you lived or how wealthy you were. (Red Pepper, Feb 13, 2018)  
A Policy for the Arts: The First Step (1965) echoes Williams’ work The Long Revolution 
in that it believes the new active cultural policies need to fight for a long period: ‘All new 
social services have to fight long and hard before they establish themselves. Only 
yesterday it was the fight for a free health service. The day before it was the struggle to 
win education for all’ (p.20).  
4.2.2 Marginalising the Arts: The Way Forward 
 
‘The arts are to British tourism what the sun is to Spain.’ (1985) 
William Rees-Mogg, chairman of the Arts Council for most of the 1980s 
 
The neoliberal process began in the mid-1970s and expanded in the 1980s during 
Thatcher’s rule in the UK (Hall, 1980, 1989; Harvey, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; McGuigan, 
2004). Beginning in the 1980s, the increasingly narrow governmental responsibility was 
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superseded by the logic of the free market, which changed the relationship between the 
state and its people and challenged the basic principle of the public service system in 
Western Europe, especially in Britain. For example, under Thatcherism, the Tories 
gradually reduced public expenditure, restricted union activity, and constricted the 
working class. This suggests that people had no choice other than to acquiesce to free-
market capitalism in the ‘Radical Right Programme’ (Hall, 1980, p.26). Moreover, the 
Tories advocated an ‘enterprise culture’ that included increasing business sponsorship of 
the arts. In this period, this discourse was popularised: individuals could support or 
choose the arts and cultural activities they liked without interference from government. 
 
In fact, this influenced the development of cultural policy in different ways, including 
reducing public support, limiting critical and contentious artworks and increasing 
commercialised art and private sponsorship (Fairclough, 1993; Hesmondhalgh, 2002, 
2005; Garnham, 2005; McGuigan, 2004; Pratt, 2005; Williams, 1961, 1979, 1984). 
Consequently, Kureishi (2009) has asserted that both the Queen and Thatcher had ‘little 
cultural sophistication or understanding’ and that the latter sincerely detested culture and 
its form of dissent. He also argues that the central channels of the arts in British life, such 
as literature, films, theatre and music, have vacillated. As a social atomist, Thatcher and 
her government positively opposed the common consensus of altruism, solidarity and 
identification with others. In the late 1970s, the Tories became incensed about the 
modernist and political artworks that gained public support (McGuigan, 1996). For 
example, Derek Jarman’s films Jubilee (1978) and The Last of England (1987), Mike 
Leigh’s film High Hopes (1988), Stephen Frears’s film My Beautiful Laundrette (1985) 
and a British satirical puppet TV show: Spitting Image (ITV, 1984), represent the radical 
and political perspective in the 1980s which opposed the social reconstruction and new 
cultural consensus under Thatcherism. Looked at from a historical perspective, the 
British art boom is definitely a product of Thatcherism. It clearly was not deliberate on 
their part, but the Thatcher-led Tory party in the 1980s encouraged a new daring by young 
artists. The language of modern British art often sounds radically left-wing. Everything 
that makes it happen, however, comes from the profound changes that Margaret Thatcher 
and Tony Blair brought to Britain. In the 1970s, these radical artists had a recurrent 
challenge to reach audiences beyond the narrow confines of the art world, how to 
convince political activists, local communities, campaigning groups, workers in factories 
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or on strike, that art could be a valuable additional resource or weapon rather than merely 
an ornament or instrument of the Establishment (Walker 2001, p.8; Wu, 2003). 
Arguably, amidst growing neoliberalism, the cultural policy features of the 1980s were 
not only commercialised but also heavily biased towards entertainment. Therefore, this 
section presents an analysis of Conservative archives during the 1970s and 1980s, as well 
as of the ICA document (ICA, 1984), reflecting the development of cultural policy in 
Britain. These documents can help us to understand the attitude between the government 
and the artists in the debate over arts subsidies. Williams’ three articles from 1961, 1979 
and 1984 will also be analysed. The expectation is that this analysis will elucidate the 
transformation of cultural policy in this period, particularly how the trend of 
neoliberalism affected the discourse on cultural policy. The titles in Williams’ three 
articles are: ‘Britain in the 1960s’ (1961), ‘The Arts Council’ (1979) and ‘State Culture 
and Beyond’ (1984), all of which discuss the issue of cultural policy in different periods 
(the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s). An analysis of these documents will reveal the process of 
cultural policymaking and the different problems it faced during the changing social 
contexts (e.g. the development of communications and media technologies, the definition 
of forms of art and the commercialisation of art) in Williams’ depictions and critiques. 
In 1978, the Conservative Political Centre (CPC) published a pamphlet entitled The Arts: 
The Way Forward, which ‘will be found of great value by a future Conservative 
administration in implementing its policy on the arts’ (p.5). This publication sought the 
dissemination of the CPC’s cultural policy position and emphasises the Conservatives’ 
market-oriented view of British culture. It starts by stating that Britain has lost its ‘world 
power’ but still exercises important influence, as ‘the establishment of the English 
language throughout the world has been our one permanent imperial conquest’ (p.9). For 
the Tories, the value of culture arises not from democratisation but from economic 
benefits, such as supporting the tourism industry: ‘In every field from literature to 
painting they earn money for Britain and this is especially true of the performing art’ 
(p.9). Hewison (1995) states that ‘Thatcherism was a moral and ideological project that 
set out to release new energies and produce cultural change’ (p.210). He believes that 
although ‘Thatcherism was presented as an economic doctrine, the underlying moral 
philosophy was more important’ (1995, p.212). Therefore, the individual empowered 
through the sovereignty of the consumer, was to be liberated by the freedom of the market 
not only from the dependency culture of collectivism, but the old hierarchies of deference, 
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status and taste. For example, the Arts Council made budget cuts and ceased funding 41 
organisations in 1980. The cuts in higher education budgets made art students realise that 
their prospects of obtaining teaching jobs in art schools were poor and they needed to 
break into the commercial gallery system (Walker, 2002, p.256). In this book Left Shift: 
Radical Art in 1970s Britain (2002), Walker points out the huge change in the 1980s:   
Wealthy collectors such as Charles and Doris Saatchi influenced the exhibition 
policies of public galleries such as the Tate and Whitechapel, and profited from 
buying and selling new art. In 1985, Charles Saatchi opened his own gallery in 
North London in order to exercise control over what was shown and how it was 
presented. In fact, what he established was a complete value-adding apparatus 
(Walker, 2002, p.256). 
Tories believed that private and business patronage could solve the serious financial 
challenges facing the arts. The pamphlet’s authors argued that the increasing public 
subsidisation of the arts has ‘cumulatively outstripped the rate of inflation elsewhere in 
the economy’ (p.19). Consequently, it is unsurprising that the neoliberal solution to 
inflation was not to increase but to reduce public sector spending on cultural projects. 
However, in the following section, we will come across different characteristics of 
neoliberalism in the third stage (New Labour). Importantly, while New Labour might 
appear to favour increases in public expenditure, this is not to suggest that its policies are 
antithetical to neoliberalism (Newsinger, 2012; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015). 
Conservatives have denounced the increased public expenditures on culture since 1964, 
arguing that this merely leads to duplication (CPC, 1978). They have emphasised the 
necessity of avoiding the danger of state patronage, claiming that it restricts creative 
freedom. To prevent this kind of self-censorship and to promote a pluralist society, the 
Tories recommended tax reduction incentives for arts development, ‘leaving more money 
in private hands for arts patronage’ (CPC, 1978, p.22). In addition, the new tax system 
would ‘give special incentives to individuals and companies to support the arts and other 
charitable causes’ (p.22). This scheme was intended to give individuals greater freedom 
to choose what they wanted to sponsor and to make artists and their works come face to 
face with consumers or sponsors.   
It can be argued that putting all patronage in private hands is more likely to reduce 
freedom of creation as it would tend to discourage art that is critical of the interests of 
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corporations and/or the rich (Shaw, 1993; Walker, 2002). Shaw (1993) elaborated that 
business sponsorship became very popular in Britain in the 1980s. The government 
actually encouraged enterprises to sponsor the arts. However, it is not philanthropic; it is 
a form of advertising. Shaw was heavily involved in the Arts Council of Great Britain 
and was its Secretary-General from 1975 to 1983. After his retirement, he found that his 
successor Luke Rittner was the representative of ‘the marriage between public subsidy 
and business sponsorship’ (p.14). Furthermore, Rittner was even urging firms to sponsor, 
reminding them that ‘sponsorship has its roots in marketing, public relations and 
advertising’. Private sponsorship is good business for these businessmen. According to 
Shaw’s data (1993) and Williams’s research (1984), we can ovserve that the amount of 
public subsidy for the arts was still more than the amount contributed by private sponsors 
during that period. However, many people feel that arts activities and organisations 
depend on sponsorship because of disproportionate coverage via the mass media 
(journalism articles and PR). The wrong impression of exclusive funding is coming from 
their names on the banner and so on. Like all neoliberal freedoms, this represents freedom 
only for those who can afford it. Moreover, several pamphlets from different periods 
show the changing relationship between the arts, artists, the government, private 
enterprise and the public (Wu, 2003). For example, A Policy for the Arts (1965) was the 
first official document on arts and culture policy.  
It covers the responsibility of government and the development of a democratising 
culture. It also mentions increasing public subsidies for the arts. However, the 1980s saw 
the rise of a discourse on the collaboration between businesses and artists. Arguably, the 
commercialised trend profoundly influenced the official discourse. The ICA (1984) 
countered by reflecting and criticising the government’s action of supporting 
commercialised sponsorships. For instance, pamphlets on the arts’ and cultural 
allowances – e.g. How to Win Sponsors and Influence People (1981), What the Hell Do 
We Want an Artist Here For? (1986), The Art of the State (1989), and UK Artists’ Books: 
Marketing & Promotion (1993) – demonstrated that ‘building better cooperation between 
the enterprises and artists’ and ‘gradually reducing public subsidy for artists’ were 
occurring in the 1980s and early 1990s. A new professional figure – the arts 
development/sponsorship officer, especially within flagship cultural organisations – was 
an even broader phenomenon which went well beyond London and involved arts 
organisations based in medium to large urban areas across the country during this period. 
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In the second period, the government, private foundations and think-tanks advocated a 
closer relationship between business and culture, thus solidifying the position of 
commercial funders. It is worth noting here that another problem with this situation is 
that sponsorship inevitably is concentrated on elite, traditional forms and is also 
geographically skewed to benefit large metropolitan areas. An Arts & Business report 
showed that over 90% of private sponsorship and donations to the arts went to arts 
organisations based in central London, and for rural areas in the north of England, for 
example, it was basically impossible to raise any meaningful sponsorship income (Brown, 
2013, 2016) – one more reason why it is unrealistic to suggest that sponsorship is an 
effective substitute for funding.   
To sum up, the logic of cultural policymaking at this crucial juncture was changing as a 
result of the tendencies of neoliberalism (the stage of Thatcherism). The authorities 
minimised the government’s responsibility in the provision of public art but ostensibly 
afforded more choices to the public. That way, everyone could find what he/she wanted 
in a ‘free’ market which included the arts. After the 1980s, commercialised cultural 
policy reached a new level, which appeared as a new item, ‘creative industries’, under 
the Blair government. 
In ‘The Arts Council’ (1979), Williams analysed the problems of the internal working of 
the Arts Council, which had a new mandate: finding commercial sponsors to support its 
arts activities, which had succumbed to financial pressure. According to the article, the 
public sectors depended, to a certain extent, on private funding and reduced the public 
subsidy in the 1970s. In addition to internal democratic issues, Williams also found 
similarities in the cultural policy logic of both political parties, e.g. new tax concessions 
for sponsors of arts activities to ‘develop the arts as prestige amenities’ (p.157). Williams 
also wrote ‘State Culture and Beyond’ (1984) for the Institute of Contemporary Arts 
(ICA), which explored problems in the state-culture relationship. He not only pointed to 
the essence of cultural policy and its feature of display, he also demonstrated the trend of 
arts entertainment. Williams explained how the operations of official policy and how 
culture is used for national aggrandisement and economic purposes (McGuigan, 2004, 
p.5). The general purpose of cultural policy as display is to embellish the prevailing social 
order, which is hardly surprising (McGuigan, 2004, p.63). McGuigan (2004, p.62-63) 
briefly recapitulates two sub-categories of cultural policy as display identified by 
Williams (1984).  
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First, there is national aggrandizement, symbolized, as we have seen, by pomp 
and ceremony. Second, there is economic reductionism, represented in business 
propositions of one kind or another which, as we shall see, are increasingly 
pronounced in rationalizing public cultural investment, including ‘leverage’ for 
economic growth and promoting the interests of corporations. 
Therefore, the development of cultural policymaking changed the essence of arts 
activities from ‘less public subsidy’ to ‘increasing commercial sponsors’ and, finally, 
becoming the great ‘entertainment businesses’. Williams examined the role of the mass 
media as a new cultural form in the 1960s, but some media such as tabloids represented 
‘bad culture’. He also wanted to ‘establish and guarantee independent enterprises [which 
were] committed to the policy outlined’ (p.371) because he had seen that ‘the actual 
producers of cultural work cannot, from their own resources, command ownership’ 
(p.368). However, Williams claimed that ‘the control of these expensive means should 
not be made available to the highest bidder’ (1961, p.368) and that cultural workers 
should not just turn into employees. In 1979, Williams opined that the mass media, such 
as TV and radio, were a kind of channel to communicate the arts. Later, in 1984, he 
articulated that the mass media were the major art of the twentieth century, which ‘should 
be regarded as part of an arts policy or fine arts policy’ (p.4). From this perspective, there 
were three significant aspects of cultural policy: ‘public patronage of the arts’, ‘media 
regulation’ and a ‘negotiated construction of cultural identity’ (McGuigan, 2004, p.64). 
Williams’ argument suggests that one of the serious problems of cultural policymaking 
is its veering towards commercialisation and entertainment. Notwithstanding, the 
important role of the mass media should be noted, which is also constitutive of cultural 
policy, as it does not work only according to market logic. These are not only the views 
of Williams (1961, 1984), but also of other researchers such as McGuigan (1996, 2004, 
2005), Gray (2000, 2007), and Wu (2003). They emphasise that the process of British 
cultural policymaking has been changed and became more commercialised, more 
instrumentalised, more privatised and more neoliberalised. For example, Gray (2007) 
explores that the use of ‘culture’, and particularly the ‘arts’, as instrumental tools for the 
attainment of non-cultural, non-arts, goals and objectives.  
The development of this tendency in arts and cultural policies is part of a wider 
set of political, social and economic changes that have been taking place over a 
period of time stretching back to the late 1970s/early 1980s. These changes 
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effectively led to a commodification of public policy through the creation of the 
ideological conditions within which exchange-value becomes increasingly 
favoured over use-value in the creation, implementation and evaluation of 
policies (2007, p.203).  
These market-based solutions for the perceived problems of the arts can be seen in many 
areas. It is the preference for a private sector basis for the arts, with the state as a form of 
residual supporter for certain art forms. McGuigan (2005) considers that the welfare state, 
then, was at the heart of social policy; and also, to an extent, cultural policy. However, 
Wu (2003) and McGuigan (2002) also examine how the ideology of ‘business culture’ 
has changed the logic of cultural policy making. The visual arts in Britain and the United 
States have become the plaything of corporate business (Wu, 2003), and London’s 
Millennium Dome is a typical case to demonstrate how business sponsorship is moving 
from kudos-enhancing associations with artistic culture to other forms of culture 
(McGuigan, 2003; McGuigan & Gilmore, 2002).  
As argued earlier, the neoliberal strategy of tax breaks only benefitted enterprises, not 
society or the public. Further, Williams (1979) succinctly illustrates the defects of 
increasing private sponsorship. For example, the Arts Council faced enormous financial 
pressure to find commercial sponsors to support their arts activities. In particular, some 
bore the logos of enterprises. Excessive private subsidies drove artists and applicants to 
acquiesce to their patrons or market trends. In the short term, private subsidies seemed 
useful to relieve pressure on government spending during the economic crisis, but would 
eventually destroy the stable development of culture.  
The condition of cultural growth must be that varying elements are at least 
equally available, and that new and unfamiliar things must be offered steadily 
over a long period, if they are to have a reasonable chance of acceptance. 
(Williams, 1961, p.365) 
Private patronage has not been a long-term or reliable funding source for the arts, 
especially because of influence from market preferences and individual purchases. The 
most reliable funding source for the arts could be the state and independent organisations 
operated by members without private capital and developed through a social-democratic 
approach (Shaw, 1993; Hewison, 2004). However, cultural policy has pushed arts 
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activities from receiving ‘less public subsid[ies]’ to ‘increasing commercial sponsors’ 
and, finally, to becoming the great ‘entertainment businesses’. 
Labour’s White Paper from the 1960s (1965, p.6) asserted that the relationship between 
enterprises and the arts is not about ‘how the enterprises assist the arts’ but, rather, how 
arts festivals supported by the Arts Council could help local enterprises grow. The White 
Paper also considered the contributions from private donors, trusts and private collectors. 
The role of the private sponsors can be regarded as having gone through two periods. 
Contributions from these sponsors emerged as a utilitarian means to encourage 
individuals and companies to support the arts in order to receive tax breaks. In addition, 
ICA Document 2 (1984) – Proceedings from the Culture and the State Conference on 
Problems in Cultural Policy – which looked at themes such as arts administration and 
finance, increasing corporate patronage and falling public grants, emphasised the 
importance of the democratisation of culture and independent creation with public 
support from the state. In advancing a future cultural policy, Williams (1984) pointed out 
a dilemma in the role of the state: ‘On one hand, the state is too small to cope with the 
developing world media. On the other, the state is too big to provide pluralistic cultural 
policies and has constructed a relatively homogeneous culture’ (p.5). The state is not only 
a nation but also ‘a public power’. Importantly also, cultural and communication policies 
were also a target of neoliberal influence. Particularly, these policies underline the 
popularity of the public discourse on business sponsorship and artists’ individual 
responsibility to secure funding in the second period. McGuigan (2004, p.44) notes that 
the Arts Council promulgated a ‘rhetorical’ report – A Great British Success Story: An 
Invitation to the Nation to Invest in the Arts – which encouraged private investment and 
arts marketing as a normal feature of the public sector discourse in 1985. Moreover, New 
Labour played the role of cultural broker and systematically outsourced the responsibility 
of public sector bodies, such as the New Millennium Experience, an exemplary case. 
According to McGuigan and Gilmore (2001, 2002; McGuigan, 2004), the ideology of 
these business sponsorships became more significant than the financial implications. 
Particularly, assistance from the National Lottery was more than the total amount of 
private sponsorship. However, the objective of New Labour was ‘to represent Britain as 
a nation of corporations instead of a democratic people’ in the New Millennium 
Experience (McGuigan, 2004, p.90). 
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4.3 Marketisation (late 1990s): New Labour and Creative Industries 
policy  
If culture and art are things that help to shape our shared identity, then there is surely a 
responsibility on government to nurture them. (Chris Smith, 1998) 
 
Chris Smith, the first Secretary of State for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS), published a collection of his speeches in the book, Creative Britain. First and 
foremost, the book claimed to provide a ‘new’ cultural perspective of Britain which 
integrates art, culture, creativity, innovation and investment into a new cultural economy. 
It was also an undeniably powerful force in convincing people to believe that creative 
industries could bring new opportunities. According to the cultural policies of New 
Labour, it could be said that the state adopted the new public-management approach in 
order to increase the profits of cultural business with a ‘modified’ public spirit.   
This symbolic project was the most high-profile moment for New Labour. The creative 
industries were seen as the panacea for reinvigorating the UK’s economic future; in 
particular, they had been criticised in the past after shifting manufacturing from the UK.   
‘Creative work has become something of an ideal form of labour in the 21st century’ 
(O'Brien, 2103). New Labour promoted the Cool Britannia campaign: ‘a celebration of a 
modern, outward-facing Britain with a new kind of industry, and a new kind of workforce’ 
(Campbell & Khaleeli, 2017). New Labour's vision of the creative industries is to turn 
the UK into a ‘cultural powerhouse’, an idea that has become very popular. It could be 
said that creative industry policy has been promoted by the government and mainstream 
media for a long time. Peer through the lens of neoliberalism and we see more clearly 
how the creative industries that have received the most support from New Labour helped 
shape the idea of society as a kind of extension of the culture and knowledge industries 
market. However, the questions remains as to who is really benefiting from this growth 
of Britain’s creative industries? There remain issues of inequality, exploitation, and lack 
of opportunity in the development of creative industries in the UK. 
In this section, the process of cultural policymaking will be presented, with particular 
attention to how New Labour facilitated ‘the modernisation of Labour’ which reflected a 
line of succession from Thatcher’s neoliberalised policies. Their new rhetoric for 
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reforming the post-war model of the welfare system, public service, and social 
democracy seems to show the difference between New Labour and Thatcherism; 
however, New Labour kept the neoliberal essentials of Thatcherism and interpreted its 
new model using several ideological labels, such as ‘knowledge economy’, ‘cultural 
economy’, ‘Cool Britannia’, and ‘Creative Britain’. Profoundly, the rhetoric of political 
slogans was associated with the semblance of ‘improved’ public service masking the 
deeper process of neolberalisation. Several problems with this neoliberalised cultural 
policymaking will be uncovered, such as the over-reliance on subsidies from the National 
Lottery, cultural commercialisation with the decoration of ‘creative industries’, and the 
new public managerialism. Also, some studies also analysed that the neoliberalised 
cultural policymaking in the period would also guide us to understand the political 
discourse practices of neoliberalism (Belfiore, 2009; Garnham, 2005; Hesmondhalgh & 
Pratt, 2005; Newsinger, 2012; McGuigan 2004, 2005).  
4.3.1 The Neoliberal Succession: New Labour 
New Labour claimed that it is not only ‘beyond Left in repudiating state socialism and 
old-style social democracy [but also] beyond Right in rejecting neoliberal Thatcherism’ 
(Driver & Martell, 1998, p.174). Blair asserted that New Labour was post-Thatcherite 
(Driver & Martell, 1998). The Guardian described Blair as Thatcher's chief successor (8 
April 2013), and Driver and Martell (1998) pointed out early on that ‘Blair shows himself 
to be the sure son of Margaret Thatcher’ (p.2). These criticisms are perhaps the most 
significant indicators of the way in which critics appraised New Labour’s undertaking of 
the mission of neoliberalisation in the post-Thatcher era. New Labour adopted a new way 
of combining a free market economy with social justice. However, there was little 
substantive difference from Thatcherite values: ‘liberty of the individual with wider 
opportunities for all’ (Mandelson & Liddle, 1996, p.17). Also, in analysing neoliberalism 
under New Labour, it is imperative that we also focus on the historical transition in the 
development of neoliberalism, in particular, the discursive practices of the state, 
capitalists and the public. An excessive preoccupation with Thatcher’s and Blair’s 
individual attributes will detract from an analysis on historical perspectives. 
The Blair government reformed the social democratic model and its welfare system to 
conform with neoliberal principles, claiming to ‘modernise’ Britain, the democratisation 
of culture, and the flexibility of the labour market. The superficial slogans of 
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neoliberalism have gradually formed a common sense in our daily lives; from the 
Thatcherites, for example, the notion of materialistic individualism as a virtue, and the 
idea that everything was justified as long as it made money (Crouch, 2012).  
Driver and Martell (1998) demonstrated that New Labour pictured ‘a greater popular 
sensitivity in politics for the many not the few’ (p.3) which is the most significant 
difference from Thatcherism. It could be said that those with vested interests and some 
of the metropolitan middle-class received some benefits from the materialistic 
individualism of the 1980s-90s, with its policies, such as privatisation, market 
liberalisation, trade union repression, and market monopolisation of the national press, 
satellite and cable TV networks (which particularly benefitted News Corporation). The 
1980 Housing Act opened the way for council house buyers – many of whom were 
initially working class as homes could usually only be bought by incumbent occupants. 
Moreover, the Thatcher government regarded culture and art as areas for individual 
choice, subject to a general market without boundaries. 
In fact, this ‘enterprise culture’ with business sponsorship of the arts constituted part of 
Thatcher’s neoliberal discourse after the mid-1970s’ crises (Hewison, 2014). As the 
discourse gradually became popular in the 1980s, the new task for artists was to secure 
additional funding without recourse to public sponsorship.  
New Labour also advocated the spirit of ‘entrepreneurship’. During this period, 
consumers not only continued to enjoy the benefits of the enterprise culture, such as 
consumer sovereignty and individual freedom, but could also become entrepreneurs with 
the emergence of the ‘knowledge economy’, ‘information flows’ and ‘creative industries’. 
This discourse also addresses the fact that the neoliberal global economic system was 
controlled by an alliance of a few monopolies, international organisations and neoliberal 
governments.  
 In the Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Deliver? (1996), we see Mandelson and 
Liddle’s attempt at clarifying that New Labour was no longer the old Labour, that it was 
better than the old. Mandelson was a significant, leading figure in the rebranding of the 
Labour Party as ‘New Labour’. Consequently, New Labour’s neoliberal turn was not at 
all surprising.   
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         Table 4.2 Neoliberalised New Labour 
New relationship The position of New Labour 
Private sector 1.Rejects centralised planning and state control 
economy  
2. Ready to back individual enterprise and flair to 
get it 
3. Market should be regulated 
 
Incentives 1.profit is not a dirty word 
2. Fair tax system to attack unjustified privilege 
 
Public ownership 
 
1. Public ownership of industry is not necessary 
2. Reform of regulation in order to prevent 
monopoly abuse  
 
Trade unions 1. A stakeholder economy: the needs and 
aspirations of individuals, not interest groups 
2. In a modern economy an efficient workforce 
must be motivated, well-educated and treated as 
partners in the enterprise. 
3.  There should be no expectation of unjustified 
favours 
 
Public 
expenditure 
 
1. An over-mighty and overly high-spending state 
is a major barrier to Britain’s success. 
2. New Labour wants to end this waste and replace 
it with economically and socially productive 
spending 
3. Cutting waste and improving efficiency should 
be a priority 
 
The state 1. Do not seek to provide centralised, ‘statist’ 
solutions to every social and economic problem. 
2. enable people to work together to achieve things 
for themselves and their fellow citizens 
Sources: Mandelson & Liddle (1996) and organised by author. 
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This discourse provides the perspectives of New Labour and attempts to eliminate 
people’s qualms about ‘old Labour’ and the bad time during the 1970s. However, it is 
not difficult to see that its ideology, political discourse, and political reforms were so 
close to Thatcher’s. According to Table 4.2, there are six different aspects – private sector, 
incentives, public ownership, trade unions, public expenditure, and the state – used to 
present the position of New Labour. As we can see, the national economic project and 
nationalised industry are broadly considered to be decreased and unnecessary. Instead, 
the efficient and regulated market with flexible labour and innovatively individual 
entrepreneurs were advocated. Moreover, New Labour deliberately alienated the trade 
unions with some plausible explanations, such as the newly modernised economic system 
and the interference of interest groups. However, the reduction of labour disputes did not 
happen. In reference to state and public expenditure, New Labour believed that wasteful 
spending and statism would stop. For all of the ‘taxpayers’ (not for the public), the private 
participation and the image of a small frugal government would be their new objective.   
Mandelson and Liddle (1996) defended the position of New Labour suggesting that: 
‘profit is not a dirty word’ (p.22). To be more specific, the public sector continued to play 
an important role in the provision of public services and in maintaining the principles of 
the market and mobile private finance; however, it was expected to make a profit. In the 
period of New Labour, cultural policy became one of the pillars of economic policy, 
particularly in a deindustrialised British society. Arguably, therefore, the urban renewal 
project integrated into the creative industries project what could be construed as a 
neoliberal solution for absorbing the surplus of capital accumulation. As Harvey (2012) 
demonstrates, ‘the whole neoliberal project over the last thirty years has been oriented 
towards privatisation of control over the surplus’ (p.23). For example, gentrification and 
urban regeneration sold the idea that the only scheme was the deregulation of the property 
market and the minimisation of governmental intervention in urban design and space – 
although the New Labour government supported some public facilities, such as the 
Millennium Dome and regional arts and cultural centres. However, most urban renewal 
projects were in public-private partnerships, ostensibly reducing public expenditure and 
increasing administrative efficiency. In fact, according to the alliance, private enterprises 
did not only undertake the contracted public expenditure projects (Harvey, 2005, 2012). 
The surrounding low-priced lands would be bought by these real estate companies at the 
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same time as the speculation. In the second stage of neoliberalism, New Labour sought 
cooperation – a more vigorous public-private scheme – to privatise these public spaces. 
4.3.2 Consequence of Neoliberalised Cultural Policy  
 In the post-Thatcherite era, New Labour not only followed the neoliberalised economic 
and social policies, but it also prepared systematic discourse for the neoliberal style of 
cultural policies. By contrast, the Tories had criticised and pointed out the impracticalities 
of the cultural policy of ‘old Labour’ which promoted democratisation the arts (CPC, 
1978). However, New Labour adopted the neoliberal approach to practice its 
‘democratisation of culture’. Hewison (2014) analysed how New Labour’s cultural 
policy was ornamented with fake democracy (p.33). According to New Labour’s cultural 
position, culture became more democratic since the vibrant cultural industries were 
boosted by the government. This argument also shows ‘the unequal democracy of the 
marketplace’ (Hewison, 2014, p.33) which was in accordance with neoliberal ideology 
and democratic packaging. However, these claims are suggestive of a kind of neoliberal 
ideology with its attendant discursive practices.  
For example, Belfiore’s research analysed speeches by personnel from the Ministry of 
Culture, such as that of Chris Smith, and found that although Smith claimed that the 
benefits of the socioeconomic functions reached the arts, there was ‘paltry evidence of 
impact’ (2009, p.348). Moreover, the concept of the ‘democratisation of culture’ was 
usually mentioned in Smith’s speeches. He asserted that ‘art and sport can […] make a 
valuable contribution to delivering key outcomes of lower-term unemployment, less 
crime, better health and better qualifications’ (Belfiore, 2009, p.348; DCMS, 1999, p.6).  
Newsinger (2012) also addresses the neoliberal transition from cultural industries to 
creative industries in Britain. Here, the market gradually supplanted the state to the extent 
that cultural policy became an instrument in the neoliberal restructuring of the economy 
(p.113). Newsinger further elaborates that the link between cultural policy and economic 
policy began under Thatcherism, when the market-oriented subsidy system began. Later, 
when New Labour won the 1997 election, the Labour government restructured the 
boundaries of cultural policy and the arts market, including ‘the cultural, film and 
broadcast sectors under a new term, ‘creative industries’ (p.113). Newsinger also believes 
that the creative industries discourse erroneously rearticulated several cultural practices 
within an economic policy framework.  
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By contrast, Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015) raise doubts the neoliberal credentials of New 
Labour’s cultural policy. First, they assert that neoliberalism represents a ‘conceptual 
looseness’ and that it is not enough to criticise its development (2015, p.98). They also 
furnish statistical evidence that public expenditure was increasing under the New Labour 
government (1997-2011). As such, they fail to recognise the new characteristics of 
neoliberalism (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2014). Furthermore, public expenditure should not 
be the only standard by which to assess New Labour’s cultural policy. For example, the 
privatised urban renewal project was actually integrated with the creative industry project, 
which commissioned land speculation and overly commercialised public spaces. 
Although the state spent more on ‘culture’, this was geared towards commercialised, 
goal-directed, and festival-based cultural activities. In the age of New Labour, cultural 
policy also embodied the significant trait of the cultural display of the nation-state. For 
example, the bulk of public expenditure, under new Labour, continued to go to the big 
London cultural organisations (e.g. Covent Garden and the National Theatre) and a 
massive investment was made as part of the commitment to free museums, which has 
been a very expensive policy that has proved to be socially regressive (Belfiore et al., 
2015). Although the recipients of funding did not change, the rhetoric surrounding that 
funding changed significantly, as well as the understanding of the goals of that funding. 
This is encapsulated beautifully in the linguistic shift from ‘subsidy of the arts’ to 
‘investment in the arts’ which had started before the New Labour era (Selwood¸2006; 
Belfiore 2012). 
Hewison (2014) demonstrates that DCMS is a neoliberal project, which combines all 
cultural aspects such as arts, museums, broadcasting, creative industries, the National 
Lottery, tourism, sport, and the Olympics, and is ‘creating an efficient and competitive 
market [which] is consistent with the neoliberal approach to culture’ (p.70). According 
to several studies (Garnham, 2005; Oakley, 2004; Bell & Oakley, 2015; Hesmondhalgh 
et al., 2014; Hewison, 2014; McGuigan, 2004; Volkerling, 2001; Keat, 2000), the 
problems of cultural policies in the UK during the post-Thatcherite period were different 
from those during the previous period. Under Thatcherism, arts and culture were of little 
importance, perhaps no more worthwhile than other commodities in the marketplace. 
This sparked a cultural war and influenced the development of BBC. Thatcherite cultural 
policies were virtually ‘parsimony’ (Edgar, 2014). In contrast, New Labour’s rhetorical 
terms, such as ‘Cool Britannia’ and ‘Creative Britain’, were overly exaggerated. 
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However, it could be argued that New Labour provided ‘a Faustian pact’ for subsidising 
art and cultural activities from a utilitarian point of view. Ostensibly, New Labour put a 
higher premium on cultural policy than had the Tories. In fact, cultural policy became 
economic policy. It could be said that New Labour valued cultural policy because of its 
exchange value (Oakley, 2004). 
The Department of National Heritage was set up in 1992, resulting in all cultural and 
artistic affairs being bundled together in a single government department. Following that, 
the National Lottery Act was passed in 1993 and provided a new source of tax revenue. 
In particular, it was managed by a private firm, Camelot. Revenues were allocated as 
follows: 50% for the winners, 12% for gambling tax, 5% for Camelot, and 33% for five 
non-departmental public bodies to act as distributors, such as the Arts Council of Great 
Britain, the Sports Council and the National Heritage Memorial Fund. Hewison (2014) 
has criticised the sources receiving the funding. Although it relieved the pressure on 
public spending, the Lottery also transformed the cultural landscape (p.19). According to 
statistics from The UK Cultural Sector: Profile and Policy Issues (2001), cultural funding 
was increased more in 1998-99 than in 1993-94. This does not, however, mean that the 
New Labour government had enhanced public expenditure. On the contrary, the data 
revealed that central and local governments reduced their budget to 190m GBP. 
Therefore, a part of the increase comes from the National Lottery and business 
sponsorship (Selwood, 2001).   
To briefly recapitulate, there are four features of cultural policymaking in the New 
Labour period. First, it essentially followed the neoliberal form from the previous period. 
In fact, even Millennium Dome project was proposed by the Tories in the 1990s 
(McGuigan, 2004; Hewison, 2014). Second, the ostentatious nature of the rhetoric around 
cultural policy discourse concealed neoliberal intentions. For example, cultural 
commercialisation is adorned by ‘creative industries.’ The freelances and the creative 
classes are actually meant to be flexible labour with the recognised self-exploitation and 
low-pay (Newsinger, 2012). Third, the over-reliance on the National Lottery subsidies 
and cuts in culture funding narrow regional cultural programmes and opportunities. Also, 
people who buy Lottery tickets are predominantly from low-income groups, but are 
supporting culture and art which – we know – are consumed by the wealthiest in society 
(Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2009). Hesmondhalgh et al. (2014) characterise this as a form 
of implicit taxation (p.101). Although the establishment of DCMS and its inflated budget 
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led people to mistakenly think that public spending on culture was increasing. Fourth, 
new public management was adopted (McGuigan, 2004, 2005; Hewison, 2014; 
Hesmondhalgh et al., 2014). According to the 1997 and 2001 Labour Party Manifestos 
(Table 4.1), we can see that there were new ideas in that period. For example, the 
manifestos began to emphasise the ‘real’ contribution of culture and art and increased 
economic efficiency and investment in 1997. Therefore, it is not surprising that New 
Labour proposed new policy tools for a ‘creative economy’ and ‘cultural industries’. 
Although the concept of the ‘culture industry’ is a negative term depicting the dilemma 
between the mass media and popular culture presented by the Marxist theorists, Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, in the 1930s, it became a positive and fashionable jargon 
in New Labour’s manifestos in the form of ‘creative industries’. The 2001 manifesto 
illustrates New Labour’s original image. First, the growing tourism industry provides the 
best validation of the value of art, culture and heritage. Second, highly effective public 
services have be highly responsive to the demands of users’. If the public sector cannot 
service the users with high quality and quick responses, private sector providers could 
replace the ineffective public ones. It could be said that New Labour treats people as 
consumers, and forces on them the ideology of consumer sovereignty inherited from 
Thatcherism. For the trinity of ‘effective public services’, ‘spirit of enterprise’ and 
‘consumer sovereignty’, New Labour not only changed democratic culture (e.g. the base 
of the social democratic model; solidarity, and communities), but also constrained 
cultural democratisation (e.g. alternative cultural policy, unprofitable cultural activities 
and various art subsidies). The government wanted to maximise the country’s capacity 
to make the most of the shift from old forms of capitalism to ‘cognitive capitalism’ 
(Moulier Boutang, Y., & Emery, Ed. 2011). 
 
Hewison (2014) points out problems with Lottery funding. For example, the main 
disadvantage is that ‘lottery money was only available for one-off capital projects – 
chiefly new buildings or restored old ones’ (p.20). Hesmondhalgh et al. also pointed out 
thus factor (2014). Many grants were abused on numerous construction projects, such as 
the paradigmatic example of the Millennium Dome. Hesmondhalgh et al. (2014) 
highlight failed projects including Sheffield’s National Centre for Popular Music, the 
National Centre for Visual Arts in Cardiff, and the Life Force Museum in Bradford 
(p.102). These plans for urban regeneration ‘appropriated art and culture for the purposes 
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of economic development’ without rooted and organic local culture (Hesmondhalgh et 
al., 2014, p.103). In comparison, New Labour has promoted a democratised cultural 
policy based on the social democratic model that flourished in the 1960-70s. New Labour 
used the name of democracy and culture to embellish economic benefits. In particular, 
the Millennium Dome is not only an urban regeneration project dealing with waste, but 
also represents a cultural policy of display (Williams, 1984; McGuigan, 2004; Bell & 
Oakley, 2015). It is ironic to recall how Blair explained the greatness of the Dome in 
front of the mainstream media to rationalise additional budgeting: ‘It will last for 
generations to come. It will not be torn down; it will be a lasting asset for the country’ 
(The Guardian, 14 December 1999). His discourse aroused the sentiments of many 
people about ‘Great Britain’. For example, Blair has said that: ‘Just as the dome should 
make us all proud of this nation's creativity and imagination, so should each of the 
millennium products’ (The Guardian, 14 December 1999).  In addition, the problem of 
‘national display’ as part of cultural policymaking was mentioned by Williams in the 
1980s.   
Therefore, cultural policy is a tool for nationalistic displays, and a strategy for invoking 
imagined communities – a modern management of culture, an ‘actual state ritual’ 
(Williams, 1984, p.3), and ‘a privilege of hegemony’ (Miller & Yudice, 2002, p.7). This 
means that cultural policy, at this level, is operated potentially by the nation, which shows 
its authority and sovereignty, and is a kind of propaganda mechanism. This does not 
represent all aspects of cultural policy; this element presents only the most anti-
democratic aspects. 
4.3.3 The rhetoric of creative industries 
Prior to its victory in the 1997 election, the British Labour Party advocated a ‘creative 
industries’ programme to solve the economic depression of the 1990s (Garnham, 2005; 
Hesmondhalge, 2005). However, many studies (e.g. Garnham, 2005; Oakley, 2004; 
McGuigan, 2004; Volkerling, 2001; Keat, 2000) discovered that the creative industries 
policy did not bring real public benefit. Moreover, Oakley (2004) found that Labour did 
not have any significant and persuasive evidenc, or related research, to support the policy, 
and did not even organise any public debate to discuss the policy.  
But, in fact, the flourishing cultural landscape in film, TV and theatre in the UK was not 
due to creative industries policy, but to their accumulation of cultural heritage and the 
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long-standing media policy based on the concept of public service. Before the term 
‘creative industry’ emerged, the government adopted different cultural policies for art 
and mass media. In the past, the art and media policies fell under different departments 
in the UK. This shows that the government once differentiated between media and artistic 
policies; however, the term ‘creative industry’ eliminated these differences. For Garnham 
(2005), this signified the reliance of government's financial sectors and departments on 
subsidies. For example, after the government implemented the creative cultural policy, 
independent film workers and non-governmental organisations had to prove that they 
could achieve anticipated economic performance when they received the subsidies.  
In its arts and cultural policy, the government implemented subsidies and emphasised the 
role of education that more clearly divided art and commerce. However, in its media 
policy, the government focused on popular culture, with the core of the policy being to 
protect the freedom of the press, pluralistic content, the national film industry, the 
regulation of broadcasting, integrated public services and the regulation of market 
operation and market failure supervision (Garnham, 2005; Oakley, 2004; McGuigan, 
2004; Volkerling, 2001; Keat, 2000). These studies demonstrate that the problem of the 
neoliberal development of creative industries policy, in particular, the logic of ‘effective 
subsidy’ means ‘economic benefits’ without long-term planning or equal regional 
development. In addition, the policy created a wider gap between big cities such as 
London and the regions. Not surprisingly, the creative and cultural industries in the big 
cities became commercialised entertainment, and a part of tourism. This development 
dramatically reduced the spaces and resources available for original art and culture. As 
the industry expanded, there were more and more creative talents and artists rushing into 
the field, but there was also more unreasonable exploitation (Hesmondhalgh, 2007). 
4.3.4 Market-oriented cultural policymaking  
Neoliberal reform in cultural and creative industries policy-making has generally failed 
to promote the public interest. The concept of creative economy has heavily influenced 
the development of cultural policy discourse. Fisher (2014) has expounded how the 
rhetoric of neoliberalism and policymaking radically transformed the British 
contemporary cultural landscape and also how the impact of the systematic reduction in 
public funding of the arts for decades put artists in jeopardy: they needed to break into 
the commercial gallery system but not the innovative ‘disruptors’. ‘The postwar welfare 
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state and higher education maintenance grants constituted an indirect source of funding 
for most of the experiments in popular culture between the 1960s and the 80s’ in the UK 
(Fisher, 2014). The point is that artists were able to draw an income from benefits and 
public grants which effectively subsidised their creative work. However, the Arts Council 
made budget cuts in the 1980s, and artists came to realise that they had to aggressively 
attract collectors, curators and dealers to market their work. The neoliberal rhetoric of 
novelty and innovation has gradually but systematically deprived artists of the resources 
necessary to innovate. For example, Tony Blair’s New Labour initiated a comprehensive 
plan for ‘Creative Britain’, intended to support the development of ‘the creative class’ 
and ‘creative industries’ in a new ‘cultural economy’ (Chakrabortty, 2011).   
The subsequent ideological and practical attack on public services meant that 
one of the spaces where artists could be sheltered from the pressure to produce 
something that was immediately successful was severely circumscribed. As 
public service broadcasting became ‘marketised’, there was an increased 
tendency to turn out cultural productions that resembled what was already 
successful (Fisher, 2014). 
Although the main manufacturing sector has shrunk in Britain, the new creative economy 
‘is conditioned by a process that began with the deindustrialization of cities, and the 
export of functions and jobs to third-world countries. Culture was then summoned up to 
repurpose those places and their people as contributors to cultural consumption’ 
(Hewison, 2014, p.7).  
According to the cultural policies of New Labour, it could be said that the state adopted 
the new public-management approach in order to increase the profits of cultural business 
with a ‘modified’ public spirit. The new term ‘creative industries’ came to represent the 
neoliberalisation trend and the retreat from the democratisation of the arts. Throughout 
the process of neoliberalisation, the relationship between the state, cultural policies, 
artists (the labourers) in cultural industries and the public (the audiences) underwent a 
dynamic process of historical change. Under the creative industries policy, the 
expectations of arts-driven social regeneration was abandoned, and support for publicly 
funded culture was withdrawn in the hope that the market would provide (Hewison, 2014, 
p.7).  
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4.3.5 Neoliberal urban governance and new creative class 
As Harvey (2012) demonstrates, ‘the whole neoliberal project over the last thirty years 
has been oriented towards privatization of control over the surplus’ (2012, p.23). For 
example, the neoliberal approach to urban regeneration was the deregulation of the 
property market and the minimisation of governmental intervention in urban design and 
space – although the New Labour government extended some public facilities, such as 
the Millennium Dome and regional arts and cultural centres. However, most urban 
renewal projects were in public-private partnerships, ostensibly reducing public 
expenditure and increasing administrative efficiency. In fact, through public-private 
partnerships, private enterprises did not only undertake the contracted public expenditure 
projects, but also coordinated private development in cities (Harvey, 2005, 2012; Zukin, 
2009). Surrounding low-priced land would be purchased by these real estate companies 
at the same time as the central project. 
Dedicated creative districts seem at first glance to decommodify urban land by 
taking it out of the economic cycle of under-use, devalorization, real estate 
speculation, and revalorization. But real estate developers and public officials 
often use the symbolic capital of the ‘artistic mode of production’ to establish 
new place-identities for problematic industrial areas, rebranding them as 
‘creative’ and increasing their economic value (Zukin& Braslow, 2011, p.132) 
New Labour sought cooperation in a more vigorous public-private scheme, to privatise 
these public spaces. The creative industries project and the neoliberal urban renewal 
project were then exploited for land with potential value. Also, a new discourse – ‘public-
private partnerships are more efficient than public investment’ – became popular during 
the New Labour phase. Therefore, while these projects claim to generate ‘job increases 
and public infrastructure expansion’, the developers, not the public, are precisely those 
who make most of the profits in the process.  
Specifically, the shortcomings of the creative industries project have been highlighted in 
by many studies. (e.g. Garnham, 2005; Oakley, 2004; McGuigan, 2004; Volkerling, 2001; 
Keat, 2000). Most of them believe that the creative industries policy did not bring real 
public benefit. The New Millennium Experience is an exemplary case (McGuigan and 
Gilmore, 2000, 2002, 2015; McGuigan, 2004; Hewison, 2014). The Millennium Dome, 
for example, cost over 1bn GBP and Prime Minister Blair (1998) claimed that it would 
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be ‘good for Britain, for jobs, for tourism, but also for our self-confidence; a symbol of 
Britain’s creativity and imagination, a showcase of the best of British. Everyone who has 
been involved in this project can be truly proud’ (22 June 1998, quotes from Blair’s 
public talk). Furthermore, the Dome ‘certain widespread tendencies of city-based 
festivals today’ (McGuigan, 2011a, p.86). As McGuigan (2015) states, ‘most of these 
cultural spectacle and cultural consumption (especially the commercial and promotional 
assumptions) reflects a curious confusion or failure of cultural purpose and have 
transcended party-political differences in mainstream politics in the recent period’ 
(p.171). Even though mass media questioned that ‘the hundreds of millions of pounds of 
public money poured into the dome should have been used for worthier projects’ (Wait, 
2000) and also denounced the exposition as a festival of corporate propaganda, the 
problem grew more serious since the New Millennium Experience was replaced by 
slogans, symbols and sensation during that period. The ideology of these business 
sponsorships became more salient than the financial implications. For example, 
assistance from the National Lottery was more than the total amount of private 
sponsorship. However, the objective of New Labour was ‘to represent Britain as a nation 
of corporations instead of a democratic people’ in the New Millennium Experience 
(McGuigan, 2004, p.90). The practice of neoliberal urban renewal in Britain also 
illustrates to Harvey’s point: ‘the reproduction of capital passes through processes of 
urbanization in myriad ways’. This entails providing the right conditions as ‘the 
urbanization of capital presupposes the capacity of capitalist class powers to dominate 
the urban process’ (Harvey, 2012, p.66). 
The Public in West Bromwich (West Midlands) is an equally if not more compelling 
example of the consequences of New Labour’s arts-led regeneration initiatives. The 
building, which combined art, retail and leisure facilities, opened in 2008, many years 
behind schedule. It required considerable subsidy from local government (Sandwell 
District Council). Although by 2012-13 managers of the Public claimed that the building 
was receiving considerable visitor numbers (380,000 in that year), it was closed in 
November 2013 and has been taken over by a local college. (Hesmondhalgh et al. 2014, 
p.77). 
The Public in West Bromwich (West Midlands) was absorbing around 31.8m GBP of 
Arts Council money, plus around 25m GBP more in local government grants. It has been 
slammed by the UK government as ‘a gross waste of public money’ (Wainwright, 2013). 
  
88 
 
Even Higgins (2009) said that ‘Arts Council England has made the right decision not to 
pour further funds into a disastrous West Midlands arts centre’. However, the 72m GBP 
Public arts centre in West Bromwich continued to function until 2013 when Sandwell 
Council said that they could not spend 30,000 GBP a week to subsidise the attraction 
(‘The Public arts centre’, 2013). Sandwell Arts Trust managing director Linda Saunders 
has argued passionately that visitor figures prove the value of the project (Morris, 2013). 
Jones (2013) explains that many new public art galleries (the Public showed visual art as 
well as hosting other art forms) have opened in the years of New Labour. Most of them 
look ‘cool’ and ‘fancy’, but this kind of superficial arts funding is utterly vulnerable when 
push comes to shove. In terms of development policy, there was a lack of consideration 
for matters of long-term financial sustainability and viability for all the new buildings 
built around that time were enabled by that Lottery. In particular, instead of developing 
projects in imaginative ways, some local authorities have opted for the ‘sexier’ option of 
an arts and cultural venue.  
 
4.4 Neoliberalised cultural policy, new public management, and 
public value  
Popular mainstream ideas such as new public management in public, and private, 
corporations and the creative economy, have been accompanied by the dramatic growth 
of neoliberal-based policymaking in Britain. New public management (NPM) has begun 
to adopt what became known as the ‘philosophy’ of business management for reducing 
bureaucratic sclerosis or the so-called public service reform (McGuigan, 2016, p.18).  
There has been much actual privatisation of public assets during the period of 
neoliberalisation. It is also vital to note, however, that public sector 
organisations themselves have been required increasingly to perform like 
private businesses, a practice known in Britain as ‘the new public management’ 
(McGuigan, 2016, p. 67).  
‘NPM developed over the 18 years of the Thatcher and Major administrations’ (Hewison, 
2014, p.15). Belfiore (2004) finds that the framework of NPM played a significant role 
in the process of public policy making in Britain. She particularly points out the 
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phenomenon of ‘the increasingly instrumental inspiration of British public policies for 
culture since the 1980s’ (p.183). Belfiore (2004, p.183) states that there was ‘an 
instrumental turn in British policies for culture between the early 1980s and the present 
day’. Roberts (2014, p.44) further underlines the dangers the public sphere has faced 
since the 1980s, as market-oriented policies were introduced into the state and public 
sector. NPM has been called a modernised approach to ‘helping efficiency of public 
service’. ‘NPM was to bring greater accountability to the management of public services 
by establishing measures of performance and contractual relationships between 
departments and agencies based on the principle of Value for Money, which would be 
judged by the three ‘Es’ of Efficiency, Effectiveness and Economy’ (Hewison, 2014, 
p.15). One of the most widely used quotations about NPM is from the editor of Public 
Administration in 1991, R. A. W. Rhodes, who gave an incisive definition (Rhodes, 1991, 
p.1; Hughes, 2003, p. 324; Hewison, 2014, p.15). 
The disaggregation of public bureaucracies into agencies which deal with each 
other on a user-pay basis, the use of quasi-markets and contracting out to foster 
competition; cost cutting; and a style of management which emphasises, among 
other things, output targets, limited term contracts, monetary incentives and 
freedom to manage (Rhodes, 1991, p.1). 
The feature of NPM in the New Labour period (1997-2010) is reflected in their new 
political rhetoric. Belfiore (2004) also noticed that NPM had infiltrated the cultural sector, 
or ‘those spheres of activity where performance was not easily quantifiable’ (p.191). 
Simultaneously, neoliberal essence is also reflected in the hollowing out of cultural 
policy making. It further underlines the ideological weakness of New Labour. McGuigan 
(2016) emphasised his opposition to New Labour’s cultural policy making and 
specifically defines the Blairite ‘New Labour’ project in general and specifically in 
matters of culture and policy, as ‘neoliberal’ (p.67). It is not only ‘the encouragement of 
commercial sponsorship and the running of public-sector organisations as though they 
were private businesses’ (p.67), because New Labour recognises that cultural policies 
figure only as instrumentalities of the competitive paradigm in economic recovery 
measures, such as culture-led urban regeneration projects. NPM became a strong 
ideology not only to support the neoliberal agenda, particularly in respect of greater 
efficiency and cost saving, but also to confirm the legitimacy of neoliberal themes. 
Roberts (2014) elaborated that NPM is a practical scheme to redefine the public sphere 
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while ‘neoliberals to regulate and mask the contradictions inherent in the neoliberal 
project and help to prepare the way for a new public sphere’ (p. 55).  
The ideological themes entrenched in NPM are also important because they 
contribute towards the reorganisation of the internal administrative mechanisms 
of the welfare state in ways favourable to neoliberalism (Roberts, 2014, p.45). 
This ‘contract culture’ has influenced the public sector system. For instance, cost control, 
financial transparency, and market mechanisms are the main characteristics nowadays, 
particularly regarding the slogan of higher quality of public service for citizen customers. 
Roberts (2014) uses the case of the regulation of the mass media in the UK as an example. 
The Office of Communication (Ofcom) not only abides by the rules of neoliberal policy 
but has also been lubricated with ‘links and connections between the marketplace and 
civil society’ for working in a harmonious relationship with one another (p.44). However, 
it is paradoxical that the term ‘citizen’ is sometimes used interchangeably with the term 
‘consumer’ in Ofcom’s official website (The consumer and citizen at the heart, 2015). 
The policy discourse has undergone a neoliberal change while ‘Ofcom’s design and 
practice positions it as an institution in the public sphere with responsibilities for 
maintaining market confidence and representing the interests of the public as citizens and 
consumers’ (Livingstone, Lunt & Miller, 2007, p.64). Consumer interests, desires, 
choices, and private benefits, are deregulated and implicated in a new public sphere in 
civil society. This is what Hewison (2014) means when he states that ‘the whole of 
government – and especially the welfare state – would be restructured along the lines of 
business practice’ (p.16) while the neoliberal values adopted by the state were formerly 
impersonal and politically and socially neutral. By spreading market incentives, however, 
it erodes the public sector basis for Labour politics. Furthermore, Hesmondhalgh et al. 
(2015) found that the original ‘arm’s length’ regulation is different from the targets of 
NPM. The NPM evaluation has more techniques for monitoring and auditing arts and 
culture. According to research and interviews by Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015), cultural 
workers struggled with these annual audits and inspections of funding. 
Many arts organisations and workers felt they paid a high price for greater 
funding by being subjected to sets of targets, audit and, in general, instruments 
of ‘new public management’, and this caused considerable resentment and 
conflict. (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015, p.33) 
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Cultural organisations and workers often felt that such mechanisms created 
bureaucratic requirements that distracted them from pursuing core cultural goals 
regarding artistic innovation, stimulation and enrichment (Hesmondhalgh et al., 
2015, p.44). 
Many researchers have questioned the NPM’s dismissal of the possibility of altruism or 
a public service ethos. However, effective public administration and the constraining 
nature of the rules on evaluation criteria are also features of the NPM framework. In an 
historical context, NPM seems to answer a number of dilemmas for both the Tories and 
New Labour. Despite the NPM framework as a way of lubricating cultural policymaking 
through the system, it cannot satisfy all conundrums, especially concerning public value. 
Kelly, Mulgan and Muers (2002) confess that ‘this approach (NPM) led to some 
important gains, not least the elevation of consumer interests and the clarification of 
objectives and responsibilities’ (p.9) in this governmental report: Creating Public Value: 
An Analytical Framework for Public Service Reform (2002). They also question 
weaknesses of the NPM such as:  
 • the focus on improving functionally defined services rather than meeting the 
overall service needs of different client groups; 
• a lack of attention given to democratic engagement with citizens and 
stakeholder groups. (Kelly, Mulgan & Muers, 2002, p.10) 
This is indeed a dilemma, but it is not a choice between NPM and public value; it is a 
question of priority. For example, the most urgent priority is not further expansion of 
‘growth’ or ‘customer satisfaction’.  ‘The concept of public value offers a useful way of 
setting out the ultimate goals of public service reform and performance’ (Madon, 2005, 
p.331), which must be the first priority for any government. However, Lee, Oakley, and 
Naylor (2011) and O’Flynn (2007) perceive a transition of the popular use of ‘public 
value’ as a policy tool.  
More broadly within the arts, public value can be seen to have had a similar 
discursive role and has been plagued by the same lack of epistemological 
uncertainties (Lee, Oakley & Naylor 2011, p.294). 
Lee, Oakley and Naylor (2011) explore the uses and abuses of ‘public value’ in 
contemporary British cultural policy. This concept surfaced in the mid-2000s to refer to 
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any benefits – social or cultural – deemed to be ‘outside of the purely economic’ (p.289). 
Especially, New Labour’s ‘public service reform’ also emphasised ‘public value’ 
superficially. The ‘new’ public value is one of the pillars of public services reform. It did 
not represent a ‘direct challenge to structural inequalities’, but had more to do with Blair's 
rhetorical style. For example, consumer sovereignty and consumer choice are new targets 
for the reform. This new framework is for measuring performance, with a far greater 
focus on the public and on their preferences (Lee, Oakley & Naylor, 2011, p.291). 
Furthermore, measuring performance and valuing return on the public investment 
became more important in public sector. It is a kind of marketplace democracy which 
focuses on individual customer-citizen satisfaction and its ‘outcome’, rather than the 
process that may generate trust or fairness (O’Flynn, 2007). 
Public value cannot be measured quantitatively without lapsing into absurdity; 
sometimes it can be costly and dysfunctional if not done properly (Lee, Oakley & Naylor, 
2011; Harkin, 2005; Pidd, 2012). Therefore, the problem is not about an ‘effective’ public 
administration system but rather the neoliberalised policymaking thought and framework 
for the equivalence granted to economic efficiency.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Figure 4.1 represents the author’s main argument on the essence of public service; in 
particular, the framework of public value-based policymaking is more important in order 
to provide public services in an energetic, creative, and effective way for equitable access, 
sustainable social care, and for allowing space for altruism in the free-market economic 
belief system. Contrary to this, problems arose from the triumph of NPM framework 
policymaking. Instead of public service reform at the pace of improvements, the 
government delivered neoliberal agreements with the private sector covering every 
aspect of economic, market-oriented logic.  
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NPM framework policymaking               Public value based policymaking 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Differences between ‘NPM’ and ‘public value based’ 
policymaking                 
 
Hewison (2014, p.132) also explains that ‘the ideology of the market had so thoroughly 
penetrated public discourse that the sole purpose of government appeared to be economic 
advantage: the only measure of government success was “growth”’. This question 
indicates that ‘New Labour over-emphasised the economic and social benefits of the arts 
over other “cultural” value’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2015, p.33). From this, Hewison expresses 
his two principal concerns that ‘there are public goods that are not subject to the market 
because they cannot be bought or sold, and that there is such a thing as public value, 
which expresses the worth of what cannot be measured in exclusively market terms’ 
(2014, p.132). Kelly, Mulgan and Muers (2002) also believe that NPM was unable to 
understand or manage such hard-to-measure outcomes as trust, legitimacy, and fairness. 
Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015) not only questioned whether ‘the intensified use of audit and 
NPM techniques were aspects of Labour cultural policy which were both ineffective and 
damaging to arts and cultural practice in the UK’ but also blamed New Labour, saying 
they ‘were far too willing to adopt dubious forms of public management, rather than to 
defend public services and the public domain’ (Hesmondhalgh, et al., 2015, p.101). 
The UK experience in welfare services in earlier periods could indicate that ‘the 
combination of strong public sector institutions and competition from private and non-
profit organisations achieves the best balance of accountability, innovation, and 
efficiency’ (Cabinet Office, 2002; Freedman, 2008, p.32). However, neoliberal thought 
about cultural policy making became an alternative approach to address the priority of 
public value.  
Very specific and limited 
focus on: User’s 
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The next chapter will focus on the global dissemination and adoption of creative industry 
discourse, particularly in Taiwan. ‘At the same time, global economic changes have 
enabled more rapid and penetrating flows of ideas about creative economies, influenced 
by the shifting geopolitics of production and business organisation’ (Kong, et al., 2006, 
p. 173-174). The background to this new dneoliberalisedevelopment is as follows: to 
compete in the new creative economy, cities should seek to implement particular 
initiatives: encourage creative industry clusters, incubate learning and knowledge 
economies, maximise networks with other successful places and companies, value and 
reward innovation and aggressively campaign to attract the ‘creative class’ as residents 
(Kong, et al., 2006; Gibson & Kong, 2005). Taiwan follows this new wave of creative 
economy in the early 2000s opening a new page to change the cultural policymaking and 
cultural landscape.   
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5 
After the Adoption of the British Model in Taiwan: The 
Transition to a Creative Economy in Cultural Policymaking 
(2000-2002) 
In the 15 years since Creative Britain was published, the UK has been living through 
something of a golden age for the arts and museums. […] it has also been down to the 
strength of our distinctive mixed funding model for the arts. 
Chris Smith (18 November 2013, The Guardian) 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is based on the analysis of ‘two major policy documents (national plans) 
and three seminars over the period 2000-02. It seeks to ascertain how Taiwanese cultural 
policy has given way to a new form of marketisation and globalisation by focusing on 
the influence of British creative industry (CI) policies in that period and how they shaped 
early Taiwanese CI policy. The worldwide rhetoric of success of the UK’s creative 
industries is a significant element in neoliberal globalisation. British creative industries 
became a model globally in the early 2000s. Taiwan is one of the countries that adopted 
this policy model during this period.  
It explains the early trajectory of cultural policy, which is considered as different from 
later CI policy. The next chapter analyses how thinking on Taiwanese cultural 
policy gave way to a new form of neoliberalism and expansion in the second period. 
The following two chapters cover the final stage of CI policy, dissecting 
its institutionalisation and its consolidation in legislation. It seeks to explain the 
neoliberal results of the reform of Taiwanese creative industries and the dilemma 
of cultural policymaking. The final chapter focuses on cultural and creative workers 
and visualises their working conditions and their growing neoliberal-self.  
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Returning to this chapter, I explore the ways in which cultural policymaking has reached 
a critical turning point in two sections. Firstly, the development of cultural and media 
policymaking ideas before the 2000s is briefly reviewed; in particular, the way the mass 
media system was neoliberalised in the 1990s, the new local discourse of cultural 
citizenship participation, and the revival of local cultural industries. The adoption of 
British CI policy in the 2000s, which was a turning point, further changed previous 
cultural policy. Secondly, two major policy documents (national plans) from 2000-02 
represented the change in cultural policy thought. For example, a new national project in 
2000 was more focused on the ‘knowledge economy’ and ‘information economy’ by 
improving higher education and technology and interactive programmes, with the aim of 
securing the high-wage, hi-tech economy of the future. In 2002, the creative economy 
became a favourite new policy presented in the new national project. Historical materials, 
government documents and interview data will be used to represent the transition. 
Finally, I review the adoption of British creative industry discourse, which was translated 
in several international symposiums in Taiwan before 2002. Many studies contend that 
the adoption of creative economy discourse occurred in 2002, after the announcement of 
the second national project. However, some CI policy experts, consultants and scholars 
from Britain, who gave speeches and held discussions in Taiwan, gave the impression of 
a celebration of new cultural policymaking and new relations between the public sector, 
artists, and new future cultural business in the early period (2000-02). It might not have 
been critical to cooperate with these activities in order to promote CI policy in Taiwan, 
but there is interesting historical evidence to prove the reach of global dissemination of 
British CI policy, even though there is currently no consistent evidence that there was 
direct intervention in cultural policymaking from these CI policy experts and consultants. 
Shortly afterwards, however, civil society and arts and culture professionals were pushed 
towards a change/promotion in government attitudes on CI policymaking, encouraged by 
progress in cultural policymaking. It demonstrates how British CI policy – the concept 
of a creative economy that embraces the creative industries and the cultural sector – was 
crafted, localised and accepted in the Taiwanese context.  
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5.2 Media policy and cultural policy before 2000s 
This section provides a brief history of cultural policy, cultural industries policy and 
media policy making in Taiwan before 2000. Cultural policy and the mass media system 
created a conflict between official Chinese nationalism and the rise of Taiwanese 
consciousness. The root problem is that, firstly, Taiwan was ruled as a one-party state by 
the Kuomintang (KMT) government which suppressed opposition not only to ensure one-
party dictatorship, but also to establish the powerful tradition of Chinese nationalism 
from 1949. Media, education, and cultural systems were used as propaganda to enhance 
the promotion of nationalism. Secondly, Taiwanese consciousness was rising up in the 
process of democratisation in Taiwan. The democracy movement emerged in 1979-80, 
with Taiwan’s first native-born KMT leader, Lee Teng-hui winning the first presidential 
election in 1996. He has tried to promote Taiwanese culture with revivalist local craft 
industries and local cultural re-establishment, ostensibly through a softly-softly cultural 
policy. The advocacy of cultural citizenship and community-based culture in new cultural 
policy thinking occurred in the mid-1990s; simultaneously, neoliberalisation of the mass 
media system happened in the 1990s (See Table 5.1). As introduced in Table 5.1, we can 
follow this historical context of cultural policymaking process, which was influenced by 
both the autocratic and democratisation periods. 
98 
Table 5.1 Brief political history and media &cultural policy after 1949 in 
Taiwan 
Time Political 
situation 
Ruling 
party 
Media system Cultural 
policy 
Before 
1980s 
1949-
1980 
declared 
martial law 
one-party 
dictatorship 
system 
KMT 1.Controlled by
the KMT
government for
spinning
government
propaganda and
promoting
Chinese
nationalism and
culture
Used to 
promote 
Chinese 
nationalism 
1980s 1988 an end to 
decades of 
one-party 
dictatorship 
KMT 1.Controlled by
the KMT
government and
the few people
with a vested
interest in the
status quo
2. underground
radio, newspaper,
magazines, and
video tapes
1989 lifting the ban 
on 
newspaper 
publications 
or political 
parties 
KMT 
1990s 1996 First election 
for president. 
KMT Deregulation;  
marketisation; 
privatisation; 
a small public 
broadcasting 
service 
Localisation; 
the rise of 
Taiwanese 
consciousnes
s 
2000s 2000 In the 
presidential 
election, KMT 
loses power 
for first time 
DPP polarised politics, 
commercialisatio
n, 
neoliberalisation, 
Adoption of 
British CI 
policy model. 
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in more than 
50 years 
Private equity 
fund and foreign 
investment 
monopolise 
Taiwan's cable 
TV market 
 
CI policy Part 
of cultural 
policy.  
Used to 
support social 
and economic 
participation 
of people in 
communities 
and act as 
community 
infrastructure. 
Includes 
‘industrialisati
on of culture’ 
and policies 
for the revival 
of local craft 
industries. 
2008 After 8 years, 
KMT became 
the ruling 
party in this 
presidential 
election 
KMT 
2016 KMT loses 
power again  
DPP 
 
People who believe in liberalism espoused market-based solutions to the problems of 
suppressed media freedom during the martial law period. However, media freedom is at 
risk from a marketised mass media system, in particular, media ownership deregulation 
cannot protect diversity of media content and ownership. Furthermore, vested interests 
remained unexposed after the marketisation of the mainstream media. Most of them 
profited from the privatisation of public resources (e.g. broadcasting services) and 
continued to support their fixed political interests and ideologies (most support KMT 
ideology – Chinese nationalism – while some support DPP ideology – Taiwanese 
consciousness). The problems of privatisation and marketisation brought polarised 
politics and neoliberalisation and indicate that Chinese nationalism in its present state 
rests on a fundamental contradiction in Taiwan. With the benefit of hindsight, we can 
now see that cultural and media policy thinking in Taiwan in this period pointed to the 
political and economic influences (such as the factor of China, the neglect of 
manufacturing and the overdevelopment of the financial sector) in the process. Since the 
shift of cultural policymaking towards neoliberalism, the idea of the creative economy 
and creative industries set Taiwan on an irreversible trajectory on which new investment, 
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new regulation and new industrial strategy began to align with the ‘British model’ (a 
global economy powered by creative industries and the creative economy). Key features 
of media, culture, and CI policy and its transition in the 1990s suggest that the 
government exerted political influence under the cover of deep economic uncertainty; 
this become extremely critical for the subsequent transition to CI policy in the early 2000s. 
This is the story before the critical turning point. 
5.2.1 Fight for Public good in a neoliberalised media market: 
The campaign of Public Service Broadcasting in Taiwan  
This section assesses the changing relationship between Taiwan’s Public Television 
Service Foundation [PTS; in Chinese 財團法人公共電視文化基金會], the State and 
civil society organisations during a fifteen year period of significant change between 
1997 and 2013.  
The Public Television Act was not passed until 1998 after considerable contention over 
many of the clauses. In line with the preferences of the KMT government, PTS should 
be an ‘ideal’ state TV broadcaster, and therefore correspond with the interests of 
Government. The budget and the President of the PTS Board would be “directly 
nominated by the government”. The DPP fought against the KMT but also worked with 
them, for example in removing a proposed clause stating that commercial broadcasters 
would have to set aside a certain percentage of their surplus each year for the 
development of PSB. The cable TV sector was also involved, a system that had become 
gradually popular since its start in the late 1970s, exerting significant pressure in the 
development of Taiwan’s neoliberalised media market. In the period of our analysis the 
cable market was monopolised by a few local private capital firms along with 
international private equity funds (Rawneley 2004 & 2011). The Public Television Act 
that was finally passed was a watered down set of ‘compromise agreements’.  
After almost 10 years of arduous negotiations, PTS was finally launched. Despite 
problems, as we discuss in ths chapter, one should not minimise the fact that this was a 
significant achievement for civil society organisations thathad collaborated on many of 
the key issues, especially including the structure for internal governance, a guarantee of 
reasonable funding, the emphasis on independence in media policy, and the scope and 
scale of public media’s remit in Taiwanese society. None of the goals were achieved in 
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full, or even fully enough, but all of them were emphasised in the discourse and these 
organisations exerted influences that made a difference in the outcomes to date.  
We look at how the newly established Ministry of Culture (2012), the agency responsible 
for public service media [PSM] in Taiwan, could create an improved system in a 
gradually neoliberalised market2. The chapter investigates the extent to which 
deregulatory communication policies, market-oriented cultural policies, bipartisan 
battles and active civil society organisations are influencing the development of PSM in 
Taiwan. The boundaries of particular importance are between the state and media, which 
require greater arm’s length relations, and between PTS and civil society organisations, 
which require stronger integration.  
At its start in 1997, PTS was conceived as a niche service to complement a rapidly 
commercialising media market. From the start it lacked sufficient funding and was 
marginalised in cultural and communications policy. The situation was later complicated 
by friction between the two major political parties in Taiwan – the Kuomintang (中國
國民黨) and the Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨). Between 2010 and 2013 
there was considerable friction over issues related to managing PTS personnel, 
particularly directors. Thus, PTS has been politicised in Taiwan.   
Radical structural reform is needed, especially regarding the media’s role and position in 
Taiwanese democracy. Civil society organisations recognise this. A variety of groups 
have become powerful voices that are demanding amendments to the Public 
Broadcasting Act, which is the basis for PSM in Taiwan. They emphasise the need to 
guarantee much higher editorial and administrative independence. Improved co-
operation would support more general reforms in Taiwan’s neoliberalised media policy.  
Since 2012, PSM in Taiwan has been governed by the Ministry of Culture. This puts PTS 
in a core position for cultural policymaking and that is promising for needed development 
in Taiwanese democracy and cultural citizenship. Raymond Williams’ (1958, 1975 & 
1984) theories and analyses of public service broadcasting [PSB] underlines the critical 
importance of cultural factors and democratic practices in determining the uses and 
meanings of communication technologies. As Jim McGuigan (1996: 180) observed, 
“Democracy is about the rights of citizens; culture is about meaning and pleasure”. The 
two are intertwined in PSB, which has a recognised role in cultivating and supporting 
cultural citizenship (Jauert & Lowe 2005). Feng (2012) convincingly argues that public 
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cultural policy is essential to the remit of PSM today. Larsen (2011: 35) contends that, 
“PSB institutions…have to live up to cultural policy obligations”. We agree and thus 
resist today’s overwhelming emphasis on neoliberal ideology because cultural policy 
contributes public value by cultivating “an inclusive public sphere, a vivid democracy 
and a national culture” (ibid: 44). 
PSM has a significant role in defending the media’s democratic and cultural 
responsibilities against damaging excesses rooted in today’s overwhelming emphasis on 
neoliberal logic. Taiwan is a useful case for improved understandings about why that is 
essential, especially in countries where democratic practice is comparatively young, 
evolving and therefore requires firm supports. PSM has a role of decisive importance in 
developing public value and enhancing democratisation in digital media markets 
(Donders 2010). As Hesmondhalgh (2005: 107) suggested, “media and cultural policy 
need to be considered in relation to each other, and in relation to public policy more 
generally”. We agree on the high degree of interdependence and co-determination this 
implies. Cultural policy in the West is particularly imbued with neoliberalism, 
globalisation and an alluring discourse that advocates the supreme importance of 
‘creative industries’. This perspective has achieved great impact and influence elsewhere, 
including Taisan. This is worrisome because a considerable body of research documents 
the failure of creative industries policy to produce the anticipated public benefits (e.g. 
McGuigan 1996, 2004, 2005a & 2005b; Keat 2000; Volkerling 2001; Oakley 2004; 
Garnham 2005; Grant 2011;).  
A new and symbiotic relationship can be developed in Taiwan that better integrates the 
relationships between PTS, civil society organisations and the state. It is a better path 
than the neoliberal prescription because it would both respect boundaries between the 
State and PTS to ensure independence, and simultaneously relax boundaries between 
PTS and Civil Society to ensure accountability. This is the vital path for supporting the 
healthy development of democracy in Taiwan. 
5.2.2 Politics and culture under martial law 
Chinese nationalism was used to support the legitimacy of the Kuomintang (KMT) rule 
over the country after 1949. Both ideological state apparatus (ISA) and repressive state 
apparatus (RSA) played important roles as the remnants of the KMT government fled to 
Taiwan by the end of 1949. For much of its early history, the KMT government ruled 
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Taiwan through terror. The country was run as a military dictatorship, often under martial 
law, and the majority of governors were military officers who followed the KMT party 
and fled to Taiwan. Most public employment in local government and education were 
occupied by mainlanders (who moved to Taiwan from China after 1945), and most 
Taiwanese were excluded from politics during the period of martial law (1949-1987). 
The plan for a counter-attack to recover mainland China was a good excuse for the KMT 
government to retain martial law for 38 years, routinely using it to suppress dissent and 
the fledging pro-democracy movement during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Human rights campaigners were jailed and brutalised. Taiwan’s democracy movement 
emerged in 1979-1980 in response to KMT’s dictatorship. There were many issues, such 
as the peasants’ movement (1988-1989) 1, environmental movements (from the late 
1970s)2, the aboriginal rights campaign3, and the independence movement4. Mass arrests 
occurred, and underground radio stations, newspapers and magazines were banned 
during this period. Most people got information and news from mainstream media, which 
was controlled by the state. Furthermore, ‘we are the successor of Chinese nation and 
culture’ was a popular slogan during the early period. For example, the Department for 
Education responded by insisting schools instill a stronger sense of ‘Chinese values’ in 
pupils. Furthermore, mainstream media were controlled by the state and propagated the 
ideology of ‘Chinese culture is better than Taiwanese culture’ via news, TV series and 
variety shows. Wang (2014) depicted the influence of Chinese nationalism ideologies as 
‘the age of homogenization’ through wrongful exclusion of ‘the others’.  
With the strong influence of Chinese nationalism, people were forced to share 
a common identity – that is, Chinese identity – and to give up their cultural and 
ethnic traditions. Many art forms and collective memories, which were not 
1 Taiwanese farmers were demanding a wider transparency of agricultural policies that were dominated by the KMT regime. 
Particularly, farmers opposed the import of American fruits and meats that affected Taiwanese peasants’ survival. 
2 Taiwanese environmental movements occurred in the late 1970s, while Taiwan society could not endure economic 
development with highly polluted, highly energized and water-wasting industrialisation. 
3 The aboriginal rights campaign highlights the challenge for indigenous peoples in Taiwan. It is not only about the problems 
of discrimination and stereotyping, but also concerns child prostitution, child labour, employment issues, medical care, and 
environmental and economic problems in aboriginal areas. These issues started with exclusion from Taiwanese society. 
Therefore, in 1984, the Taiwan Association for the Promotion of the Indigenous Rights issued its Declaration of the Rights 
of Taiwan's Indigenous Peoples and continues the fight for aboriginal rights.  
4 Taiwan’s independence movement is a political movement whose goals for independence have arisen from international 
law in relation to the 1952 Treaty of San Francisco. People contend that when Japan renounced all rights to the islands of 
Taiwan and Penghu, they did not specify the successor state, and consequently the sovereignty of the two territories should 
one day be determined by the Taiwanese people through self-determination and referendums in Taiwan. 
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relative to Chinese culture, were exclusive to cultural policy; therefore, it was 
viewed as ‘the age of homogenization’ (p.39). 
It could be said that most people were vulnerable to the influence of Chinese nationalistic 
ideology. 
5.2.3 The end to martial law and the spoils of opening the media market 
The KMT government and private capital have controlled broadcasting in Taiwan for 
decades. From TV’s start in the 1960s, Taiwan Television Enterprise [TTV, 台灣電視
公司], the China Television Company [CTV, 中國電視公司] and the Chinese Television 
Service [CTS, 中華 電視公司] were primarily propaganda tools serving the demands of 
a one-party state5. In a sense, TV broadcasters were ‘accomplices’ of the state and were 
legally permitted to make extortionate profits as a related benefit. This warped 
broadcasting system merged authoritarian political ideology and commercial interests. A 
sweeping privatisation of Taiwan’s media market ensued, in principle forbidding 
political interference (or at least ownership). The jargon and ideology of the ‘free market’ 
was all the rage, with strong emphasis on the presumed benefits of liberalisation, 
globalisation and individualism.  
This situation persisted through the 1990s as Taiwan’s neoliberalised media market 
emerged in the 1990s. The KMT government and a few private capital firms controlled 
broadcasting before this change. Taiwan’s broadcasting system was a type of 
authoritarian market. The structure of television regulation was neoliberalised in the 
1990s. In particular, the transition of the media market structure was changed from a 
politically controlled free market to a deregulated free market. Liu (2006, p.116) stated 
                                            
5  Three stages define the concept of the ‘state’ in the historical process of Taiwan. First, the nationalist KMT 
government and Chiang Kai-shek fled mainland China and established the Kuomintang (KMT) government, an 
authoritarian market-state in the pre-democratization period from 1949. 
Democracy and social movements emerged in the 1980s and indirectly contributed to the lifting of martial law 
and the ban on competing political parties in 1986. Some studies (Taylor, 2002; Wang, 2004; Laio, 2008) have 
suggested the first wave of democratisation in Taiwan was from 1986.The state’s authoritarian control gradually 
loosened in the second period. These dynamics demonstrate that the democratic character of the state has only 
slowly developed and is still not complete. Taiwan’s PTS was conceived in the third period, which is a blend of 
semi-authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes that has taken hold since the late 1990s. In 2000, the ruling 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) oversaw the transition to a genuine two-party system that allowed alterations 
in political rule. The DPP eventually threw its support behind the KMT, however, and the latter formed a new 
government in 2008. 
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that, unfortunately, ‘this trend meets the interests of media owners rather than of the 
public’. 
5.2.4 Localisation of cultural policy and ‘industrialisation of culture’ for 
local CI revival in the 1990s 
Cultural policy represents a significant intervention in shaping citizenship and 
recognising the country's cultural diversity. In particular, the democratic bonds of our 
multicultural society strengthened through cultural policy. However, many of the 
progressive partisans/activists/academics we need in this struggle were being stifled in 
this period under martial law (Wang, 2014a, 2014b). After declaring martial law, new 
political parties could finally be legally established (i.e., Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP)), and new newspapers could be published. The first election in Taiwan for the 
legislature was held in 1992; the first election for president was held in 1996. In the 2000 
presidential election, the KMT lost power for first time in more than 50 years. The logic 
was to change the political situation in the country in the 1990s by removing and 
replacing an undesirable leader (i.e., President Lee Teng-hui, who is Taiwanese, was 
KMT’s leader and won the popular election for the presidency in 1996 to become the 
first elected president of Taiwan). The conflict between Chinese nationalism and 
Taiwanese consciousness was rising during the process of democratisation.  
Wang (2013, 2014) elaborates that the contradiction between Chinese nationalism and 
Taiwanese consciousness in Taiwanese society is highlighted by the cultural policy 
employed to promote Chinese nationalism since the 1940s. However, the process of 
democratisation from the 1980s and the change of the political and cultural situation in 
the 1990s revealed the possibility of a new cultural landscape and local participation. It 
can be argued that it is inevitable to have internal division when the KMT party/ 
government had such a loose structure. During President Lee Teng-hui’s rule, cultural 
policy included more local cultural discourse of Taiwanese consciousness – and it 
required a distinctive Taiwanese national and cultural identity to develop cultural 
citizenship and participation and community awareness. After almost 40 years under 
dictatorship and the ISA (and RSA) of ‘Chinese nationalism’, the new cultural policy, 
which included revival of local cultural industries and ideas of cultural community, was 
practiced during the 1990s. This means that cultural policymaking in 1990s’ Taiwan was 
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more focused on community development, community identity, local participation, 
cultural citizenship, and local handicraft industries. 
Ku (2012) argues that cultural policy for local community empowerment and 
participation in the mid-1990s was related to the significant correlation between the 
industrialisation of cultural policy and political democratisation. Wang (2014b) 
elaborates ‘the relationship between national identity and cultural policy in Taiwan from 
a historical perspective’ (p.35). She believes that the rise of Taiwanese consciousness 
from the 1970s to the 1990s also strengthened the wave of local community 
empowerment and cultural participation. 
Cultural policy became an important political tool/ideology for sharpening people’s 
consciousness and identity. However, this has been in the context of decades of high 
political anxiety. This trend particularly underscores a broader identity crisis between 
Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness, shedding light on why ‘Chinese 
nationalism’ politics from the martial law and post-martial law periods still plays a role 
in Taiwanese society. Therefore, new cultural policymaking in the 1990s that encouraged 
‘local community’ and ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ could not replace ‘Chinese 
nationalism’-oriented cultural policy. This was more like a cultural policy based on 
orthodox Chinese culture, supplemented with Taiwanese culture. The conflict, dilemma 
and opposition between the two perspectives came from stereotypes of Taiwan and 
Taiwanese culture in the mainstream media and the education system. A typical example 
from the early period is that people who speak Taiwanese are in lower social classes, but 
people who speak standard Mandarin in Taiwan have higher education levels or higher 
cultural capital. The KMT government ‘educated’ Taiwanese people to learn Chinese 
culture and speak good Mandarin with the message that they could be in a higher social 
class through early-period cultural policy, the education system and control of the 
mainstream media.   
In the first period (1949-1987), the legitimacy of the KMT governance has been cited as 
a key factor in influencing the cultural and media policy for promoting Chinese 
nationalism and orthodox Chinese culture in Taiwan (See Table 5.1). In the face of 
profound changes in the political landscape, people protested against restrictions on 
freedom of speech, political freedom and freedom of movement. Taiwanese 
consciousness was rising up against the mythology of Chinese nationalism which 
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occupied a common status in the paternalistic state – Taiwanese people were taught they 
are Chinese – for a long time. Therefore, cultural participation in the revival of local 
communities and local cultural handicraft industries played a role in growth of Taiwanese 
consciousness in the second period cultural policy. Simultaneously, market-oriented 
media policy aggravated the condition; mainstream media were controlled by the 
autocratic state first; then manipulated by the private consortium as part of the old 
KMT/media relationship in Taiwanese politics and journalism. Some manifestly 
abandoned their own political independence and supported the DPP as part of a new 
DPP/media relationship. Deregulation of media systems did not bring about genuine 
media freedom but delivered polarised politics and more contradictions between Chinese 
nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism. The more economic motives behind cultural 
policy were adopted around 2000. These include not only the previous ‘local cultural 
handicraft industries’ policy but also add media policy into a broader framework of 
creative industries policy in the third period (see Table 5.1).  
 
5.3 The diffusion and adaptation of CI policy between 2000 and 2002 
Taiwan’s first official creative industries project was proposed in 2002. However, the 
concept of creative industries had been discussed in the United Kingdom since 1997 and 
Australia since 1994. Neoliberalism, global capitalism and the profitable growth of 
global cultural industries gradually affected the direction of cultural policy in Taiwan. 
The government has regarded the creative industries as a feasible solution for 
transforming traditional industry and increasing employment and the value of production. 
In Taiwan, the British conception of the creative industries was also grafted on to a new 
cultural and creative industries project. 
In this section, several published government documents, national development plans 
and conference handbooks were analysed. More specifically, two main national 
development projects were concerned with the early appearance of the creative industries 
policy discourse. The first project was the National Development Plan for the New 
Century (2000) which underlined the development of the ‘knowledge economy’ but 
failed to mention any cultural policy regarding ‘creative industries’ or the ‘cultural 
economy’. However, the second national project Challenge 2008 Six-Year National 
Development Plan (2002) made a definite claim for developing the ‘cultural and creative 
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industries’. Considering these national projects together, the idea of ‘creative industries’ 
appears to have been adopted between 2000 and 2002. In this period, there were two 
national plans and the first ‘creative industries’ international conference took place in 
Taiwan. At this turning point in the country’s development, any reference to the 
conception of creative industries was an oblique one, against a background of declining 
traditional industries’ need to cast off and move on as manufacturing sectors shrank 
during the 1990s; Taiwanese factories were closing, and production was moving to China, 
with the loss of jobs in manufacturing. Therefore, the crux of this matter in this section 
is that the DPP government supported a sustained and aggressive creative industries 
policy.  
Cultural policy was not as important as other policies in the first national project. The 
main slogans – such as ‘knowledge economy’ and ‘information society’ – were seen in 
the context of increasing employment and advancing internet technology and high-
quality human resources, which may have further offset the decline of traditional 
manufacturing. The administration’s attitude to cultural policymaking was a ‘better than 
nothing’ approach. They saw art and culture as being about decoration or adornment. 
However, the second national plan vigorously promoted cultural policy within the 
‘cultural and creative industries’. The policymakers’ attitude has changed since cultural 
policy could be seen as a component of economic policy. The change of the cultural 
policy discourse during this period will thus be elaborated. 
5.3.1 National Development Plan for the New Century (2000) 
The DPP government proposed two national development projects: The National 
Development Plan for the New Century (2000) and The Challenge 2008 Six-Year 
National Development Plan (2002). While both projects included cultural policy, the 
second contained the first official discourse promoting creative industries. The crucial 
difference in the cultural policies of the two national projects arose from the policy 
discourse of neoliberalism. The National Development Plan for the New Century (2000) 
focused on the knowledge economy, information society, and financial liberalisation. In 
addition, the issues of environmental sustainability, cultural diversification, and social 
justice were briefly mentioned in the first project (CEPD, 2000, 2002). In all, the first 
national project concurrently released the neoliberal antidote to the recession and 
unemployment and met the requirements of justice and culture.  
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The concepts of innovation, entrepreneurship, information technology and digitisation 
were all based on the growth of capital and the knowledge economy. Therefore, the 
government aimed to accelerate the application of new research and to increase support 
of emerging industries, especially the development of high-tech industrial parks. 
Although Taiwan was among the first countries to successfully develop the electronics 
industries in the 1970s and most Taiwanese electronics industries were considered 
excellent, labor-intensive original equipment manufacturers, moved to China and other 
Southeast Asian countries because of their cheaper work forces (Kuo, Fei & Ranis, 1981). 
Therefore, the government aimed to incentivise high-tech companies to stay in Taiwan’s 
high-tech industrial parks through the organic integration of applied knowledge, 
technological innovation, free-flow information networks and multi-skilled workers 
(Chang, 2009).  
The traditional manufacturing sector also suffered job losses. As such, new internet-
based businesses, digital information services and internet technology were promoted 
under the ‘knowledge economy’ slogan of the national development project (CEPD, 
2000). Also, an analogous industrial transformation plan for traditional manufacturing, 
including new production technologies and effective management, was immediately 
facilitated. However, automated workflow processes and labour flexibility could not 
restrain the crisis of stagnating wages, unemployment and rising living costs. 
Consequently, the knowledge economy entailed new industries, such as digital industries, 
and these new industries required innovative and creative human resources to meet the 
current global challenges. Furthermore, the Taiwanese government has always been an 
active member of the international financial institutions and thus an active participant in 
the global financial system. The project (2000) embraced some popular mantras of 
neoliberalism – financial liberalisation, deregulation, free trade, open markets, 
privatisation of national industries and increasing the size of the private sector (a more 
vigorous public and private collaboration). The discourse of the national development 
project not only attempted to enhance the competitiveness of traditional manufacturing 
industries but also to improve profitability in relation to the foundation of the ‘knowledge 
economy’. The policy rhetoric was instantiated through the ideology of post-Fordism and 
neoliberalism.  
However, cultural policy was not used as the main tool for economic recovery in the first 
national project (CEPD, 2000). It was applied in order to achieve environmental 
110 
sustainability and social justice; its economic benefit was not directly considered. Several 
new cultural policy initiatives appeared in the section on culture in only three pages 
(p.306-8). Firstly, a new Ministry of Culture will be established to integrate all cultural 
affairs at the state level before 2011 (‘Ministry of Culture,’ n.d.). The ministry is tasked 
with coordinating resources, integrating regional cultural policy, local and community 
cultures and the new value placed upon uniquely Taiwanese culture in community 
development (CEPD, 2000). Secondly, Taiwanese-oriented cultural policy was viewed 
as a significant means to mitigate the influence of the 50-year-long Kuomintang (KMT) 
governance of Chinese-oriented education and cultural policy which had ignored and 
devalued Taiwanese local culture for political purposes (Walker, 1959; Hsiau, 1997; 
Rawnsley, 1999). Walker (1959, p.122) also elaborates that ‘during these years increased 
emphasis was placed on building Taiwan's symbolism as a repository of Chinese culture’. 
Therefore, it could be said that this new localised cultural policy was based on Taiwanese 
national identity and political objectives (CEPD, 2000, p.103, 448). Finally, overseas 
cultural offices and international cultural communication were increased on an 
international level (p.163). 
The social functions of cultural policy were also emphasised in the project. For instance, 
several cultural policies addressed sustainable regional development and social justice. 
Improving local cultural facilities and helping bridge the digital divide, especially in 
remote mountainous and rural areas, received high priority (p.165). Cultural 
diversification, balanced development of urban and rural culture and the conservation of 
aboriginal culture were also government priorities to encourage the organic growth of 
culture. In addition, the targets of sustainable green business and economic policies for 
regional industries were environmental protection, leisure, tourism and local culture 
(p.308, 348). The aims of cultural policy were to integrate cultural diversification 
(democracy), cultural localism (politics), a sustainable homeland (green development) 
and local tourism, (cultural industries economy). Therefore, it could be said that the main 
purpose was to establish a new localised cultural identity. Briefly speaking, the discourse 
of the first national development plan represented that the importance of the knowledge 
economy was its role as the ideal cultural policy – when it was essentially a neoliberal 
economic strategy. This can be consistently developed, but can prove difficult to balance 
and sustain. However, the second national development project then emerged through 
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the need to reformulate cultural policy to make it far more effective for economic 
recovery, similar to the British creative industries policy of 2002. 
5.3.2 Welcoming the international creative industries experts to Taiwan 
Neoliberalism, global capitalism and the profitable growth of global cultural industries 
gradually penetrated the direction of cultural policy in Taiwan. Its first official cultural 
and creative industries project was proposed in 2002. The ‘Creative industries’ concept 
had been discussed in the United Kingdom since 1997 and Australia since 1994 (Flew, 
2012). In Taiwan, imbalance of priorities in cultural policies has been linked to the 
chronic short-termism of cultural governance. These discourses regarded the creative 
industries as a feasible solution for transforming traditional industry and increasing 
employment and the value of production. However, as this economic role for cultural 
policy has intensified, it created a new conflict between two values: market-oriented 
investment and public-service subsidies. 
This British creative industries policy appeared to several Asian countries such as Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore to be a successful paradigm after New Labour won the 
1997 election (Banks & O’connor, 2009; Kong et al., 2006). Several international 
conferences of ‘creative industries’ were held during 2000 and 2002 and the Taiwanese 
government implemented a creative industries policy in 2002. Therefore, the conceptions 
and practices of British creative industries were portrayed as a new strategy for both 
cultural policy and cultural economy in Taiwan.  
These conferences represented a key moment in disseminating discourses relating to 
creative economies from Britain to Taiwan; in particular, the British Council and 
independent cultural institutions in Taiwan (see Table 5.2) played a significant role in 
the process. The British Council was one of the most important intermediaries in the 
export of the idea of creative industries. Elledge (2012) has analysed the characteristic of 
the British Council as an ambitious player, successfully introducing British culture and 
its reputable education system to the global market.  He said:  
The British Council, it's widely thought, is a thoroughly good thing. It is the 
epitome of soft power, a long-established arm of the Foreign Office that 
promotes British interests not with bombs and guns, but through culture and 
education. […] The British Council isn't just a charity (Elledge, 2012). 
112 
Another study (Kong, Gibson, Khoo, & Semple 2006) goes even further, arguing that the 
creative industries discourse was disseminated from West Europe to Asia, especially in 
several cities such as Hong Kong, Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul and Singapore between 1999 and 
2000. The adoption of the creative industries policy discourse by the cultural policy 
planners, artists and academics was derived from Western creative industries experts 
through various international conferences, procurement contracts and consultancy work. 
The international conferences, workshops and seminars held by the British Council and 
other local cultural organisations can be understood in the context of the needs of the new 
Asian cultural economy and its interests. 
Nowadays, cultural and communication policy underlines the popularity of 
public discourse on business sponsorship and artists’ individual responsibility to secure 
funding. In particular, the new term ‘creative industries’ came to represent the 
neoliberalised trend and the retreat from the democratisation of the arts. 
Throughout the process of neoliberalisation, the relationship between the state, 
cultural policies, cultural workers in cultural industries and the public (audiences) 
underwent a dynamic process of change. 
The first forum, entitled ‘2000 New Government and New Cultural Policy’, consisted of 
two main sections (see Table 5.2). First, Dr Chris Bilton, who had been a lecturer at 
Warwick University since 1997 where he founded and acted as course director for a 
master’s programme in creative and media enterprises, spoke about British cultural and 
creative policy, particularly the New Labour government’s policies and the 
new relationship between the government and small creative businesses. The second 
section of the seminar comprised the discussion. The main participants were two 
Members of Parliament, artists, representatives of local cultural organisations, art 
institutions, and Bilton. Some attendees worried that the protection of Taiwanese 
cultural industries might not with stand an era of globalisation (Shi, 2000, p.14). 
Bilton’s speech was the main event relating to cultural localisation and 
globalisation, and the critique of high-cost 
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cultural events was reported in the national newspapers such as United Daily News and 
Chinese Times (Chen, 2000, p.11; Shi, 2000, p.14). Bilton (2000), in this first conference, 
pointed out the contradictions in cultural policymaking in Britain and expressed the belief 
that small creative businesses, local cultural organisations, and individuals were the hope 
of cultural policy. The government should support them by building training 
infrastructure, providing opportunities, and coordinating different sectors through micro-
policy (Bilton, 2000; Chen, 2000; Shi, 2000). In response to the plight of New Labour’s 
cultural policy, Bilton (2000) suggested that the government should more vigorously 
support the growth of local culture, such as small creative business. Furthermore, he 
posited that the optimal development of the creative industries must not be driven by 
government. On the contrary, the role of government should be that of a facilitator or 
promoter in the process. 
Representing the localised approach, conference attendees – Taiwanese politicians, 
cultural organisations and scholars – responded by describing conflicts between the 
globalised culture industries and the subjectivity of Taiwanese culture (Chen, 2000; Shi, 
2000). Therefore, the practice of art education, the development of community culture 
and the preservation of cultural heritage were discussed in the second section of the 
seminar. 
However, the problems relating to New Labour’s creative industries policymaking were 
not unveiled until 2004 (Oakley, 2004; Garnham, 2005; McGuigan, 2005a, b). Only a 
few critical academics writing about the UK addressed these issues during that period 
(McGuigan & Gilmore, 2000; Volkerling, 2001), even though certain dilemmas were 
mentioned at the conferences – for example, the overextended development of 
intellectual property rights; legally sanctioned monopolistic practices, leaving enterprises 
free to set their own prices (Bilton, 2000). At the same time, the positive aspects, such as 
increasing employment, industrial transformation and freelancers in creative industries 
were magnified, rather than the negatives. 
In 2001, three experts from the UK participated in the second meeting: 2001 Creative 
Money: Culture Economy Seminar (see Table 5.2). This was also the first time that local 
government (Taipei City) supported this activity. Different experts from academia, local 
cultural affairs, and government sectors contributed with further practical help and 
effective advice. Creative Industries International Summit was held in 2002 soon after 
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the government announced the second national project. Five experts came from Britain, 
some of whom shared the successful British experience in terms of holding regional 
cultural festivals. Some worked in government sectors such as the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), some were from local councils that shared the ideas 
of ‘Cool Britannia’ and the Millennium Dome as an urban renewal project. However, 
New Labour adopted the neoliberal approach to practice its ‘democratisation of culture’ 
and Hewison (2014) analyses how New Labour’s cultural policy was ornamented with 
fake democracy (p.33). He demonstrates that DCMS is a neoliberal project that combines 
all cultural aspects such as arts, broadcasting, creative industries, National Lottery, 
tourism, sport, and Olympics, and is ‘creating an efficient and competitive market [which] 
is consistent with the neoliberal approach to culture’ (p.70). According to several studies 
(McGuigan, 2004, 2016; Oakley, 2004; Garnham 2005; Hewison, 2011, 2014; 
Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015; Bell & Oakley, 2015; Newsinger, 2015), the problems of 
cultural policies in the UK during the post-Thatcherite period were different from those 
during the previous period. Under Thatcherism, the arts and culture were of little 
importance, perhaps no more worthwhile than other commodities in the marketplace. 
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Table 5.2 Creative industries seminars in 2000, 2001, and 2002 
Date Topic International Speakers/ 
Background  
Organisers 
17 April 
2000 
2000 New 
Government, 
New Cultural 
Policy 
(2000新政府
新文化政策) 
Chris 
Bilton 
Director of MA in 
Creative and 
Media Enterprise, 
Centre for the 
Studies of Cultural 
Policy, School of 
Theatre Studies, 
University of 
Warwick, UK 
 
Organised by   
1.School of Continuing 
Education, Chinese 
Culture University 
2.Culture Concern 
Association 
3.British Council 
 
18-19 
August 
2001  
Creative 
Money:  
Culture 
Economy 
Seminar 
( 創 意 的 財
富：文化經濟
研討會) 
Chris 
Bilton 
 
As above Advised by 
Department of Cultural 
Affairs, Taipei City 
Government, British 
Council, and Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. 
 
Organised by academic 
institutions and cultural 
foundations  
 
Phyllida 
Shaw 
Researcher in 
cultural policy and 
practice 
 
Toby 
Hyam 
The Chief 
Executive of The 
Huddersfield 
Media Centre 
 
25-27 
October 
2002 
Creativity is 
Endless 
Resources: 
Creative 
Industries 
International 
Summit 
(創意化為綿
綿不絕的資
源：2002 文
化創意產業國
際高峰會) 
Michael 
Seeney  
 
Head of the 
creative industries 
division in the 
department for 
culture, media and 
sport 
 
Organised by   
Council for Cultural 
Affairs,  
British Council, and 
some foundations 
Phyllida 
Shaw  
Researcher in 
cultural policy and 
practice 
 
Kathryn 
McDowell  
Director City of 
London Festival 
 
Alastair 
McDonald  
Director of the 
Highland Festival 
 
Jeremy 
Tyndall  
Head of Festivals, 
Cheltenham 
Borough Council 
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The second creative industries seminar (see Table 5.2) focused on a very different 
objective: exploring the economic value of creative industries. The title – ‘Creative 
Money: Culture Economy Seminar’ – revealed the real intent of new cultural 
policymaking, and the seminar showed that the discourse of the creative industries was 
developing new keywords: turnover, size of employment, profit, loss, and growth 
potential. At the seminar, the economic value of the creative industries was heavily 
emphasised. Some successful British experiences were embellished with statistical data 
to demonstrate that the creative industries worked economically in the UK. The 
introduction to the project declares its purpose: ‘Great Britain brought in the Industrial 
Revolution in the 18th century, and now the British creative industry will again be crucial 
to a new wave of industrial revolution in the 21st century’ (2001 Creative Money: Culture 
Economy Seminar 2001). It also asked a question: ‘Do art and culture have weak 
performance compared to industry?’ The aim of the programme implied that the creative 
industry should combine with cultural activities to double their economic value in the 
industrialised economy. Three British experts were invited to the second conference: 
Bilton (2001), who spoke at the first conference; Phyllida Shaw (2001), a freelance 
researcher in cultural policy; and Toby Hyam (2001), who founded a successful creative 
business and advised the local governmental cultural sector in developing creative 
industries (see Table 5.2). New ideas were discussed, such as new cultural policymaking, 
increasing self-employment (freelance), and the new relationship between the 
government and enterprise. These positions illustrated that these new industries needed 
cooperation among the government, corporations, and creative individuals.  
It can be argued that the increase in cultural and creative jobs has been a key employment 
trend in the knowledge economy and information society. Self-employment has not only 
meant creative freedom but has also entailed financial risk. In addition, young people 
who choose to engage with creative and cultural work usually deal with an untenable 
income. However, the freedom to pursue a job that one does like might be the main reason 
that new entrants into the labour force are prepared to endure low wages without fighting 
for their economic rights or for reasonable treatment. In her speech, Shaw explained the 
meaning of ‘self-employment’ as creative freedom and financial risk. However, she also 
rationalised the structure of exploitation in the context of ‘creative people with a saleable 
skill’ (Shaw, 2001). She opined: ‘It would be quite wrong to imply that all self-employed 
people in the cultural sector are struggling financially. This is not so. For anyone who is 
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offering a service that the market wants, there is a good living to be earned’ (Shaw, 2001). 
Nevertheless, except for those offering a marketable service or saleable skill, such as 
record producers, film actors, screen writers, and pop musicians, most freelancers are on 
the lower income scale in the creative industries (Banks, 2007; Hesmondhalgh, 2010). 
Regional cultural sector officials, local cultural institutions, and artists played a 
significant role in the second conference. The invited Taiwanese artists and cultural 
organisations mainly discussed the protection of their livelihoods in the new creative 
industries in Taiwan. It could be argued that this was the moment the projected 
development of the creative industries began, since government representatives from the 
economic and cultural sectors were questioned by artists and cultural workers who had 
also been deployed along the front line in this conference. Questions focused particularly 
on the new relationship among the government, private enterprises, and the individuals 
involved – artists, curators, cultural workers, and so on – in developing the creative 
industries environment. 
The third conference – Creativity Is Endless Resources: Creative Industries International 
Summit – was held after the second national project in 2002. As the name suggests, the 
conference focused on the new creative industries programme for policy planners and the 
implementation of new creative enterprises. The list of international experts, the head of 
the Creative Industries Division of DCMS, three heads of regional cultural festivals, and 
Shaw focused more on effectiveness – for instance, economic benefits deriving from 
cultural festivals and the new commercial models of creative industries. These British 
representatives and professionals influenced the creative industries policy direction and 
discourse in the third conference; the British experience was deemed a great success, and 
an effective economic stimulus (Li, 2001a, b; 2001 Creative Money: Culture Economy 
Seminar, 2001). The purpose and agenda sheet did not categorically contain the cultural 
workers’ viewpoints, which were presented in the second conference, and the issue 
relating to the self-employed in creative industries was mentioned only briefly.  
It could be said that the main purpose of the third conference was to promote a new 
approach for city tourism, festivals and activities, and creative industry policy. Therefore, 
most discussions were focused on international festival experiences and the city’s festival 
history.  Cultural workers’ situation in the new frame of creative industry policy is not 
the most important issue at this time. For the public sector in Taiwan, global and 
successful festival experiences—from a unique performing arts festival to a popular 
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children’s festival—will help the public sector make and execute this policy. 
Collaborating on festivals can help local governments and cultural organisations make 
useful contacts and gain experience.The topics were in keeping with the general 
ambience of the increase in future wealth (McDonald, 2002; McDowell, 2002; Sweeney, 
2002; Shaw, 2002; Tyndall, 2002). 
 In particular, the economic effectiveness that might result from creative industries 
attracted mostly positive attention. A quotation from the British creative industries 
mapping document (Creative Industries Task Force 1998) illustrated that ambiguity is 
the essence of creative industries, a point also featured in the opening words of the 
conference. 
The creative industries were defined by the industries which have their origin in 
individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job 
creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property (2001 Creative 
Money: Culture Economy Seminar, 2001). Also, the discourse of the conference reflected 
the new approach of cultural policymaking, which has used the resulting policy space to 
pursue a variety of economic programmes for cultural policy (i.e. creative economy). In 
Table 5.2, we see the change of organisers for each year. Moreover, the British Council 
acted as the intermediary between the British creative industries discourse, the experts 
and independent cultural organisations in Taiwan. It is interesting to explore the 
significance of the selection of representatives of ‘experts of creative industries’. Only 
one international expert was invited in the first-year conference to introduce British 
cultural policy and creative industries. Consequently, it fell to Bilton to introduce, 
theoretically and historically, the British experience of developing creative industries 
(2000, 2001).  
The creative economy has heavily influenced the development of cultural policy 
discourse. The Taiwanese government embarked on a major cultural policy shift towards 
neoliberalism after concluding that its adoption of ‘creative industries’ policy from 
Britain in 2002 had failed to reform the structure of the media and cultural industries.  
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5.3.3 Emphasising creative industries policy in the second national 
development project: The Challenge 2008 Six-Year National Development 
Plan 
Before the release of the official creative industries policy in the national development 
project: The Challenge 2008 Six-Year National Development Plan (Executive Yuan, 
2002), the creative industries seminars that focused on the British experience were held 
by local cultural organisations, academics and the British Council in Taiwan in 2000 and 
2001. The third seminar took place after the announcement of the creative industries 
policy and was held by the cultural organisations and the government in 2002. Following 
the successful presentation of the British case and experiences, the official document 
directly emphasised the economic value of the creative industries. In addition, the 
‘creative industries project’ was one of the most significant national plans in Challenge 
2008: Six-Year National Development Plan (Executive Yuan, 2002).  
We shall look at the differences between these two national projects (see Table 5.3). The 
first national project made mention of the ‘knowledge economy’ in the context of the 
innovative economy and ‘sustainable development’ and ‘the social function of culture’ 
in the context of social justice. Furthermore, the fundamental contradiction of neoliberal 
ideology was embodied in the discourse of the knowledge economy, which focused on 
increasing employment after the decline of traditional manufacturing in Taiwan. 
However, cultural policy was not considered as a policy tool for economic development. 
The first project promised a more results-oriented and efficient administration, including, 
for example the privatisation of national industries, instead of propping up manufacturing 
industry which was in gradual decline as production moved overseas. A modern and 
innovative approach was adopted to promote more efficient management for industrial 
development. 
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Table 5.3 National development plans in 2000 and 2002 
Date Title Main objectives 
2000.12 National Development Plan 
for the New Century 
 
knowledge economy 
sustainable development 
social justice and the social 
function of culture 
 
2002.4 Challenge 2008 Six-Year 
National Development Plan 
creative industries 
knowledge economy 
information technology 
digitisation 
 
This project was also the first national project to establish the importance of cultural 
policy. This section thus introduces the creative industries programme, particularly the 
securely anchored principles for the main development of the programme. This national 
project has served as a prominent symbol of the orientation towards an ambitious agenda 
for creative industries. It can be argued that the new creative industries project was of the 
very highest importance in a post-Fordist period. Interestingly, while ‘post-Fordism’ was 
not mentioned as a category in the first project, it appeared in the background in 
descriptions of the plight of industrial development. It was claimed that the Taiwanese 
economy faced the new prospect of deindustrialisation; in particular, the dominance of 
large-scale manufacturing had disappeared since neighbouring countries had cheaper 
labour than Taiwan (Executive Yuan, 2002). Moreover, two main approaches were more 
specific to Taiwan: (1) high-tech industries developed as high-tech original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM) in Taiwan over decades; (2) the launching of a new sustainability 
strategy for the knowledge economy, which set out a joint approach to sustainability. The 
government also indicated that the ‘cultural and creative industries’ had enabled Taiwan 
to secure substantial additional value in the ‘knowledge economy’ for the post-Fordist 
generation. Therefore, it asserted that the objectives of the creative industries policy were 
to foster double employment, triple output value, and create a new leading position for 
Taiwanese creative industries in the Chinese-speaking world (Executive Yuan, 2002, 
p.37). To introduce the new cultural policy, the government even claimed that ‘Culture 
could be part of the economic policy; however, it has been ignored for a long time’ (p.37). 
The government first coined the term ‘cultural creative industries’ in this national project 
by combining the two concepts cultural industries and creative industries. It attempted to 
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develop Taiwanese ‘cultural and creative industries’, after consulting international 
experts about possible policies, including in relation to a global vision and localised 
practice.  
One of the interviewees (D1, an ex-public worker, who worked in theCouncil for Cultural 
Affairs) who worked in the Council for Cultural Affairs mentioned that the ‘cultural and 
creative industries’ policymaking included different public sector organizations, such as 
the Council for Cultural Affairs, as well as those in media and economic sectors.  
The new policy will develop a cluster of new industries of creativity, innovation, and 
knowledge. However, the art and culture sectors have argued that they should be at the 
core of the CI policymaking process. Initially, the cultural sector even proposed the 
concept of ‘culture industrialisation’ and negotiated a soft deal for including the two 
terms in this new project. Under huge public funding for developing CI policy, ‘culture 
industrialisation’ represented a new trend of highly effective public services that are 
highly responsive to the demands of users. This ideology implies that a more ‘effective’ 
cultural sector could explain how art and culture made the creative industries the fastest 
growing sector. Although art and culture are the basis of creative energy, the government 
wanted to maximise the country’s capacity to make the most of the shift from old forms 
of the public sector to new cognitive cooperation between the private and public sectors 
on creative industry projects.   
The national project assumed that the flourishing creative industries and this new 
business model might facilitate a new form of manufacturing, which integrated high-tech, 
aesthetic design with a high quality of production (Executive Yuan, 2002, p.43). Several 
ongoing sub-projects were presented, including an inter-ministerial group, an industrial 
general survey, a mapping document, annual reports, new environmental facilities (such 
as the creative industries park), various training programmes, intellectual property 
protection, new public subsidies and investment incentive policies.  
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Table5.4 Official documents which are related to the creative industries in 
Taiwan 
Year Title (English) Title 
(Traditional 
Chinese) 
Commissioned 
by 
Published 
by 
2000.
12 
National 
Development 
Plan for the 
New Century 
新世紀國家建
設計畫 
民國 90至 93
年四年計畫暨
民國 100年展
望 
Executive Yuan Council for 
Economic 
Planning and 
Development 
2002 Challenge 2008 
Six-Year 
National 
Development 
Plan  
 
挑戰 2008：
國家發展重點
計畫 
Executive Yuan National 
Development 
Council 
2002 The Survey for 
an Analysis of 
the Cultural 
Creative 
Industries 
Overview 
 
文化創意產業
概況分析調查 
Council for 
Economic 
Planning and 
Development 
National 
Culture and 
Arts 
Foundation 
2003 Systematic 
Services 
Planning 
Report for 
Promoting 
Cultural 
Creative 
Industries 
 
推動文化創意
產業之系統服
務規劃研究研
究報告 
Council for 
Cultural Affairs 
Taiwan 
Institute of 
Economic 
Research 
2003-
until 
now 
Taiwan Cultural 
& Creative 
Industries 
Annual Report 
台灣文化創意
產業發展年報 
Industrial 
Development 
Bureau, 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Affairs 
Cultural-
Creative 
Industries 
Promotional 
Office Project 
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The records suggest anxieties relating to each field. For example, people from the visual 
and performing arts did not agree that they should be part of an ‘industrial’ development 
(NCAF 2002). Some claimed that the original public subsidy was not used for its 
intended purpose and that the new policy for creative industries should embody the 
demands of all industries because they are in very different situations (NCAF, 2002, 
p.195-7). The other problem is that new policies usually encounter implementation 
delays because of changes in political circumstances such as the struggle between the 
DPP and the KMT. The report adopted the successful experience of foreign creative 
industries to depict a new ‘cultural and creative industries’ policy in Taiwan.  
The other report, Systematic Services Planning Report for Promoting Cultural Creative 
Industries (2002), was implemented by the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research. It 
concentrates more on the actual output value from each industry. Also, the main creative 
industry categories highlight the economic prospects of the 13 sectors of the creative 
industries. The two reports include important statistics and data on the cross-border 
publishing trade (Taiwan Cultural & Creative Industries Annual Report 2003) for the 
previous year. It can thus be argued that 2002 marked the first year in the development 
of Taiwanese creative industries.  
Comparing the two national projects, the new DPP government promoted its second 
project in 2002, this included ‘digitalisation’ and the ‘knowledge economy’. Although 
the section on culture was only a few pages, there was a relatively greater emphasis on 
the social function of culture than in the first national project. However, a more basic 
contradiction tends to be ignored in the first project, particularly in relation to the 
economic tool for revitalisation, which is a neoliberal economic programme. However, 
the aim of the social and cultural policies was presented as a tool for strengthening 
citizens’ rights and achieving social justice. The two ideas are thus diametrically opposed. 
In the period 2000-02, the initial stage of the origin of the creative industries discourse 
in Taiwan was also being discussed in a seminar held by local organisations and the 
British Council. It can be argued that the new creative industries policy was being 
formulated in this period and that the British Council played a significant role in the 
process. Knowledge of the creative economy was being diffused via these international 
experts and was being adapted in several Asian countries (e.g. Taiwan, Korea and 
Singapore). The DPP government supported a new second national project and formally 
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announced the plan for ‘cultural and creative industries’ to run until 2002. Arguably, 
cultural policy suddenly became a fashionable and popular economic development tool 
in the second national project. Many new creative businesses and companies would be 
set up. Furthermore, several university departments were renamed ‘creative industries’ 
departments. As the second national project estimated, there was an increase in the 
number of people, especially the younger generation working in such creative industries, 
but problems emerged, specifically job instability and low wages.  
Four government departments, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Council for 
Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of Education, and the Council for Economic Planning and 
Development were represented in the inter-ministerial group (Executive Yuan 2002, p.37; 
the group of the creative industry promotion, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004, 2005). 
Also, many domestic and foreign experts, professionals, and artists were invited to 
participate in the new group with the aim of implementing the new policy and drafting 
the law. There was special interest in the conception and experiences that came from 
Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Hong Kong. There was an attempted localisation 
of the British creative industries policy within the government’s commercialised cultural 
policy reforms. This was in order to encourage businesses to innovate practical solutions 
and policies, in exchange for new public subsidies. The term ‘creative industries’ can be 
considered politically neutral language without sufficient evidence-based analysis in the 
early stages of its adoption. However, under the creative industries project, the 
government’s participation was reduced to a narrow, instrumental view of the arts. This 
illustrates that cultural and media governance began to value economically beneficial 
effects in the short term over the permanent development of culture; media policy’s 
primary purpose as a public service had disappeared. However, the idea of creative 
industries was promoted by the UK and its adoption in Taiwan basically followed this 
new trend of the creative economy although it was difficult to take this kind of economic 
risk. The strength of the creative industries policy project created new incentives to make 
reform happen. For example, the challenge of renewing public services is balancing 
reformed media and cultural industries policy and a securing long-term financial 
foundation. However, the British approach to new public management and a new way of 
combining a free market economy may be overly focused on the profits of cultural 
business with a ‘modified’ public spirit. 
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Over the next few years, new creative parks such as a pop music centre and design centre 
were constructed in abandoned city factories as part of the new urban renewal plan. For 
example, one of the most ‘successful’ and high-profit cases in the capital city, Taipei, 
was Huashan1917 Creative Park, which was reconstructed from the former national 
brewery. In addition, many new creative businesses and companies were set up in the 
period. According to the online search system of the governmental Commerce Industrial 
Service Portal (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2016), the number of ‘cultural and creative’ 
company registrations illustrates that a swarm of emerging ‘creative’ businesses was 
thriving during this decade. 1,265 ‘cultural and creative’ enterprises founded after 2002. 
Forty-five companies had been set up by 2002. However, the increasing number of new 
companies did not mean growing development of creative industries. For example, many 
enterprises just changed their name and added the term ‘cultural and creative’ to respond 
to the wave of official promotion from creative industries. 
The project made mention of the ‘knowledge economy’ in the context of the innovative 
economy and ‘sustainable development’ and ‘the social function of culture’ in the context 
of social justice. The fundamental contradiction of neoliberal ideology was embodied in 
the discourse of the knowledge economy, which focused on increasing employment after 
the decline of traditional manufacturing in Taiwan. Cultural policy, however, was not 
considered a policy tool for this sort of economic development. The project was promised 
through a more results-oriented and efficient administration, such as the privatisation of 
national industries, instead of propping up the gradually declining manufacturing 
industry that had been moving production overseas. Thus, the project aimed at a modern 
and innovative approach to promoting more ‘efficient’ management for industrial 
development. 
Finally, the creative industries project encouraged the education system to set up more 
‘creative industries’ departments for providing tailored training in relevant skills for 
creative industries. As the second national project estimated, there was an increase in the 
number of people, especially younger people, working in such creative industries. At the 
same time there were problems specifically related to job instability and low wages. 
5.4 Conclusion  
Neoliberal reform in cultural and creative industries policymaking in Taiwan has 
generally failed to promote the public interest. As a trajectory of neoliberalisation in 
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Taiwan, public expenditure on the expansion of the creative industries sector in the last 
decade illustrates that creative industries policymaking has been embodied in a complete 
neoliberal transformation in the past decade. The expansion of the creative industries in 
cultural policymaking is analysed in next chapter.  
It can be said that these original cultural industries and the arts are actually integrated 
under the item ‘creative industries’. However, the long-existing dilemma and major 
drawbacks of these fields continue to the present day, so these issues will be encountered 
again in the latest creative industries policymaking, which seeks to translate policy into 
practice. In the next chapter, the gap between policy and practice will be analysed. The 
next chapter will ask why, after 10 years, did the creative industries policy not solve the 
problems but, instead, resulted in additional problems?     
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6                                                                                                             
The Neoliberal Legislative Process of Creative Industries 
Policy (2004- ) 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the legislative process relating to the Cultural and Creative 
Industries Development Act (CCIDA) 6, which was the basis for neoliberal cultural 
policies proposed in the early 2000s and approved by parliament in 2010. The first 
cultural and creative industries project was mandated in 2002 by the national Challenge 
2008: Six-Year National Development Plan. This plan clearly outlines the legislative 
process for the CCIDA, which has become a key element of the creative industries project 
and is considered vital to the development of the creative industries. A draft of the law 
for the long-term development of creative industries was proposed to parliament in 2009, 
leading to the passage of the CCIDA in 2010. However, not all parties were satisfied with 
the law. In particular, the last version seemed to be a compromise which could rope the 
public and private sectors into a strikingly different partnership. Certain types of tax relief 
and a new real-estate development were highly controversial topics throughout the 
legislative process. It can be argued that the pendulum swung too far in the direction of 
the rights of private capital, sacrificing public services to the creative industries and 
cultural economy. 
Neoliberal legalisation of creative industries must be thoroughly analysed to gain a 
general sense of the dynamic process. The main source of legislation for these cultural 
policies was based on an economic, neoliberal ideology. This chapter will discuss three 
dimensions: first, the process of law creation, which demonstrated a cultural policy shift 
towards prevailing neoliberal economic orthodoxy; second, the theory that neoliberal 
thought has become law, as represented in the article details; and third, the expected 
results of the neoliberal law in determining what is allowable, with the public recourse 
being commercialisation and privatisation according to the CCIDA. It could be argued 
                                            
6 The Cultural and Creative Development Industries Act (文化創意產業發展法) has been translated by the 
Ministry of Culture in English in the official website: The Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative 
Industries. In conventional terms, however, ‘Act’ as being in formal use rather than ‘Law’, the term ‘Act’ will 
imply ‘Law’ in this chapter. 
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that the neoliberal legislation of creative industries policy accelerated the expansion of 
existing profit-driven structures and the marginalization of public cultural policymaking.  
This chapter is based on an analysis of the official records, documentary materials, 
newspapers, previous studies, and surveys which provide accessible research data useful 
in tracing the legislative trajectory. In particular, the records of the Taiwan Parliament 
Gazette describe tension between legislators and officials from the Council for Cultural 
Affairs, Government Information Office (GIO) and the Ministry of Culture. It will be 
shown that the parliament and the public cultural sectors are wrestling with the dilemma 
of how to reduce government spending and curb the budget deficit. One could also argue 
that the final result of the CCIDA will be a compromise among lobby groups. The voices 
of artists, cultural workers, and members of art and cultural organisations were not taken 
into account during the legislative drafting process. Public cultural policymakers are 
embroiled in a neoliberal war; however cultural workers and citizens are suffering the 
consequences of the disenfranchisement of the policy creation process. 
According to records, the pendulum has swung concerning conceptions of public 
expenditure, private investment, and public-private partnerships in the development of 
creative industries policy. In a profound sense, the legislative process has forced 
Taiwanese cultural policymaking to adapt to the neoliberal terrain. Documentary analysis 
is therefore the primary research method. The dynamic development of creative 
industries policy legislation will be examined. The development of policy was influenced 
by conditions of political interference and a burgeoning neoliberalised discourse. This 
chapter highlights the tug-of-war over creative industries policymaking and the real need 
for cultural policy in an increasingly hegemonic structure shaped by neoliberal cultural 
and media policy. 
 
6.2 New Act for Creative Industries in the neoliberal legalisation   
In the early 2000s, the government planned to merge the Council of Cultural Affairs and 
the Government Information Office (GIO) into a new cultural agency, the Ministry of 
Culture. However, the Council of Cultural Affairs proposed creating a new 
administrative authority, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, to promote the entire 
creative industries project under the CCIDA. This proposed ministry was expected to 
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integrate culture, creativity, design and technology to develop a new industrial pattern 
(p.167). These parliamentary meeting records reveal that the discourse of the full 
development of creative industries dominated the discourse of culture and art policy. 
Even the cultural sector representatives expected the new cultural sector to focus on 
industrial development and increase industrial efficiency. However, the CCIDA (see 
Appendix 1) is a neoliberal law with four chapters and 30 articles offering a mild 
palliative for the development of the creative industries in Taiwan. In addition to 
analysing the contents of this law, this section addresses the central problem with the 
CCIDA: it is essentially ambiguous and functionally neoliberalised, which allows the 
Ministry of Culture to legitimise almost any initiative. 
Some legislators who were also local representatives sought higher funding for local art 
and cultural activities and creative industries considered major regional characteristics 
(e.g. festivals, tourism, local manufacturing). Regional resource allocation provides a 
good example of the dilemma creative industries policy makers faced. In this record, one 
KMT legislator, Chiung-Ying Yang, suggested increasing the public subsidy for local 
industries, such as Instrument Industries in Taichung (台中), which she represented 
(p.169-170). Another DPP legislator, Yi-Hsiung Chiang, who represented Chiayi City, 
requested more public funds from the creative industries project to organise the 2011 
Band Festival in Chiayi (嘉義市) (p.175). Paradoxically, legislators did not hold the 
numerous ways of assessing creative industries to the same standards of effectiveness 
when discussing their constituencies. The mixture of realpolitik was accompanied by the 
conflicting reality that every apparently economic choice is actually social and political. 
These records reveal the ambiguous position of cultural sector representatives and 
legislators in the early debate on implementing creative industries policies. At this point, 
some policies, such as Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse, retained some of their original 
intent during the transition to a neoliberalised policy discourse. The questions asked 
pushed the neoliberal rhetoric and perspective of marketisation and commodification, 
demonstrating that the parliament and cultural sector had utterly contradictory instincts 
concerning the creative industries policy. The last public hearing for the new law would 
further offer more debates between the participants who attempt to clarify the deliberately 
ambiguous rules on the statement of the law. 
  
130 
 
Parliament authorised a public hearing for the draft of the CCIDA in 2009 before it was 
enacted in 2010. This record (2009) clearly shows different suggestions and criticisms 
from interest groups, creative industries experts and scholars. In particular, the interest 
groups voiced concerns that the safeguards for the interests of each creative industry were 
outweighed by the harmful aspects of the legislation, such was the poor definition of the 
CCIDA’s articles. Although many creative industry representatives expressed serious, 
legitimate concerns and issues in this public hearing, it seems far more likely that creative 
industry itself was a field of struggle. According to the record, industries’ fear of 
marginalisation and the rivalry among the pivotal industries became increasingly and 
distinctly political rather than in the public good or national economic interest.  
For example, the names for the industries – ‘cultural industries’, ‘creative industries’ and 
‘cultural and creative industries’ – divide and exclude some industries. One spokesperson, 
Wei-Gong Liou, a cultural policy scholar, suggested that the name ‘cultural and creative 
industries’ better reflected the diversity of the new field. He further explained that the 
term ‘cultural industries’ proposed by the DPP legislator Chin-Chu Wong was partially 
based on a misunderstanding that CCIDA was limited to resources available only to 
traditional cultural industries, such as the publishing, arts and crafts industries (p.12). 
However, the private-sector lobby groups expected that more manufacturing and digital 
content industries would be included and connected in the new industries policy, 
allowing them to claim a larger slice of the economic output of the creative economy. 
The publishing industry representative sought to ensure that, at least in principle, his 
industry was clearly included in the law. The CCIDA draft did not list ‘the publishing 
industry’ but only potentially considered it within the media and film industry. The 
industry representative issued a strong claim that publishing is the foundation of other 
industries’ claims that they are leading cultural industries, with significant potential, and 
therefore should be protected and helped to grow. Almost every cultural industry was 
connected to the publishing industry, such as radio programmes, television shows, films, 
manga, digital content and video games. Therefore, the representative argued, there was 
an urgent need to foster an environment that supported the publishing industry. It seems 
that the publishing industry was not alone. Industry representatives also pushed for 
fashion and lifestyle industries to be included in the CCIDA’s creative industry categories. 
Each industry’s representative emphasised the importance of his or her creative industry 
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and proposed that it should qualify for different mechanisms of tax relief permitted to 
creative industries (p.26).  
First, the consumption of creative commodities and experiences was the easiest target for 
giving direct benefits to taxpayers. The purchase of books should be duty free under the 
creative industries policy to promote reading culture and to increase sales for the 
publishing industry. The consumption of art and cultural activities, through exhibitions 
and performances, for example, should be treated as a tax-deductible expense. The 
hypothesis was posited that such changes to the new creative industries policy would 
have cultural ripples in other industries (p.27-9).  
Second, tax relief for industrial investment and environmental development were an 
important issue for creative industries representatives. They claimed that a number of tax 
reliefs encouraging investment in areas, such as the digital video game, film and 
television industries, can be used by large private-sector consortia to cut their tax bills. 
The creative industries representatives urged the creation of incentives and rewards for 
investment in the creative industries through specific provisions and policymaking. The 
policy for talent development at universities in the CCIDA draft was considered 
undesirable. The representative from the digital game industry even said that this policy 
did not effectively bridge the creative industries and academia as universities’ talent 
training programmes and courses did not reflect industry experience, trends and 
development. Therefore, the talent-development policy was less effective than providing 
direct funding with the right incentive structure for industries (p.31). Those interest 
groups who represented the leading creative industry figures supported professional 
training to build marketing capacity in the creative industries parks (for more on the case 
of these parks, please see Chapter 7) and supply the industry with a cohort of trained 
personnel through academy-industry collaboration. 
Third, the record shows that there was discussion of planning a new law loosening the 
creative industries development in policy statements. For example, the development of 
the new creative industries parks should depend on the reuse policy for national 
properties, such as abandoned, vacant national factories. In addition, the Land, 
Government Procurement and Building acts should be loosened. Creative enterprises 
might need change-of-use planning permission to legally lease public assets for the 
purpose of developing creative industries. This seemed the best approach if expediting 
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the industrial development and serving the public good could be accomplished within the 
proposed timescale. The overall investment figures then were in line with expectations, 
and most importantly, the whole blueprint of culture policy and its main purpose were 
deliberated. It was almost certain that some groups, such as the emerging creative 
enterprises and investment and consultancy firms, would benefit from deregulation, 
while valuable public assets were frittered away in privatisation. 
Scholar Tung-Hung Ho, the only participant at the meeting to speak against the CCIDA, 
claimed that the development of creative industries should be given more time for 
consideration. In particular, the blueprints for the basic principles of complete cultural 
policy reform should be pondered, and the role of the creative industries plan should be 
determined (The Legislative Yuan’s official gazette, 2009b). Additionally, the creative 
industries park project should not serve as cover for land development and urban renewal. 
Many representatives argued that the new creative industries policy needed legislative 
support to further loosen regulations. However, loosening laws was opposed by first-line 
creative industries workers, who saw tax implications resulting in ever more garbled and 
confusing policies as the main issues in the CCIDA. Instead, the policy should grant tax 
relief to genuine small entrepreneurs who would plough it back into the creative 
industries.  
In the meetings, questions of developing the effectiveness of the creative industries (The 
Legislative Yuan’s official gazette, 2008, 2009a, 2009b) illustrate the dynamic of the 
policymaking in the period (see Table 6.1). Neoliberal policymaking discourses were 
adopted by both KMT and DPP legislators. It could be argued that they all focus on the 
performance and productivity of creative industries. They believed that tax concessions 
and cultural vouchers7 could be an effective policy tool for the government's approach to 
stimulating the creative economy. The main dilemma is that local representatives, to 
serve their political interest, sometimes requested more budgets for local cultural 
activities. Local cultural activities and construction are important; however, most local 
cultural activities are festivals for getting a disposable annual income easily and pleasing 
people with bustling activity and excitement. Therefore, the contributions of politicians 
                                            
7Cultural vouchers is one of the new measures in creative industries policy. They are intended to 
stimulate creative product consumption and investment. Policymakers believe that tax concessions 
and cultural vouchers could be an effective policy tool for a government approach to stimulating the 
creative economy.  
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concerned with local effects might be unhelpful if they and few local interest groups 
swallowed too large a share of the local cultural budget and served self-interest and 
specific policies.   
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Table 6.1 The positions between the legislators and Cultural 
sector on the creative industries policy 
Position 
 
Achieves 
 
The questions and suggestions from the Parliament  Cultural 
sector’ 
responses 
KMT legislators  DPP legislators 
The 
Legislative 
Yuan’s 
official 
gazette 
May 2008 
• efficiency 
• more profitable 
• more marketing 
• downsized the public 
expenditure  
• developing tourism 
• more cultural budget 
for local 
• rising the proportion of GDP 
• employment rate 
• export growth 
• the cultural vouchers  
• tax concessions 
• more cultural budget for 
local the problem of public 
assert reuse 
• projecting, 
implementing 
the policy  
• need more 
budget 
• quantifying or 
predicting 
performance 
 
The 
Legislative 
Yuan’s 
official 
gazette 
March 
2009 
• downsized the public 
expenditure  
• the cultural vouchers 
• more cultural budget 
for local 
• cultural tourism 
efficiency, profitable, 
marketing 
• employment rate 
• stable arts subsidy 
• industrialisation 
• outsourcing public 
assert  
• support the name of 
‘the Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism’ 
• High education and 
talent incubator 
 
• unequal arts subsidy 
• promote cultural vouchers 
• employment rate 
• tax concessions 
• tourism 
• cultural budget for local  
• developing crafts industry 
• art subsidy 
• talent incubator 
• against ‘the Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism’ 
• support ‘the Ministry of 
Culture 
• submission of the law draft 
• a restoration plan for 
Taiwanese heritage sites. 
• projecting, 
implementing 
the policy  
• need more 
budget 
• quantifying or 
predicting 
performance 
Public 
hearing  
May 2009 
 
• tax concessions 
• efficiency, profitable 
and marketing 
• public asserts reuse 
• deregulation  
• attract private 
investment 
• talent incubator 
• fostering the small business 
and community's business 
• arts have been ignored 
• against KMT’s deregulation 
policy 
Listening to 
the 
suggestions 
from the 
private sectors 
and academics 
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6.3 The details of the law 
The Cultural and Creative Industries Development Act (CCIDA) came into effect on 3 
February 2010. The chair of the Council of Cultural Affairs announced that the creative 
industries policy would take off after implementation of the Act, particularly that the 
creative industries development and the corresponding policy would have a new legal 
basis. The CCIDA outlines the administration's explicit legal basis for its creative 
economy policy and governs the redevelopment of public assets. The new law attempted 
to strictly define the various categories of creative industries, but in reality, creative and 
non-creative industries do not have clear boundaries. 
The problem of the new definition was that each creative industry representative was 
lobbying as part of the legislative process and fought only for their industrial interest. 
The official categories of creative industries show that the final result of the CCIDA is a 
compromise among lobbying groups. However, the reasons why industry representatives 
lobby are often obscured; it is about pushing for more market opportunities for the 
creative industries. New public funding supporting creative industries’ development 
encouraged lobbyists to keep working on benefits and profits from this new project, such 
as government privatisation and public service outsourcing. 
The definitions of the creative industries have arisen from their historical contexts and 
the practices of political and economic interventions. In particular, the government 
believed that it could articulate unambiguous regulations for funding creative businesses 
and tackling earlier policy failures, but the questions of who the subsidised subjects are 
and how the new legal regulations could be successfully implemented were not fully 
resolved. 
Furthermore, the value of creativity is the main legal justification for strengthening the 
conception of intellectual property rights. The government expected that creative works 
and creative labourers would be protected under the CCIDA, which set new standards 
for safeguarding the knowledge and creative economies such as the protection of 
intellectual property rights.  Furthermore, officials promised that the new IP framework 
would be effective in generating jobs and growth in the creative industries. 
Creative labourers are indeed freer than before, but most face innate financial instability 
such as low earnings and little job security. However, for the creative industries to thrive, 
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we must ensure that they are in an area where wide-ranging opportunities for formal jobs, 
work placements, and paid internships exist so that individuals are able to access careers 
in the sector and flourish. Rapid change has brought challenges and opportunities for 
Taiwan’s creative industries, and the CCIDA should play a more positive role in ensuring 
cultural workers and creative graduates with innate talent and potential receive a better 
salary and career progression, which could be an effective policy for raising the quality 
of the creative industries. 
These creative economies were radically redesigned on newly dominant neoliberal 
principles amid the rapid growth of financialisation and offshoring of production. 
Althugh the article providing cultural vouchers is a highlight of the CCIDA,  legislators 
and the cultural sector believed that flourishing creative industries were needed in order 
to address demand-side problems and that the cultural voucher could serve as a 
mechanism to increase consumption of cultural and arts activities. Tax credits and 
allowances will likely increase consumption in the short term, but that does not ensure 
that this policy tool will improve talent training, the aesthetic education system and the 
environment of the cultural and creative industries.  
In some ways, the law is a microcosm of long-standing political struggles among 
legislators, the cultural public sector and representatives of individual creative industries. 
The 16 creative industrial categories defined in Article 3 reveal the interest groups which 
grabbed positions before others during the making of the law. This classification system 
claims a level of impartiality and is intended to be diffused, economically and politically. 
Changes in this classification system indicate shifts in the creative industries policy (see 
Table 6.2). The first official draft in 2007 listed 13 creative industries, the third official 
draft had only four industries, and the final number of creative industries is 16. These 
radical changes in the creative industries landscape point to problems in the law-making 
process.  
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Table 6.2 Versions of the CCIDA draft 
Version 1st official 
draft 
(7, November 
2007) 
3rd 
official 
draft 
(13 April 
2009) 
DPP 
legislators’ 
Version 1 
(13th April 
2009) 
KMT legislators’ 
Version (13 May 
2009) 
Final version 
(2010) 
The 
Category 
of creative 
industries 
1. visual arts 
industry 
1.arts 
industry 
 
 
 1. visual arts 
industry 
1. visual arts 
industry 
2. music & 
performance 
arts industry 
 
 
2. music and 
performance arts 
industry 
2. music and 
performance 
arts industry 
3. cultural 
assets 
application 
and exhibition 
and 
performance 
facility industry 
 3. cultural assets 
application and 
exhibition and 
performance facility 
industry; 
3. cultural 
assets 
application and 
exhibition and 
performance 
facility industry; 
4. handicrafts 
industry 
7. handicrafts 
design 
industry 
4. handicrafts 
industry 
4. handicrafts 
industry 
5. film industry 2.media 
industry 
 
1. film industry 5. film industry 5. film industry 
6. radio and 
television 
broadcast 
industry 
2. media 
industry; 
6. radio and 
television broadcast 
industry 
6. radio and 
television 
broadcast 
industry 
7. publication 
industry 
3.publication 
industry 
7. cultural content & 
publication industry 
7. publication 
industry 
8. 
advertisement 
industry 
 8. advertisement 
industry 
8. advertisement 
industry 
 5.pop music 
industry 
 15.popular 
music and 
cultural content 
industry 
9. design 
industry 
3.design 
industry 
 
 9. industrial design 
industry 
9. product 
design industry 
10. design and 
fashion 
industry 
6.fabric design 
industry; 
12.fashion and 
living industry; 
11. designer 
fashion industry 
11. 
architecture 
design 
 10.architecture 
design industry 
12.architecture 
design industry 
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   10. visual 
communication 
design industry 
12 digital, 
leisure and 
entertainment 
4.digital 
content 
industry 
8. digital 
content 
industry 
11. digital content & 
application industry 
13. digital 
content industry 
13. creativity 
living industry 
 4.creativity 
industry 
12.fashion and 
living industry 
14. creativity 
living industry 
   13.conference, 
exhibition, and 
tournament industry 
 
Other industries as designated by the central Competent Authority 
*2nd official draft (4 February 2008). The same as the first version of official draft 
**DPP legislators Version 2 (13 May 2009). The same as the first version of official draft 
 
In the Education and Culture Committee’s meeting records (2008), legislators are 
dissatisfied with the definition of 13 creative industries. For example, KMT legislator 
Chao Li-Yun questioned whether too many types of creative industries would share 
limited resources, along with raising other questions about the policy and programme’s 
effectiveness (The Legislative Yuan’s official gazette, 2008, p.181). When the Council 
of Cultural Affairs revised the number of the industry categories to four, industry 
representatives voiced their discontent with the categorisation system at a public hearing 
in 2009. They claimed that it led the government to ignore certain creative industries, 
particularly those not specifically mentioned in the law.  
Although industry representatives and legislators expressed dissatisfaction, the former 
were concerned that they could not use resources for their own benefit if their industry 
category was not included in Article 3. The latter focused on the budget and declared that 
the state should concentrate its limited resources on only a few high-potential industries. 
A significant cause of industry representatives’ discontent with the third draft was the 
designation of crucial industries in the new policy. They wanted the government to design 
the law to support development of their industries through measures, such as cutting taxes 
for the creative industries, permitting a more flexible labour force and economically 
activating state assets (i.e. privatisation).  
The final version of Article 3 includes 15 creative industries types, even more than in the 
first draft (13). This classification method isn't perfect by any means. Some items overlap 
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and are poorly defined (see Table 6.2). The CCIDA relies on unrealistic neoliberal 
expectations for creative businesses which manage creative exhibition and performance 
facilities as part of the creative industries project under the law, as mentioned in the next 
section. Finally, the law’s definition of ‘creative living’ industry has been criticised as 
deliberately vague. It could be said that everything in daily life is referenced in the 
creativity living industry. For industries, it was worth securing a mention in the law 
before it was enacted. In particular, the National Development Fund (NDF) was launched 
in 2002 as a new investment mechanism for supporting emerging industries and had a 
budget of nearly 10 billion NTD (approximately 218 million GBP) exclusively for the 
development of creative industries. Such incentives likely were the main reasons that 
many industries attempted to be classified as creative industries.  
Legislators were concerned not only about the profitability and productivity of creative 
industries but also about strong intellectual property rights. Consequently, the law 
devotes a significant amount of attention to the application of intellectual property rights. 
For example, Article 3 defines creative industries as those which depend on ‘creativity 
or the accumulation of culture through the formation and application of intellectual 
properties’. Additionally, the ‘protection and application of intellectual property rights’ 
is encouraged, and the violation of intellectual property rights prohibited in articles 12 
and 21. The CCIDA gives serious regard to the issue of intellectual property theft. 
Legislators claim that this is a good development for the creative industries, creators, 
innovators and consumers. Intellectual property enshrines in law a clear definition of 
consent. However, subjectivity pervades decisions regarding the nature of intellectual 
property and what it actually means to infringe the intellectual property of conglomerates, 
whose usual defence mechanism is to form monopolies politically. Harvey (2005, p.68) 
explains the relation between the mechanism of modern intellectual property and 
neoliberalism:  
The establishment of intellectual property rights (patents), furthermore, 
encourages ‘rent seeking’. Those who hold the patent rights use their monopoly 
power to set monopoly prices and to prevent technology transfers except at a 
very high cost. (p.68) 
In the CCIDA, the legislators did not step in to counteract the asymmetric power relations 
trend. The neoliberal legislation makes a deliberate obfuscation of processes that will 
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lead to the concentration of wealth (Harvey, 2005, p.68).  McGuigan (2009) also 
elaborates on the purpose of creative industries and the importance of intellectual 
property in this framework.  
The purpose of cultural industries and, more broadly, the creative industries, is 
to commercialise expressive value; hence the importance of exploiting 
intellectual property rights in order to ‘grow’ the business of a country: ‘The 
business model of the creative industries depends significantly on their capacity 
to copyright expressive value’. (McGuigan, 2009, p.160) 
However, people who ‘create’ the ideas and information and people who ‘own’ these 
have been in a huge debate since the 1980s. This debate also precipitated the development 
of intellectual property and copyright. Hesmondhalgh (2013) explains that the idea of 
creativity and culture becoming ‘“ownable” and of strategic commercial interest’ made 
the intellectual property issue important in creative industries policymaking. 
Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015) also indicate the gap between cultural corporations and 
creative workers. The former actually possess the ownership and their lobbying groups 
could push for legislation on intellectual property. However, creative workers and artists 
have to ‘make some money from their ownership of rights, or via contracts with corporate 
rights holders’ (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015, p.144). Cultural policy development was 
dominated by a mindset that ranked economic development ahead of cultural benefits, or 
equated the latter with the former (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015, p.113). This might be the 
main reason why companies and organisations have also tended to argue for longer, 
stronger copyrights in the process of legislation. 
Subsidising student attendance is a benefit of the legislation even if the overall balance 
was harmful. In Chapter 2 on the Assistance, Reward and Subsidy scheme, only two 
articles mention the public sector. Article 13 specifies that the government ‘shall provide 
schools which are below the senior high school level with artistic and cultural creativity 
appreciation courses and arrange for relevant educational activities’, and Article 14 that 
it ‘may earmark budgets to subsidise students viewing and appreciation of artistic and 
cultural exhibition and performance, and issue and distribute tickets to artistic and 
cultural experience events’. The national museums, galleries and theatres should provide 
concessions for students and the government could directly subsidise the institutions. It 
is a well-intentioned policy. 
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6.4 Conclusion  
Direct investments and tax incentives have become major government tools to stimulate 
growth in the creative industries under the CCIDA. The law details protection of creative 
businesses’ interests through different approaches, such as the reuse of public assets for 
creative parks and the new tax credits scheme for consortiums. The main discourse of 
this law advances a neoliberal rhetoric and embraces the dynamism of private enterprise. 
The private sector is to be unleashed to create jobs and propel growth in the creative 
industries and plough billions into Taiwan’s creative economy.  
Some articles in the DPP version (2009) which could have provided an important 
framework for the sustainability of the creative industries were removed from the final 
version, even though the cultural sector claims that the creative industries need to take 
urgent action to foster talent and continue to compete on the world stage. For example, 
Chapter 3, Funding for Cultural Industries Development (articles 26-28) and Chapter 5, 
Fostering Artists and Supporting Cultural Quarters (articles 31-33) could be seen as 
trying to improve important characteristics of cultural policies but they were not 
considered in the final CCIDA. The final CCIDA ignored the importance of subsiding 
more public cultural space (e.g. arts and cultural cluster or public gallery) and NPOs in 
this area. This could foster new talents and support the industry and so its inclusion in 
the CCIDA would help the creative industries thrive. However, these are not directly 
profitable and so were removed. 
Each creative industry representative was lobbying in the legislative process and fought 
for his or her only industrial interest. However, creative industries policymaking should 
not only focus on effectiveness and economic value. The most viable compromise to keep 
cultural diversity in the new Act appears to involve going ahead with developing creative 
industries but then seeking a common culture value and public interest base with citizens 
– but not only consumers.  
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7                                                                                                                   
How the Creative Industries Project Expanded in Taiwan 
(2008-2013) 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the expansion of the Creative Industries Project, including the 
development of a new public-private partnership based on neoliberal ideology for 
revitalising investment activity and economic recovery. The ambitious nature and 
rhetoric of the Cultural and Creative Industries Project (CCIP) both illustrate how 
governments promote ‘deregulated’ markets and illustrate in particular how globalisation 
has accentuated these tendencies. The purpose of CCIP was to support sustainable 
development of the economy, while increasing the employment rate and cultural 
development. However, the purpose was not followed or implemented well in the process. 
CCIP became too focused on short-term investments that ignore long-term planning to 
foster talent.  
Throughout the process of neoliberalisation, the relationship between the state, cultural 
policies, cultural workers in cultural industries and the public (audiences) underwent a 
dynamic process of change. The government believed that cultural policy could be a 
useful tool in economic recovery in CCIP. Popular catchphrases, such as ‘knowledge 
economy’, ‘creative industries’, ‘information highway’, ‘culture is a good business’ and 
‘information society’ were seen in the context of the potential to increase employment 
and advance internet technology and high-quality human resources, further offsetting the 
decline of traditional manufacturing. Therefore, the creative industry project (CCIP) 
became a significant item in the national develop project (the national Challenge 2008: 
Six-Year National Development Plan) in 2002, the first time that many resources were 
allocated to the cultural sector. This was great news for the film and television industries, 
as it meant they were supported with sufficient resources. 
Additionally, sales of creative commodities, such as film and television products, were 
encouraged in the Chinese market by deregulation, trade agreements, and cross-border 
cooperation. Overly focusing on the huge market opportunities in China led to the 
absorption of individual talents (Taiwanese cultural workers) and the undermining of 
  
143 
 
Taiwanese cultural industries in Taiwan. For example, cultural workers in Taiwan have 
been suffering from long working hours and unstable employment while the cultural and 
media industries pursued the free-market philosophy in the early 1990s. The high wages 
in Chinese market seems more attractive to Taiwanese media and film workers. Finally, 
the CCIP also influenced higher education in Taiwan. Official data from the Ministry of 
Education on higher education shows a significant increase in new departments with 
names such as Cultural and Creative Industries founded in universities during this period 
(see appendix 1). Given this trend, the relationship of the creative industries policy, the 
actual employment of these graduates, their working conditions and the development of 
higher education will be clarified. To a large extent, creative industries policies did affect 
higher education. These new departments had been founded not only to ‘train the talents 
for global creative industries’ but also to deliberately cultivate this ‘reserve army of 
labour’. After the resources of the mass media, communication, art, design and 
management departments are merged, these ‘Department of Creative Industries’ are 
symbols of the new neoliberalised Taiwan. 
As discussed in a previous chapter, cultural creative policy was formed through the 
legislative process. Under the framework of cultural creative policy, the film industry has 
been the focus and has been exclusively developed. This can be clearly seen from two 
main film industry projects—the Film Industry Promotion Project and the Flagship Film 
Industry Development Project. These were announced in 2002 and 2009 as sub-projects 
of the Cultural and Creative Industries Project. These two projects have received 
financial support and were designed to meet the framework of the planning of cultural 
creative industries. 
The total budget of the first project was almost 16 million GBP in the first seven years, 
and its main goals are to increase production and box office receipts gradually and to 
seek more international cooperation. The second project encouraged Taiwanese 
filmmakers to target the Chinese market. The Taiwanese government believed that a new 
coproduction deal offered Taiwanese the chance to grab a piece of China’s booming but 
heavily censored movie industry. Thus, the Chinese market became a key project in 2009. 
The private enterprises that gained public sources of funding for investing in filmmaking 
also believed that film production should focus on the Chinese market to recover 
production in Taiwan. As shown in Table 8.1, these two projects were planned using a 
creative industries model. From the content, resources, and implementation of these two 
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projects, the film industry embodied the logic of cultural creative industry policy–
neoliberalised logic while also being a representative (typical) example of neoliberalised 
policy. However, although these projects sought to integrate with private investment and 
NDF to augment the Taiwanese production, they did not solve the problem of the 
Taiwanese film industry. 
Table7.1 Two film industry projects in creative industries model 
Date 2002–2008 2009–2013 
Title of the 
Plan 
Film industry Promotion 
Project 
Flagship Film Industry 
Development 
Project 
(comes from) 
Sub program 
Cultural and Creative Industry 
Development Plan 
Six Flagship Plans 
(comes from) 
Main Project 
Challenge 2008 Six-Year 
National 
Development Plan 
Creative Taiwan: cultural and 
creative industries 
development 
Main targets • Short-term goal (2004–
2007):production increasing 
and 
box-office growth (10%) 
• Medium-term goal (2008–
2011): 
box-office growth (10%–20%) 
and international cooperation 
• Long-Term goal (2012–
2014): 
box-office growth (20%–40%) 
and more international 
cooperation 
• Plan 1: Make the movies that 
have great acclaims and a big 
box-office hit 
• Plan 2: successful marketing 
and 
promotion in Chinese film 
market 
• Plan 3: developing industrial 
base 
and emerging talent 
 
Source: The author combines from Film Industry Promotion Project and Flagship Film 
Industry Development Projec (CEPD 2008; CCA 2009). 
This chapter is divided into three parts to present the development of and the differences 
in the creative industries during the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) period (2002-
08) and the Kuomintang (KMT) period (2008-16). The first section describes the increase 
in funding and the changes to public subsidy systems related to these industries. The 
second section describes the development process of the Chinese market. Finally, the 
interesting phenomenon of creative industries departments appearing at universities, in 
order to nurture talent, is explored.  
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7.2 Marketisation of Public Subsidy and Investment 
The marketisation of public subsidy and investment is among the popular mainstream 
ideas – such as new public management, public-and-private corporations and the creative 
economy – covered by the neoliberal essence of policymaking. Furthermore, the object 
of public service innovation ‘is to provide a diversion from the big business colonisation 
of public sector contracts and assets and to create a secondary market so private 
contractors can later acquire social enterprises’ (Whitfield, 2012, p.16). The discourse of 
creative industries policy, such as ‘job creation and innovation’ and ‘effective and 
positive investment’ create competition among creative firms trying to get enough public 
funds and more private investment. 
CI policymakers saw culture and arts policy as an economic tool. The cultural subsidy 
system and public investment mechanisms have changed since 2004. This occurred 
despite the culture sector’s insistence that increasing the budget for cultural and CI could 
also benefit several of the non-profitable sectors of the art market, such as visual arts and 
performance arts. The growing CI sector has become the main target for the Taiwanese 
government to evaluate its cultural policies since 2008. The National Development Fund 
(NDF) mainly supports most of the increasing funding. The NDF was founded in 1973 
to finance industrial developments, such as in the high-tech and biotechnology industries, 
and NDF is administered by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This logic of NDF leads 
inevitably towards investment in highly profitable and commercially valuable industries. 
However, in terms of cultural policy, the logic is flawed. Several problems arose from 
the rapidly expanded investment in creative businesses since 2005. First, the new 
investment system was consistent with a market-oriented logic in cultural policymaking. 
It became an economic tool for economic stimulus, although the arts are much more than 
simply money-making 'creative industries'. The policy undermines cultural diversity and 
equity. It was in conflict with a truly equitable cultural policy. Therefore, the 
concentration of arts funding in the most profitable creative business should be corrected, 
with a more equitable sharing-out of funds across the whole of arts and culture. Second, 
although the new public-and-private partnership funding system was touted as achieving 
public money savings, in practice it has reduced cultural diversity by intensifying the 
more commercialised and aesthetically mainstream, while ignoring the impact of social 
injustice. Finally, private investors and venture capital (VC) do not fund arts and 
community projects that have limited financial return. Secure backing from investors and 
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VC, who usually focus on ensuring a return, is crucial in this public-private model. The 
necessity to achieve profitable returns indirectly makes cultural workers and others who 
apply for funding comply with mainstream and commercial preferences. In other words, 
this type of subsidy alters the relationship between cultural producers and the public 
sector. 
I do not mean that private investors and the finance industry should not invest in viable 
and diverse CI and a ‘creative economy’. The main problem is that the new funding 
system for the cultural sector will increasingly be about utilising a variety of instruments 
in order to exploit public money to attract private investment and to find the new 
economic and financial configuration of the cultural policy system. The culture industries 
are not completely separate or distinct from profit-making industries; they are already 
deeply entwined in the profit-making economy. For example, new VCs and investment 
advisory firms are commissioned by the public sector to evaluate which projects, such as 
film financing and creative businesses, are likely to be more profitable. For new creative 
entrepreneurs to take advantage of a wave of public funding, they must appeal to a 
market-oriented and tax-avoidant private sector. Often, advisory firms have a single-
minded concentration on profit maximisation and tend to avoid incurring unnecessary 
pay-outs on unprofitable projects. 
The CCIP was implemented as part of the Challenge 2008 Six-Year National 
Development Plan of 2002. The new government-funded programme was supported by 
the National Development Fund (NDF) to extend the range of Taiwan’s influence and 
operations on the global market.  
NDF became a significant public resource for the CCIP from 2003. Initially, the purpose 
of NDF was to strengthen the implementation of industrial policies, particularly to 
facilitate some high-risk industries, such as petrochemicals, semiconductors, and biotech, 
which were thought to have emerging strategic importance from 1973. In addition, NDF 
aimed to foster an environment that encourages entrepreneurship, acceleration of 
industrial upgrading, industry innovation; industrial research and development and the 
creation of Taiwanese own brands. The Plan for the Executive Yuan Development Fund 
to Invest in the Digital Content, Software and Cultural & Creative Industries was drawn 
up while the Challenge 2008 Six-Year National Development Plan (2002) supported 
CCIP. Therefore, the Plan to Invest in the Digital Content, Software and Cultural & 
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Creative Industries (2005) was wholly operated in accordance with the principles of the 
Plan for Strengthening the Promotion of Digital Content Industry Development (2005). 
The NDF’s budget draft for 2003 represented the first year of a long-term public spending 
plan for creative industries policy. First, the Digital Content Venture Capital Fund was 
amended under the Executive Yuan Development Fund Plan for Strengthening 
Investment in Venture Capital Enterprises to raise 45% of the upper limit of the 
investment (NDF, 2005). It could be said that the digital content industry was considered 
to be part of high profitability development for national investment plans in the early 
period. According to the new budget, four start-up companies of digital content creation 
were directly funded via the NDF in 2005. They are Digimax, TV Bean, Vivavr 
Technology Co., and Double Edge Entertainment, and total direct investment is 365m 
NTD (2005 NDF Annual Report, p.13). It was the first time that NDF invested in the 
‘creative industries’ in Taiwan. These first investments in affordable digital content 
production were meant to support the Development Fund Implementation Programme 
for Strengthening Investment in Digital Content and Cultural and Creative Industries. 
The programme had a budget of 2Bn NTD, which was distributed to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, the Government Information Office (GIO), and the Council for 
Cultural Affairs to fund projects requiring total expenditures of less than 100m NTD in 
2006. An additional 10bn NTD was allocated in 2007 to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs’ Small and Medium Enterprise Administration to invest in domestic SMEs, 
including creative businesses, during the following ten years. The first domestic film 
production investment from NDF was an 81.6m NTD in Spot Films Co. Ltd. in 2008, 
supporting the government’s goal to boost cultural and creative industries (NDF, 2009). 
Therefore, digital content production was the recipient of significant public investment 
during this time. 
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  Table 7.2 The Transition of the public investment system due to NDF 
Period Title of the Project form 
Before 2002 
creative industries 
project, there are 
several cultural subsidy 
policies  
 
For example, 
The film Subsidy Grant 
Art Subsidy 
limited subsidies 
and small grants 
from public sectors 
2002-2008 
Period 1  
(the DPP government) 
Cultural & Creative 
Industries 
Development Project 
(From the Challenge 
2008 Six-Year National 
Development Plan) 
 
retain the original 
grant system, but 
also increase the 
public budget for 
investment on the 
digital content 
industry and 
creative industries  
2009-2013 
Period 2  
(the KMT government) 
Creative Taiwan: 
cultural and creative 
industries development 
more investment via 
NDF was 
authorised, and the 
private investment 
was encouraged 
           Source: organised by the author 
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Many public investments supporting creative industries were permitted by the NDF from 
2003 onwards, although these investments were not comprehensive. The NDF’s annual 
reports for 2005, 2006, and 2008 showed that public investment was directly funding 
development of creative enterprises or productions primarily related to digital content 
production and the film industry. The government was criticized by mainstream media 
because it did not use the NDF to invest in more creative companies and productions, 
which led to an increase of the delegated investment for creative industries in 2010. In 
this year, the NDF approved the Implementation Programme for Strengthening 
Investment in Cultural and Creative Industries and allotted 10bn NTD for investment by 
the Executive Yuan’s Council for Cultural Affairs in domestic cultural and creative 
enterprises (NDF, 2011). In the NDF annual report for 2013, several professional 
management companies, their invested companies, and the proportion of public 
investment were listed (NDF, 2014); these included four venture capital (VC) 
investments in creative industries such as film, television, and popular music.  
To support the Golden Decade National Development Plan of 2010, the NDF allocated 
30bn NTD to the Project for Strengthening Investment in SMEs, the Project to Strengthen 
Investment in Cultural and Creative Industries by the Ministry of Culture, and the Project 
to Strengthen Investment in Strategic Service Industries. This funding was meant to 
bolster funding assistance for cultural and creative enterprises and early-stage enterprises 
(NDF, 2011). Additionally, VC investments in creative industries were part of a new plan 
implemented in 2013. Although VC investments had been implemented in various VC 
investment programmes since 1985, THIS was the first time this type of investment was 
implemented for creative industries, and the NDF invested 285m NTD in CDIB CME 
Fund Ltd. and 360m NTD in Ya Tai Venture Capital.  
The government claims that new VC investment would stimulate promotion of emerging 
creative industries. However, cultural sectors have delegated authority to professional 
management companies, which has changed the original relationship between the public 
sector and creative labourers, such as filmmakers and artists, who once usually applied 
for public subsidies in Taiwan. This has meant that private investments concentrate on 
more potentially profitable cultural products. Public funding from NDF has become the 
new protective umbrella to attract the VCs to invest in creative businesses through CIP.  
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These new cultural and creative enterprises and domestic VCs would be the main 
objectives of investment. It could be argued that the creative industry project was 
vigorously promoted through the financial support of NDF, which originally cultivated 
traditional Industries and high-tech industry. The Creative Industry Project was officially 
regarded as a key national development programme. The big programme of investment 
in the beginning shows how the cultural policy was expected to be part of the economic 
tool. This programme should embrace mission-orientated public investment to shape the 
creative industries market globally, but the government claimed that public-private 
partnerships are more efficient than public investment and government supply of services. 
The public investment system therefore has been thrown open to private business 
interests in unprecedented fashion in the second period (see Table 8.1). It is not only the 
increasing funding from NDF which allocated 10bn NTD for this programme in 2010, 
but also the new public-private partnership was set up between the state, the novel 
venture capital fund, and creative enterprises such as filmmakers and artists (see Figure 
8.2).  
Before the creative industry project, there were several limited cultural subsidies for 
artists and filmmakers. These public allowances were not enough to support and rebuild 
a new Taiwanese film industry and market; the film subsidiary grant would help 
individual filmmakers only for each production. In addition, the subsidy could not defray 
all production costs. This meant that the filmmakers still needed to take out a loan or look 
for private sponsorship. Sometime, the box-office determined whether the filmmaker 
would gain the next subsidiary grant or not. As mentioned above, the domestic film 
market has figured prominently in few leading cinema chains, and Hollywood film 
distribution corporations have dominated the market over 30 years. The vicious circle of 
miserable status for the indigenous film industry was supposed to be broken by the 
creative industries project. In particular, it was hoped that the investment and loan 
projects from NDF would improve the amount of film production. 
Taiwanese film production has been in recession for a long time. However, a dramatically 
successful movie, Cape No.7 (海角七號) achieved over 530m GBP box-office in 2008 
(CCA, 2009), which prompted increased investor confidence and government attention 
to domestic film productions, ultimately focusing on maximising profit in the short-term. 
Furthermore, the private enterprises interested in Taiwanese film productions are allowed 
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to apply to the NDF to reduce their (or the public’s) investment risk, to provide effective 
financial management and to safeguard their profitability. It seems reasonable that the 
VC should provide professional management services for effective applications for 
public funding and for their private investment to the film industry. However, the healthy 
development of the Taiwanese film industry might not only depend on pursuing a high, 
short-term Return on Investment (ROI). Most crucially, developing a healthy regard for 
our own talent and filmmakers will be a better strategy for Taiwanese Screen within 
creative industries policy. The project could propose more ground-breaking schemes (e.g. 
holding different thematic workshops across partner venues and working with 
experienced and senior film producers to train and mentor) in Taiwan to uncover and 
develop young and emerging film industry talent. Policymakers have to know that only 
long-term strategic investment in talent, and high-end production facilities in the film 
industry, could make Taiwan the destination of choice for more international productions 
and cooperation. The investment model currently encourages only certain highly 
profitable feature films, especially since the essence of private investment is about 
pursuing high returns. Therefore, one cannot blame the VCs for wanting to support film 
productions which yield them brilliant commercial value, but on the other hand, the 
policy for investing in film production should be reviewed. 
Now filmmakers face not only bureaucracy, but also professional VC when they apply 
for subsidy and investment for film production; problems in the new investment system 
can be found specifically within the logic of existing profit-driven structures of 
production. The plight for funding applicants (e.g. filmmakers) is that they need to 
present considerable evidence to convince the VCs that their works have predictable 
commercial value. According to the NDF annual reports for 2011 and 2013, film 
production was a popular choice for VC investments in the creative industries. The long-
term public subsidy, lending, and investment system for Taiwanese film production was 
implemented in the late 1980s. This is a good starting point for comparison of two 
systems, the public subsidy system and public-private investment system, which are both 
important for creative industries. Therefore, the film industry subsidy system and the new 
funding from the National Development Fund will be elaborated upon. This new subsidy 
and investment mechanism has changed the relationship between the state (cultural 
sector), the filmmakers (creative workers) and the new private enterprises (venture 
capital for creativity). 
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Before Taiwanese film industry policy started to follow a creative industry model, it 
experienced an open market that, since 1986, emphasised the free trade of foreign films, 
particularly by Hollywood distributors. It could be said that the production line of 
indigenous films was gradually decaying in this period. Although the Government 
Information Office (GIO) has pushed the film subsidy grant policy since 1989, the film 
market has been monopolised by Hollywood distributors and local motion picture 
cinemas for a long time. The film subsidy grant mechanism actually helps several 
Taiwanese filmmakers to make films, some of them were global film festival winners, 
but it cannot support an entire film industry.  
Many Taiwanese filmmakers were not directly saying they were unhappy with film 
policy; however, the travails of filmmakers are full of self-deprecation, said to be like 
manual labourers, with makeshift equipment, temporary settings and non-existent 
production lines. Before the creative industry project, a small public allowance system 
supported individual cultural workers such as filmmakers, artists and local cultural 
organisations (see Figure 7.1). However, the cultural budget in the public sector is always 
very low, including the film subsidy grant mechanism. These public subsidies could 
support cultural affairs and individuals directly without the intermediary VC. 
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                                                    Applying for subsidies 
 
 
 
                                                  Supporting the cultural and  
                                                                art system   
Figure 7.1 Model of public subsidy system before creative industry policy. 
 
When the government began to support the creative industry policy in 2002, the subsidy 
system started to change progressively. Both creative industry policy and the NDF 
investment mechanism followed a neoliberal ideology, and huge increases in state-
backed investments were promised. Public investment continued to support VC 
investments in cultural productions through legislative amendments in 2010. Importantly, 
cultural and communication policy was another target of neoliberal influence. Cultural 
and communication policy underlined the popularity of public discourse on business 
sponsorship, as well as artists’ individual responsibility to secure funding. The new term 
‘creative industries’ came to represent the neoliberalised trend and the retreat from the 
democratisation of the arts (for example, Figure 8.2). Although this is not a universally 
accepted view. There are others, like Cowen (2002) for instance, who would argue that 
the precise outcome of the growth of the creative industries has been enhanced 
democratisation of the arts and creativity. 
However, the new development plan has ignored Taiwanese film’s essential themes (e.g. 
focusing on native and domestic context in Taiwan society) and more diverse films, 
instead concentrating on more private investments, high box-office numbers and entering 
the Chinese market. Over a long period of pushing forward creative industries across two 
governments, there has been a long-term commitment from the government to secure 
state support. Supporting new venture capital activities like investment funds was a 
the cultural 
workers. 
e.g. local cultural 
organisations/ 
foundations, 
artists, and 
filmmakers 
 
the public 
sector 
  
154 
 
disaster at first; nobody wanted to watch some of the films. Furthermore, some 
independent filmmakers’ plans were rejected because they lacked commercial value or 
Chinese elements for selling in China. 
 
 
 
                                                                      applying for subsidies    
  
 
                                                                    allowance was reduced… 
                                                                                                                                    
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
Figure 7.2 Model of public subsidy system after 
creative industry policy. 
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the public 
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The new subsidy system under the CI model illustrated the imbalances between the 
public sector, private investment and cultural workers. The government encouraged 
private corporations to set up new venture capital to invest in CI, (e.g., popular music, 
television and film) because most of these industries are high-risk and operate at high 
cost. Therefore, management by a professional investment advisor was required in the 
process. However, co-operation between the government and private enterprises was not 
for the common good of the industry. Public sectors (NDF) provided public funding to 
encourage private capital involvement in CI investment, and also to reduce the risks 
associated with investment. However, young directors must be nurtured, and emerging 
talent must be fostered in the Taiwanese film industry. Furthermore, the film industry 
development plan under the creative industry framework does not protect emerging 
directors, nor does it allow them to develop over time.  
 
The government claims that the new model can be highly flexible, adaptable, and able to 
meet the challenges of accelerated CI development. One counterpoint to this claim is that 
the direction of cultural policy and public funding veers inevitably towards full 
privatisation. The possibility of a public cultural and communication policy has been 
replaced by neoliberal cultural policy. The younger generation of arts professionals is 
becoming acclimated to this ideology. As public subsidies dry up, heavy dependence on 
public subsidy is viewed as a hindrance. Furthermore, popular terms like ‘creative 
industries’ and ‘the creative economy’ are naturalised in everyday discourse. As artists 
and entrepreneurs buy into the myth that private investment is more effective and 
efficient, private companies are gradually but inevitably replacing the public sector. This 
new model might not a viable long-term strategy for boosting public investment in the 
creative economy. The development of complex collaborative partnerships and multiple 
funding streams naturally results in increasing inequality in cultural policy thought and 
the cultural landscape. For example, some independent film directors who usually apply 
public funding for making movies are facing new situation. The professional consultant 
and management companies indirectly demanded that their future partners (the applicants, 
the directors) accept some kind of market-oriented incentives as a precondition to any 
final agreements. 
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7.3 Breaking into the Chinese market  
Expansion during the second period was based on aggressive policies to break into the 
Chinese market. In the Challenge 2008 Six-Year National Development Plan (2002), the 
keyword ‘China’ was mentioned four times, indicating that China was the target region 
for relocating Taiwanese manufacturing and production to decrease Taiwan’s 
marginalisation in the global market. Additionally, Taiwan had no advantage over the 
lower costs and exploited labourers in China, an example of which is the Foxconn scandal; 
this involved a major Taiwanese high-tech company, one of Apple’s primary suppliers, 
accused of exploiting more than one million Chinese workers (Neate, 2013). The 
government’s attempt to develop a knowledge economy, information highway, and 
creative industries was similar to the British situation in the late 1990s; as the British 
manufacturing sector slipped further into recession, the government promoted a new 
industry revitalisation project aimed at the creative industries. Taiwan’s desire to export 
cultural products to the Chinese market was also similar to the British attempt to export 
cultural products to the US and European markets. 
The Challenge 2008 Six-Year National Development Plan (Executive Yuan, 2002) 
reported that Taiwan is internationally competitive in manufacturing; however, 
manufacturing is challenged by cheaper labour in Southeast Asian countries and China. 
This is why China, which is also a competitor in the global market, was represented in 
the National Development Plan during the first period. Conversely, the project entitled 
Creative Taiwan: Cultural and Creative Industries Development (2009) considered the 
rapid development of China to be an advantage because it could strengthen the 
cooperative relationship between the two countries. The Creative Taiwan Project (2009) 
promised to deregulate reforms in cross-strait policies to encourage more cultural and 
economic exchange. Additionally, the government believed that Taiwan should absorb 
Chinese resources and markets, which could lead to new opportunities to develop 
Taiwanese cultural and creative industries (Council for Cultural Affairs, 2009). 
In 2009, the cultural and creative industries’ (CCI) annual report stated that the negative 
attitude of the DPP government towards the dramatic rise in the Chinese market and its 
effects on Taiwan were presented in each annual report from 2003 to 2008. The Council 
for Cultural Affairs stated that the relationship between Taiwan and China should not be 
only a series of binary oppositions; active bilateral trade could facilitate sustainability 
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and be more beneficial (Council for Cultural Affairs [CCA], 2010). This idea was 
strongly advocated during the second period of the CCI project. The main benefit of 
breaking into the Chinese market in the CCI project was a new coproduction deal for the 
bilateral film and television (TV) industries. First, the KMT government implemented a 
co-production deal by offering Taiwanese filmmakers the chance to partner with China’s 
booming but heavily censored movie industry under the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA). This was a product of years of effort by the KMT 
government to promote bilateral policies, which increased skepticism among the 
population but also found supporters. In particular, Hong and Sun (1999, p.543) have 
elaborated that ‘the huge Chinese market exerts an irresistible attraction for Taiwan's 
media/culture industry, and the industry has strongly and effectively influenced the 
government's policymaking’. It could be said that producing only movies that overly 
target the Chinese film market and its box office would marginalise Taiwanese elements 
in film productions. The results were predictable: the most serious situation is not 
Chinese official censorship; rather, the more perilous journey is the process of self-
censorship that automatically panders to the ‘requirement’ of the Chinese market. For 
example, ‘only 34 foreign films are given cinema releases each year under a quota set by 
Beijing, and all are subject to official censorship of content deemed politically sensitive 
or obscene’ (Evans, 2016). Smith (2016) also points out that ‘a more valid concern is the 
self-censorship cropping up in Hollywood products to appease China’s notoriously strict 
censor board’ (Smith, 2016). But this might not be a big deal while global investors are 
proactively engaging with the Chinese on wider and increasingly attractive – trade, 
investment and economic cooperation. For example, David Cameron and George 
Osborne coined the phrase ‘golden era’ – in describing UK-China relations (Halliday, 
2016). Furthermore, DCMS announced and celebrated a clear demonstration of the large 
demand for UK goods and services in the Chinese market. 
China is one of the most important markets for UK creative export opportunities, 
with DIT aiming to double creative exports and the number of creative 
businesses exporting through the Creative Industries International Strategy by 
2020. (DCMS 2017, December 7) 
The new creative industries’ policy of bilateral co-production led to a greater willingness 
to invest among private investors, such as VCs. Particularly, corporate interests would 
be considered first for more commercialised and less sensitive film production. It could 
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be argued that the Taiwan film industry has not yet created a big domestic market and 
has a precarious audience; however, ‘Chineseised’ film production will accelerate the 
situation of the ‘crumbling foundation’ of the Taiwanese film industry.   
The report Creative Taiwan: Cultural and Creative Industries Development (2009) 
elaborated opportunities for the Taiwanese film and television industry to break into the 
Chinese market. The new bilateral co-production policy was a priority for helping the 
Chinese market to open smoothly to Taiwan, while Taiwanese film and TV industry 
workers were ready for more opportunities to conquer the Chinese market (CCA, 2009, 
p.39). The importation of Chinese TV drama programmes has represented an imbalance 
between Taiwan and China (see Table 7.3). 
 
Table 7.3 The export of TV drama production between Taiwan and 
China (hours/year) 
year 2006 2007 2008 
The domestic production of TV drama 
(hours) in China 
13847 14670 14498 
The import of Chinese TV drama (hours) 
in Taiwan 
560 1478 2392 
The export of Taiwanese TV drama 
(hours) in China 
376 185 474 
The proportion of Taiwanese TV drama 
(hours) in China 
2.61% 1.15% 2.81% 
Source: Creative Taiwan: cultural and creative industries development 
(CCA 2009, P.38) 
 
In 2008, five time more TV drama productions were imported from China than 
Taiwanese productions went to China. In this sub-project (from Creative Taiwan), the 
production of purely domestic films was not encouraged indirectly. Additionally, co-
production was strongly boosted via the project in Taiwan, while the Chinese government 
(the state administration of press, publication, radio, film and television) announced that 
TV drama co-production (Taiwan and China) would not be limited as were other 
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imported TV dramas, but rather would have the same rights as other Chinese domestic 
dramas in 2008. The Taiwanese government believed this was a new bilateral 
cooperation programme based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit for 
Taiwanese film and TV workers. Therefore, TV drama and film co-production was 
strongly encouraged by the Taiwanese government. Taiwanese film and media workers 
were encouraged to participate in the co-production project, as the value of the project 
through exporting Taiwanese TV dramas and films might be realised if co-production 
increased in the future. However, research (Chien, 2011) has confirmed that co-
production put the Taiwanese media industry in a new plight as the partnership changed. 
The Taiwanese government claimed that the bilateral co-production would do more good 
than harm and be dominated by Taiwan (CCA, 2009). However, China did not assume 
the subsidiary role in the process; thus, Taiwanese production was marginalised, while 
all stages from pre-production to post-production were controlled by China. Additionally, 
the Chinese TV drama policy dominated the partnership and programme content in the 
co-productions (Chien, 2011, p.98). Therefore, bilateral co-production actually causes 
more harm than good. It could be argued that the Chinese market (the Chinese film and 
TV industry system) has incorporated Taiwanese media workers in its productions in a 
fiercely competitive market. 
The core challenge in Taiwan remains the need to overcome a complex combination of 
structural features that particularly include neoliberal media policy, political interference 
and the marginalised position of public service in Taiwan’s highly commercialised media 
market. The rapidly growing media and film market in China has always fascinated the 
Taiwanese government and media workers, offering much encouragement for a bid to 
win over a Chinese audience. However, the process turns Taiwanese productions into 
Chinese co-productions, with more Chinese elements in stories, production and funding. 
Although it matches a range of other bilateral co-operative projects in terms of providing 
‘more effective’ economic development, it also reduces the development of the 
Taiwanese elements-oriented media and film industries. It is accompanied by restrictions 
on freedom of speech and the most sensitive subjects are avoided. Furthermore, the 
Taiwanese film and TV industries have not really improved through the process of co-
production; rather, individual media workers have been incorporated in the Chinese 
market. The serious problem here is that the Taiwanese government is pushing for 
individual Taiwanese media workers to stay in China to earn better salaries and reach the 
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international market. However, this sets the Taiwanese media industry back; hours of 
foreign TV programmes have filled most of the space in the Taiwanese TV schedules. 
Academics (Campaign for Media Reform, 2010; Feng, 2007, 2008; Wei, 2009, 2010, 
2013) have said that commercial television companies should be banned from the 
excessive buying of overseas formats, such as Korean romantic comedy, Chinese 
costume drama, and Japanese TV series (including those of different genres and variety 
shows), which audiences have accepted for their high quality. 
The government believed that Taiwan should open up to Chinese resources and markets, 
which could lead to new opportunities to develop Taiwanese cultural and creative 
industries (CCA, 2009). In the previous section, the public subsidy system, which was 
changed in the creative industries’ model in the second period, was mentioned. New 
private investors, professional consultants, and management companies and VCs became 
the new brokers expected to be ‘extremely efficient’ allocators of public resources after 
2008. Potential creative enterprises that could generate more profit in the emerging 
market would be easy to choose. For example, some independent film directors who 
usually focused on serious and sensitive issues found that it was difficult to apply for 
investments and subsidies, as professional consultant and management companies 
indirectly demanded that their future partners (the applicants) accept the game rules as a 
precondition to any final agreements. Therefore, the product had to not only be popular 
in the Taiwanese market but also sell to the Chinese market. Overly depending on the 
Chinese market has destroyed the Taiwanese media industry, especially the deregulation 
of the domestic broadcasting market and following the traditional interest-oriented 
creative industries’ policies (Interviewee B1, independent film director). 
Incidentally, the successful export of productions in the Japanese TV drama and 
animation industry and the K-pop industry are further examples of how the development 
of homegrown cultural and creative industries was established on the back of a strong 
public broadcasting system and then focused on the global market. To some extent, a 
heavy reliance on the Chinese market is risky while one is building up Taiwanese creative 
industries, such as the media industry, which will be under siege by a glittering new 
Chinese market. However, it does not mean that bilateral co-productions are totally 
inappropriate; they simply should not be seen as the panacea for reinvigorating media 
industries in Taiwan. Rather, they could be an option after the homegrown cultural and 
creative industries have begun to thrive. It could be argued that a better co-production 
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relationship should be formed as an authentic representation of the differences and 
similarities between bilateral cultures, with the themes of the films resonating with 
audiences well beyond their own borders.  
The fact that the existence of a more formal cooperation between Taiwan and China can 
boost economic growth is an important tenet of the KMT government. However, the CCI 
annual report’s (2012) entire first chapter introduced the benefit and success of ‘bilateral 
cooperation’ until 2011, which happened through challenging and changing the creative 
industries’ policies and funding system, and often that means relatively subtle changes 
that will have a long-term impact. 
7.4 Setting up the departments of creative industries in universities 
The third salient characteristic of this period was a rapidly expanding higher education 
system with a vibrant discourse surrounding the competitiveness, effectiveness, and 
thriving future that the CI can bring about. The development of commercialised HE is 
not only the result of CIP, which accelerates HE to produce more ‘lower-paid talents’, 
but also due to global neoliberalised development. For example, the manufacturing sector 
of the West has largely been moving to East and Southeast Asian countries, like China, 
for decades. Surplus labour has been totally engaged in HE via a neoliberal discourse 
characterised by phrases such as ‘the best investment for your future’ in a new de-
industrialised society. As noted by McGuigan, we have entered ‘a neoliberal phase of 
‘free-market’ higher education by turning degrees into expensive commodities’ (2015, 
p.103). Broadly speaking, almost everything was related to economic logic in 
neoliberalised HE, particularly the principle of user pays. In recent years, students have 
demonstrated against increases in tuition fees globally. The conception of HE is no longer 
the public service but consumer service under the neoliberal wave. 
Additionally, the performance of university departments sometimes depends on 
‘customer’ feedback from students at end of each semester and the number of 
international journal papers published by academics (McGuigan, 2013, p.83). Arts and 
Humanities have not been considered ‘star’ departments like Finance and Business, 
Information Engineering, and Pharmacy for a long time and are seriously marginalised 
in universities in the neoliberal deviation (Bérubé, 2013). It could be said that the HE 
system has been externally influenced by neoliberalised policymaking and social 
development. For example, an increasing proportion of the independent revenue sources 
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of universities are subject to austerity policies, and this is likely to have indirectly 
contributed to universities employing relatively more short-contract lecturers than long-
term staff members, as well as constantly increasing tuition fees and vicious competition 
to attract students. Various evaluation systems have been implemented in the name of 
increasing ‘efficiency’, ‘competitive strength’, and ‘high quality of service’ through the 
prism of the neoliberal status quo. For example, evaluation of the learning environment 
and of teaching has come to be based on customer' satisfaction with the standard of 
service offered by universities and teachers. Furthermore, academics need to prove 
themselves as productive, such as in terms of the number of journal papers published and 
the amount of national research programme funds they have successfully secured for the 
university (McGuigan, 2013). 
Since 2002, CCIP has gradually influenced the outlook and appearance of the HE system 
in Taiwan. The project reflects, to an extent, the neoliberalised HE market that has led to 
the establishment of over 70 CI departments in universities (see Appendix II). The talents 
who come from the departments of Arts and Humanities are the origin of CI (CCI Annual 
Report, 2002). However, when universities were energetically encouraged to set up 
creative industries departments post-2002, Arts and Humanities departments were 
simultaneously merged and downsized, leaving them marginalised. Students studying in 
CI departments at universities are the ‘new human capital’ that can accelerate the 
development of CI. Schlesinger (2017) has mentioned that the term – human capital – is 
drawn from an analogy with ‘the objects of various kinds of investment – education to 
the fore – that might enhance the qualities of labour’ (p.78).  
The training of creative labourers for CI in new university courses and departments 
represents the commercialisation of HE. Graduates from departments of design, 
communication and cultural and creative industries have sought jobs and even 
undertaken unpaid internships in related fields. Official data on higher education from 
the Ministry of Education point to a significant increase – 70 – university departments 
with new titles such as ‘cultural and creative industries’. Many of these were founded 
under CIP, which offered funding for establishing new departments, programmes and 
courses related to the cultural and creative industries. In addition, nearly 90% of young 
people are optimistic about the development potential of the CI, according to a 2011 HR 
survey highlighting the impact of policy and the fluctuating growth of the CI (1111 Job 
Bank Survey, 2011). However, the hidden fact is that existing jobs are inadequate, despite 
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government measures to stimulate growth. The higher education system has set up many 
‘creative industries’ courses and departments in universities over 10 years in a 
phenomenon fuelled and supported by the mainstream media system and some 
‘successful’ celebrities of the ‘creative class’. Therefore, most graduates are optimistic 
about their job prospects, not knowing they are about to enter a flawed jobs market. In 
the UK, 30 universities provide undergraduate and masters courses in the creative and/or 
cultural industries, or the creative economy (Schlesinger, 2017). Schlesinger (2017) 
elaborates that the academic agenda has been shaped by CIP, both in teaching and 
research, especially as ‘the UK Research Councils have invested heavily in research into 
the creative and digital economies’ (p.83). AHRC Creative Economy Champion (Arts 
and Humanities Research Council, 2016) has shown an interest in the development of 
the creative economy between academia and business. 
It spent circa 100m GBP on research related to creative economy interests 
during 2011 and 2015. Academic research plays a vital role in informing the 
development of new ideas, practices and business models and in building 
entrepreneurial capacity in the creative economy. (Arts and Humanities 
Research Council, 2016)  
In Taiwan, Arts and Humanities departments secured funding for developing innovation 
and creativity in the CI field when CCIP became one of the more important sections in 
the national plan (the national Challenge 2008: Six-Year National Development Plan). 
In 2002, the CCI Annual Report claimed that there would be a new ‘opportunity’ for 
assisting Arts and Humanities graduates to obtain employment in CI. However, the 
instrumentalisation of Arts and Humanities departments reflects the problems of CIP 
implementation. Firstly, the challenge represented by an increasingly volatile job market, 
especially in the cultural and creative industries, is naturalised for the individuals: the 
prospect of finding their dream job now seems exciting and terrifying for freelancers. 
However, the mass media’s encouragement of individuals to visualise their dream work 
has promoted the ‘freedom of cultural and creative works’, and asserted that it is cool to 
have a challenging, rewarding, fun job and a great urban lifestyle. Secondly, the 
government has claimed that more jobs are created by CI, without acknowledging that 
this occurs through deregulated, flexible labour market policies.  
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It is essential for us to conceive of ‘creativity’ and ‘culture’ as ‘commodities’ if we are 
to see the convergence of pop music, film, media, design, digital content, and art 
industries (CCA, 2009, p.22). The policy of broadly establishing new CI departments in 
universities was actually instigated by the government and could have been a catalyst in 
exacerbating the neoliberalised HE system and the development of CI. It clearly stated 
that the inadequacy of the brokers of cultural and creative industries had to be mitigated 
through more industry-academic cooperation, new university courses and departments, 
and more internship opportunities. Furthermore, new university departments needed to 
meet the requirements for emerging CI in the Flagship Project (CCA, 2010; CCA, 2011). 
The fields of Art Design, Digital Content Technology, Management, Marketing and 
Intellectual Property Rights were required as the main part of the core curriculum for 
talent training (CCA, 2009, p.23; CIAR, 2013, p.176). Additionally, the government 
encouraged universities to develop a CI internship programme, as it believed that more 
internship experiences would assist undergraduate students to advance their future 
careers in the CI. 
The issue of marketisation in universities was raised in the early 1990s (Fairclough, 1993). 
Even at that early stage, it was becoming clear that university admissions services and 
advertising focused on attractive slogans such as ‘invest in yourself’ and ‘a successful 
life’, especially in Business, Financial Management, Electrical Engineering, and 
Chemical Engineering departments. Additionally, Arts and Humanities departments 
existed ‘in the context of educational cutbacks’ at the time (Burgin, 1984, p.66).  
Nowadays, ‘art and culture’ could be considered a new business (with a nice name) in 
the CI. Therefore, universities have become ‘cultural and creative’ vocational training 
institutes.  
The government and universities aimed to swell the workforce supply in order, to create 
a steady stream of ‘reserve army of labour’ conscripts for CI; the creative workers who 
are the new graduates are indirectly suffering with low wages, long hours and unstable 
employment and it is easy to take them for granted. This trend of an over-supply of young 
people in the CI was mentioned in the 2005 CIAR Annual Report (CIAR, 2006). 
According to official statistics, 50,232 creative talents (who graduated from CI 
programmes) did not work directly in the CI in 2004, and this increased to 63,687 creative 
talents who were unable to find a job in the same field in 2006 (2005 CIAR, 2006, p.256). 
The report predicted an oversupply of creative talents in the next three years, as well as 
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indicating that the industry is largely comprised of self-employed and temporary or part-
time jobs, leaving creative labourers woefully unprepared for retirement (2005 CIAR, 
2006, p.254). Additionally, the young generation, many of whom actively attempt to 
become members of CI, are habituated to unstable labour and unstable living. Notably, 
neoliberalism has made people accept the exploitation of the ‘creative class’. It can be 
argued that the neoliberalised social structure and its agents interact and form neoliberal 
individuals, neoliberal identities and neoliberal phraseologies on a daily basis, 
particularly since the late 1990s, when popular, pervasive neoliberal phraseology made 
the ideology easily accessible. The use of neoliberal language has been the ideological 
scaffolding for ‘moulding identities and characterizing social relationships’ (Massey, 
2013, p.3). Beck (2002, p.23) explains that the notion of ‘a life of your own’ emerged 
from a process of individualising society driven by the evolving role in Western culture. 
In spite of this, the broad establishment of creative industries departments in universities 
is still seen as providing a solution to these problems of youth unemployment. 
Although the CI depend on art schools to supply fresh talent, an official investigation 
found a 72% unemployment rate among recent graduates of university Performance Art 
departments in 2002 (2006 CIAR, 2007, p.68). Therefore, CIP has encouraged 
universities to nurture more creative talents for CI via the setting up of specific creative 
industries and management departments. The challenge of imbalanced supply and 
demand was revealed in the 2005 CIAR Annual Report. Following this, the 2006 CIAR 
Annual Report deemed that the main problem faced by unemployed creative talents 
relates to the institutional deficiencies of personnel training in universities, since 
graduates cannot be absorbed by the creative industries. The numerous creative industry 
departments and institutes were founded in universities through the promotion of the CIP. 
According to the website of the Ministry of Education and National Culture and Arts 
Foundation, 70 departments related to CI and innovation have been founded since CCIP; 
notably, 62 departments were set up after 2008 and 17 departments changed their original 
title. The terms ‘creative’, ‘creativity’, and ‘innovation’ suddenly became the most 
popular choices in naming departments after that time.  
The sharp rise in number of CI departments in universities was a dilemma resulting from 
the marketisation of universities. It represents growing private profit-seeking in the 
public sphere and the creative industries policymaking process. For example, the arts and 
humanities tend to be marginalised and replaced in universities. The 
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departments/modules of the creative industries are more ‘practical’ and ‘useful’. CI 
departments have been taken seriously alongside investment and research. Schlesinger 
(2017) elaborated that how the higher education programme has been influenced by CIP 
and the new development of the creative economy between academia and business is a 
popular issue; in particular, HE should strengthen in tandem with the human capital for 
productivity in high-performance creative industries. This approach represents the plight 
of the marketisation of HE. 
If Arts, Humanities and Social Science Schools are replaced by Creativity Schools in 
universities, it would put the cart before the horse in admitting that there is intrinsic value 
in nurturing the talent required to develop and maintain a modern workforce in the CI. 
The trend of broadly setting up CI departments illustrates that HE has been adhering to 
neoliberal dogma. Ostensibly, nurturing new talent and education is a central concern of 
the CI project, but in practice this does more harm than good to the development system 
in the Taiwanese cultural industries. Furthermore, the process of ‘training creative talent’ 
in Arts, Humanities and Social Science departments shift the balance in favour of 
emphasising market-oriented and pragmatist programmes, as more public funding and 
resources have been allocated to these ‘creative industries’ departments. Additionally, 
some Arts, Humanities and Social Science institutes have been merged, renamed or even 
cut entirely in the process of CIP being encouraged. This serious imbalance is likely to 
exacerbate the inequalities that have already reached slightly terrifying dimensions. 
 
7.5 Conclusion  
To sum up, neoliberal reform in cultural and creative industries policymaking in Taiwan 
has generally failed to promote the public interest. The creative economy has heavily 
influenced the development of cultural policy discourse. The marketisation of public 
subsidy and investment has changed the relationship between cultural workers and the 
public funding system. The new funding and investment system requires more market-
oriented programmes and venture capital firms play a significant role in deciding ‘which 
application is worth investing in (or not)’. The purpose of cultural and CI funding is not 
to develop the diversity and plurality of the cultural landscape, but to be an effective 
machine that instils what the market wants. Finally, the fact that many university creative 
industry departments, MA degrees, and modules have been founded in the past decade 
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represents the problems associated with the commercialisation of higher education. In 
particular, this has reaffirmed the lessons and business model of the CI and has 
completely marginalised the arts humanities and social sciences.  
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8                                                                                                             
The Developing Creative Workers’ Survival 
Mechanism: in the Neoliberalised Creative Industries 
Market 
 
Cultural workers appeared, at best, as ghosts at a feast of creative labor, organized 
elsewhere. While the agency of consumers was dissected in detail and often celebrated, 
the agency of cultural producers was denied or ignored. 
(Murdock, 2003, p.16) 
 
8.1 Introduction  
Neoliberalised creative-industries policymaking and legislation have framed the 
development of the creative industries in Taiwan. The creative industries project (2002) 
promised to generate employment, opportunities and prosperity. However, the creative 
industries’ operating method has increasingly relied on large numbers of younger 
workers entering the industry in low-paid jobs, volunteer positions, internships and 
temporary work.  
This chapter explores the experiences of creative labourers, particularly film and media 
workers whose trajectories of uneasy working conditions and flexible contracts embody 
the complexity of the neoliberalised plight. Most creative labourers have internalised the 
paradoxes of neoliberalism. For example, the education system and workplace have been 
overwhelmed by the ideology of ‘competition relies upon universal quantification and 
comparison’, and individuals have difficulty seeing the growing, inherent contradictions. 
However, the nature of neoliberalism is not fixed and immutable. The neoliberal ideology 
and political practices have to be crystallised in contextual embeddedness through the 
workers’ different survival mechanisms.  In this way these individual creative labourers 
were not only passive recipients but also actors in a dynamic process. Some have adapted 
to neo-liberal terrain; some complained and are slightly tweaking some of the more 
cumbersome rules; some compromised between the imbalances of themselves and the 
society. Therefore, it wasn’t simply lofty neoliberal rhetoric, but an interactive process 
which builds relationships between the ideology and individuals. It can be argued that 
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this historical dynamic has played an important role in and accelerated the formation of 
neoliberalised individuals. In this chapter, an elaboration of the historical background of 
the Taiwanese cultural industries and in-depth, semi-structured interviews with creative 
workers are interwoven with the development of the cultural and creative industries to 
re-contextualise neoliberal initiatives and individuals. 
The three sections of this chapter discuss the different situations of these cultural workers. 
Although the interviewees are in the same global neoliberal economic system and 
influence each other, their semi-structured interviews reveal some differences that should 
be elaborated. First, the younger generation in the cultural and creative industries in 
Taiwan has been shaped by neoliberalised cultural policymaking and the process of 
individualising cultural labourers. The second section describes the situation of cultural 
labourers who have worked for more than 20 years, and thus faced changes in public 
funding, private investment and market rules while cultural policymaking was reframed 
through the function of the creative industries. Finally, the third section explores the 
reasons that Taiwanese immigrant cultural workers chose to enter and stay in China’s 
media market from the late 1990s. Unsurprisingly, these Taiwanese immigrant cultural 
workers have been involved directly and indirectly in global competition in different 
periods. ‘With the acknowledgement that markets are becoming globalised, media 
consortia have been eagerly exploring new markets. One of the world’s largest 
media/culture markets and resources, China especially becomes a prime target for 
Taiwan’ (Hong & Sun, 1999, p.544). For example, Rupert Murdoch and his News Corp 
purchased satellite Star TV in Hong Kong in 1993, seeking opportunities in the China’s 
media market. Therefore, some senior Taiwanese media workers, attracted by the rapidly 
growing global satellite television market in China, and the ambition of the global media 
conglomerates, were recruited by Star TV.  
 
8.2 The young generation in the cultural and creative industries  
The cultural and creative industries have become a booming business. According to 
official company directories (Department of Commerce, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Commerce Industrial Services Portal 2016), 1,462 Taiwanese enterprises use ‘cultural’ 
and ‘creative’ in the company name. Only 52 companies were founded before 2002, 
when the creative industries project was launched. Today, these firms have all changed 
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their names, adding the terms ‘cultural’ and ‘creative’ (文創). Since the Cultural & 
Creative Policy (2002) was announced, 1,410 new cultural and creative firms have been 
founded. Evidently, the creative policy spurred the remarkable growth of new businesses 
in this industry. The cultural policy, though, was steered by the limitations of the 
neoliberal economic use of profit as a measure. Most public funding in cultural policy 
has encouraged creative entrepreneurship but has not actually fostered a wide range of 
benefits within a good working environment. Furthermore, the Cultural Ministry’s 
website and creative industries annual reports have featured the quantification of short-
term achievements. For example, a summary in the 2015 Cultural & Creative Industries 
Annual Report quantified policy performance literally: 
There were 62,264 companies in creative industries in 2014 and a 0.59% 
increase compared with 2013. Visual design industry was the most effective one 
to raise the number of companies for 27.42%. The creative industries have just 
had its better year, with a turnover of 199bn GBP (794.5bn NTD) on economic 
recovery in 2014 and a 1.80% increase compared with 2013. Total turnover 
mainly from the domestic market's share was 90.33% in 2014. (2015 Cultural 
& Creative Industries Annual Report, p.3) 
We have serious doubts that the profit growth, the turnover, and the profit margin are 
either a useful tool or a measure of policy effectiveness. It could be argued that these can 
be an evaluation criterion in cultural policy but are not the only or primary criteria to 
quantify effectiveness. They do not seem to have delivered the expected improvements 
in economic performance and employment in the creative industries.  
Logically, the thriving of the creative industries – apparent in the numerous creative 
businesses founded during this period (2002-10) – can be expected to have increased 
annual gross domestic product (GDP), boosted private investment and employment, and 
helped to solve the problem of a deep manufacturing recession. These benefits were 
assumed in the initial primary mechanism of the national development project in 2002 
(2003 Cultural & Creative Industries Annual Report, p.23). However, the official 
cultural statistics (2013, 2014, and 2015) demonstrated that the creative industries policy 
efficiency measures were currently not growing as expected. For example, the turnover 
of creative industries as a proportion of GDP, without a significant increase in the growth 
rate, increased only 0.43% from 2009 to 2010 (see Table 9.1). Annual growth rates of 
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the creative industries’ turnover were also not good enough. A statistically significant 
increase of 18.44% in the 2010 annual growth rate happened because the Act of Cultural 
& Creative Industries Development was launched in the same year. Some new industrial 
categories were legally included into ‘cultural & creative industries’ in the new law. 
Therefore, the annual growth rate rapidly upturned in 2010.  
Table 8.1 The performance of creative industries during 2008 and 2014 
Year the turnover of 
creative 
industries 
(million NTD) 
annual 
growth 
rate (%) 
the turnover of 
creative industries 
In the proportion 
of GDP (%) 
The employment in 
creative industries 
(number of people) 
2008 674,720  5.13% (2014) 169,911/ ? 
2009 645,442 -4.34% 4.98% (2015) 164,542/ 224,108 
2010 764,471 18.44% 5.41% 170,539/ 232,022 
2011 786,129 2.83% 5.29% 172,903/ 230,031 
2012 759,632 -3.37% 5.17% 172,757/ 236,387 
2013 780,442 2.74% 5.13% 175,129/ 240,114 
2014 794,477 1.8% 4.94% 175,129/ 245,520 
Source:  the Cultural Statistics, the Ministry of Culture (2016), Annual Report 
(2013, 2014, 2015) and reorganised by the author  
 
Although official statistics suggest a surge of around 21,412 jobs during 2009 and 2014 
(see Table 9.1), the sector provides only a small proportion of job opportunities for 
numerous annual graduates. For example, according to an official survey by the Ministry 
of Education’s Department of Statistics (2016), Taiwan had 24,677 graduates from 
design departments (13,024), communication (5,774) and the arts (5,879) in 2014, 
outnumbering the jobs available in those fields. In addition, graduates from not only 
departments of design, art, and communication but also departments of cultural and 
creative industries have sought jobs and even unpaid internships in these fields8. Also, 
nearly 90% of young people are optimistic about the development potential of the 
creative industries, according to a 2011 HR survey highlighting the impact of policy and 
                                            
8 There is not a category for ‘Creative industries departments’ in the Ministry of Education’s Department of 
Statistics. However, creative industries departments could disperse in design, communication, film and media, 
and art departments.  
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the fluctuating growth of the creative industries (1111 Job Bank Survey, 2011). The 
hidden fact is that jobs are inadequate, despite government measures to stimulate growth. 
Many ‘Creative Industries’ departments were founded. Furthermore, this phenomenon 
was fuelled and supported by the mainstream media system and some ‘successful’ 
celebrities of the ‘creative class’. Therefore, most graduates are optimistic about their job 
prospects, although they do not know they are facing a flawed jobs market.  
However, the results show that the cultural policy had had a one-sided focus on short-
term stability, and its solutions for short-term issues might create more long-term 
problems (see previous chapters). For example, the turnover of all the creative industries 
in Taiwan needs a significant increase for its achievements in the policy review. Not only 
has Taiwan’s self-employed workforce grown, but also flexible working arrangements 
(sometimes) with low pay is profoundly reflected in the issue of job insecurity.  
Casualization […] has been on the organization of labor markets within the 
cultural industries as corporations have sought to cut costs by shifting workers 
from secure employment to freelance contracts and making more use of part-
time and casualized labor, hiring people “just-intime” to meet particular 
production needs and then returning them to the reserve army of cultural labor 
(Murdock, 2003, p.22). 
Owning your creative business and being a freelance have been perceived as cool and 
popular; or, in other words, neoliberal ideologies have increasingly shaped people’s 
entrepreneurial selves (Brockling, 2016) and self-blame (Banks, 2007, p63). It is part of 
the neoliberal project to emphasise individuals’ responsibility. The number of self-
employed workers under pressure to make a success of their ventures has risen rapidly. 
Their ambition and desire to succeed accelerates their willingness to take risks. The gist 
of the argument is rooted in the myth of the heroic individual entrepreneur; some workers 
might easily blame themselves for their failures, even when they are suffering through 
the large numbers of unpaid jobs in the exploitative creative sector. Conceptions of 
exploitation and freedom have been redefined in the current neoliberal system and the 
individualised process. These individualised situations have undermined the possibility 
of unity and resistance as individual cultural workers compete with each other in a global 
network, struggling for their next job. McRobbie (2002), Gibson (2003) and Banks (2007) 
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explain that neoliberalised and individualised work has tended to produce obedient 
(albeit autonomous) labourers who want to be the next successful model. 
Not only has the government encouraged people interested in creative jobs and 
businesses, but the mainstream media have also promoted these issues. For instance, 
media outlets have featured highly successful cultural workers who earn/ 
learn/experience more than they would working nine-to-five jobs doing the same thing 
every day (1111 Job Bank, 2011; Apple, Daily 2014; Wang, 2016; ET Today, 2016). New 
books, business magazines, daily news reports and workshops have presented these 
successful models to the younger generations and recent graduates and spread the 
discourse that they should achieve their dreams and aspirations (1111 Job Bank, 2011; 
Apple Daily, 2014; Wang, 2016; ET Today, 2016). Furthermore, some news reports claim 
that the prospect of finding the dream job seemed exciting and terrifying for freelancers. 
This process of visualising the dream self has been carried out via mass media promoting 
the ‘freedom of cultural & creative works’ and asserting that it is very cool to have a 
challenging, rewarding, fun job and a great lifestyle in the cities (Boom & Cowan, 2012; 
Chen, 2015; Cohen, 2011; Winfrey, 2016).   
Books such as How to Immerse Yourself in the Creative Industries are numerous, and 
one of the best-selling books in Taiwan was written by a top human resources (HR) 
agency with the catchphrase, ‘One small step in your career can be a giant leap towards 
achieving your goals’ (1111 Job Bank, 2011). The book (2011) appears to be a practical 
guide for younger workers, urging them to have a positive, entrepreneurial outlook and 
to be passionate, energetic and patient in their work in the creative industries. An official 
with the Youth Development Administration in the Ministry of Education even wrote a 
preface calling this ‘a great book to meet the challenges of creative industries in the 21st 
century’ (1111 Job Bank, 2011). However, the basic discourse packaged in this book – 
that young people should endure all difficulties to achieve their goal of an ideal job – 
pushes young people to endure this deceptive neoliberal individualism. The models of 
famous, successful cultural workers, such as movie directors, producers, songwriters and 
designers, have been unhealthily glorified by the mass media and social media, which 
should, instead, dispassionately consider these cases, especially the factors that promote 
or hinder success. It can be argued that the aura of these creative industry celebrities and 
their talent has rationalised the exploitation and injustice in the system of neoliberal 
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democracies that demands that people dream, accomplish, and work ever harder to 
develop their unique talents.  
The government, enterprises and mass media have sided with and produced this 
neoliberal discourse. Increasing numbers of (would-be) creative labourers struggle in 
these industries in the new, individualised, aesthetic economy. Furthermore, Banks (2007) 
argues that most cultural workers easily accept and do not challenge the rules of the game, 
as the ideologies of individualism and the entrepreneurial self have become the main 
pillars of the neoliberal economic structure. Banks (2007) provides a trenchant argument 
contextualising the neoliberal structure and individualised cultural workers.  
The pressure to conform and compete in a more market-led and individualized 
economy may bring with it the corollary of social atomization, and a more 
pronounced need for self-coping as a consequence of disembedding from 
collectivized environments and structures of support. It is suggested that strong 
incitements to become more self-directed, self-resourcing and entrepreneurial 
may enhance possibilities for worker self-exploitation and, relatedly, self-
blaming. (p.43) 
Precisely these characteristics of self-enterprise, self-exploitation and self-blame are seen 
in the anxiety of the younger generation of workers in the creative industries.  According 
to the analysed interview data, four interviewees aged 26-31 with four or five years of 
work experience in the cultural industries, are in similar situations. Three main aspects 
are key to understanding their challenges and plight: self-evaluation, working conditions 
and career planning. These are important aspects of their work performance mentioned 
in the interviews (see Chapter 2)9. From their positions as newly qualified workers, the 
desire to become highly skilled in the cultural industries represents both their ambition 
and their anxiety, which arise from the process of individualisation that accompanies the 
neoliberal model. For example, two interviewees who had worked in the film and 
television industries for three and four years were freelancers. One was keen to emphasise 
the reasons why she does not want to work for a television company: 
I don’t like the system of TV companies and that kind of job. I mean the idea of 
working nine to five and doing the same thing every day. You feel trapped in 
                                            
9 The full details of research methods are provided in the method chapter.   
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this kind of job and unable to get promoted or find another flexible role. I also 
don’t like the production process of Taiwanese soap operas. One of the highest 
rated TV soap opera crew members asked me last month if I wanted to join their 
team. […] That was a stable monthly salary job, and the wages were higher than 
my last work, but I still turned down the opportunity for the long term. Ideally, 
a filming project or TV series production with a good script, acceptable salary, 
nice director and crew is analogous to a TV series in its quality for me. […] I’m 
a freelancer, but I can choose the job that I really want to do. Furthermore, peers 
will recognise that I have been on some high-quality TV series or film 
productions. […] I am accumulating more credits and will have a better 
reputation in the field, and I can ask better wage for the next case. (Interview 
A2) 
She believes that freelancer status grants more choice and freedom, although it 
sometimes means only a minimum salary at first. This problem is one that frequently 
arises in the new economy or the so-called creative economy. Brockling (2016) considers 
self-controlling, self-economising and self-rationalising to be characteristic features of 
freelancers. However, he observes that these ‘freelancers are eking out a living as “Me 
Incorporated” […] with no realistic prospect of attaining the prosperity once associated 
with the figure of the entrepreneur’ (Banks, 2007, p.22). Some studies (Banks, 2007; 
Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2009; Huws, 2006) have already illustrated the deepening of 
this tendency – many cultural workers are ‘rational-economic-man’ who sacrifices the 
wage and sticks with his/her career for more opportunities. For example, unpaid/low-
paid internships are not frowned upon by everyone, since the education system, 
enterprises and mainstream media officially have supported this idea for a long time. 
However, it is a huge problem and becoming increasingly common in the creative 
industries (Lindvall, 2013; Page, 2014; Mason, 2016). The tendency of new cooperation 
between universities, industry partners and the government has resulted in potential 
trainees being treated as members of the industrial reserve army (Feng, 2016; Yan, 2016). 
It is a vicious circle in which companies provide internship opportunities for the 
students/graduates and know that those seeking work experience will/have to accept the 
roles. 
Although the other production assistant interviewed loves her busy work now, she has 
found that, despite all of her efforts to prove that her ability is worth a higher wage, it is 
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quite difficult to ask for more salary. The complication is that young cultural workers 
sometimes feel the situation is all right (an acceptable salary for an ideal job), but they 
are under increasing pressure as the rent and next month’s bills come due. 
I remember once working with a TV series team for almost six months when I 
was a novice. At first, the crew promised me that it would be a four-month 
project, but it wasn’t and it extended two more months with half wage. […] I 
felt something going wrong in the end of the third month – the production 
suffered extensive delays due to the screenwriter only finishing half of the script 
lines and the cinematographer and director spent too much time arguing. In the 
end of the fourth month, the crewmembers informed us that we still have to 
complete this work for one or two months more and that this month’s salaries 
will also be delayed. […] You know what? I didn’t even receive the final 
payment until two or three months after. There are insufficient funds/resources 
for the issue of extensive planning delays, but our payment has been sacrificed 
for the final solution. I have learnt from this lesson and only do the work that 
can pay me regularly every month. (Interview A1) 
A budget deficit or shortfall is sometimes a normal occurrence in making these young 
assistants choose a relative sacrifice. Media/film freelances have to endure similar 
difficulties, which is actually self-exploitation. The characteristics of self-enterprise, self-
exploitation and self-blaming should be seen as a symptom, not a cause, for the neoliberal 
process. According to the interviews, the struggling young cultural workers represent 
inherent contradictions – while they sometimes feel autonomous, they also suffer from 
exploitation. Moreover, they are also channelling emotions, such as pride in achievement 
and satisfaction or pressure, anxiety, self-doubt and vulnerability. This further indicates 
the tremendous swing between pressure and pleasure. Therefore, it could be argued that 
these cultural workers are not only being shaped into neoliberal individuals, but they also 
are riddled with self-contradictions. The individual experience and the structural plights 
are inextricably interwoven. 
 
  
177 
 
8.3 Cultural workers survive in the new funding mechanism since 
the subsidy cuts took effect 
Experienced cultural workers who have worked in the cultural industries for decades 
recognise that the problem of neoliberalised cultural policymaking has grown more 
serious since the promotion of the creative industries project. They feel strongly that 
the new policy is unfair. 
Since the Ministry of Culture set up the Department of Cultural and Creative 
Development, the grossly unfair allocation of cultural policy funding, of course, 
has strong and obvious negative effects on the growth of the cultural landscape. 
(Interviewee B2, independent curator) 
In this view, creative industries policies are considered a benefit provided by the public 
sector. However, cultural workers rarely benefit from any new project which has been 
bequeathed economic logic so tied in to the neoliberal framework. Ironically, the 
enterprises might benefit from tax cuts encouraging creative industries investment, or 
from deregulation, privatisation, outsourcing and competition in public services. A low- 
tax economy, a very flexible job market, and unpaid/low-paid internships are widely 
accepted as crucial for the government believing in the need to inject more economic 
stimulus; for the new cultural workers seeking the best positions after university; and for 
the companies rapidly processing capital accumulation. Neoliberalised cultural policies 
do not work for the public value but work for a few private sectors. Furthermore, they 
inflict unnecessary suffering on cultural workers (McGuigan, 2015; Newsinger, 2014). 
There is a need to mitigate the difference in the cultural values between the cultural 
workers and the new public-private partnerships that will inevitably dominate. Cultural 
workers, such as independent curators and independent directors, believe that creative 
industry policies have exacerbated matters. For example, one interviewee explains that 
these new cultural policies may seem like a grand public spending project with apparent 
economic benefits for the country, but actually ‘nowadays applying for cultural subsidies 
is more difficult than before’ (Interviewee B2).  
There are at least 15 types of creative industry in the official creative industries law 
(2010); these include: 1. Visual art industry; 2. Music and performance art industry; 3. 
Cultural assets application and exhibition and performance facility industry; 4. 
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Handicrafts industry; 5. Film industry; 6. Radio and television broadcast industry; 7. 
Publication industry; 8. Advertisement industry; 9. Product design industry; 10. Visual 
communication design industry; 11. Designer fashion industry; 12. Architecture design 
industry; 13. Digital content industry; 14. Creativity living industry; 15. Popular music 
and cultural content industry. However, not all of them are funded adequately. The 
interviewees argue that some types are not potential commodities and are excluded in 
certain ways.  
The official project said that the art and cultural creativity is the most important 
of all creative industries. I can’t see that actually. It has gone so far to the money 
that it has lost its core values. (Interviewee B2) 
As the claims made by the government get bigger, it seems increasingly likely 
that the massive financial investment associated with private investor-state 
cooperation will effectively grant creative industries policy, which is only based 
on a commercial funding mechanism. (Interviewee B1, independent film 
director) 
Furthermore, the government (NDF, 2010) claims that around 476m GBP (200 bn NTD) 
has been spent since 2010, which is a tremendous sum for supporting new creative 
business companies and encouraging venture capital firms to invest in creative industries, 
such as film, television and pop music industries (Fan, 2009; Feng, 2014). There was a 
total of 62,264 creative business companies in 2014, a 0.59% increase over 2013 (2015 
Annual Report, p.17). These new germinating companies were founded especially to 
explore a massive and imminent upsurge of creative economy.  
Some of the independent studios or cultural organisations who didn’t have the 
creative business license 10 now set up the creative business companies for 
applying more funding and investment from the project. It seems to me that 
encouraging creative business is not the same as helping us to envision a 
genuinely prosperous creative economy. (Interviewee B2) 
As a result, the creative industries are not the fastest growing sector of the Taiwanese 
economy (2015 Annual Report). The government has faced pressure to adopt policies 
and laws that open government tenders to the new creative business companies. 
                                            
10 The details of the creative business license are presented in chapters 7 and 8. 
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Unsurprisingly, the new firms surged forward. Therefore, the privatisation of a public 
subsidy system – the new investment model (see Chapter 8) – profoundly changes the 
relationship between the government, the cultural workers and the venture capital 
companies. 
Cultural workers in film, television and the pop music industries might still feel that they 
have opportunities to get access to investment. The government vigorously promoted the 
entertainment industry and the investors, in particular, via the creative industries policy. 
One independent director told me that ‘an idea for a new commercial movie began to 
germinate in his mind’ (Interviewee B1). In the beginning, he felt truly excited about the 
new policy for facilitating domestic film production, but he ultimately learned that the 
investors already had their own preconceptions about ‘what constitutes the commercial 
success of a film’.  
The first hard part is finding funding for production. All investors I have met, 
they all care about maximum profits on two aspects: bilateral co-production 
between Taiwan and China and the film exhibition in the Chinese market. And 
this is their prerequisite for whether a film proposal could obtain the funds or 
not. I attempted for two months to visit countless individual investors and 
venture capitalists and I encountered the same problem everywhere. 
(Interviewee B1) 
This filmmaker has not complained of ‘commercial censorship’ of his latest film project 
and is committed to making a marketable film. ‘But a practical solution is possible’ 
(Interviewee B1). Cultural workers firstly believe that the government funds domestic 
film industries. Therefore, some individual workers can make a difference, provide 
practical solutions and prove that they are having considerable commercial acuity for the 
new funding mechanism. Although on the far-more-subjective notion of marketability, 
investment advisory firms subjectively determined that this project was not an effectively 
marketable one for them.  
I was extremely surprised and disappointed about the result after people have 
said that our domestic film production and market are flourishing in the present 
economic climate. And people also claim that there is a huge amount of funding 
for investing in domestic films. Therefore, we thought that we were also trying 
to cater to the trend towards the efficacy of following the commercial formula. 
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We believed that it could allow the sides some more negotiating space. Not 
really. (Interviewee B1) 
According to Chapter 8, the new investment mechanism did not assist domestic film 
production effectively. Instead, the restrictions of new private investors are 
simultaneously tightening cultural workers. The privatisation of public investment will 
indirectly make film producers likely to gravitate towards a sure-fire commercial 
proposal while they are applying for investment. Although the government expects a 
greater proportion of revenue as a result – with returns fed back into the film production 
industry – the fact is that the heart of the problem is still the issue of funding for 
filmmakers and the new policy plants obstacles to the growth of the Taiwanese film 
industry.  
Some artists, curators and local cultural organisations are plagued by funding problems 
similar to those in the film industries. Art and culture subsidies are always on the edges 
of a tiny budget in policymaking. However, the new creative industries policy gives hope 
to these cultural workers. First, some types are included in the project, such as the visual 
art industry, the music and performance art industry, the cultural assets application, 
exhibition and performance facility industry, and the handicrafts industry. This means 
that the new budget will spread benefits thinly across all of the cultural workers. Second, 
the concentric circles model of the cultural and creative industries project, which was 
adopted from the British creative industries, claims that the value of the arts and creativity 
are the core value of the creative industries (Creative Industries Task Force, 1998; White, 
2009). However, although this presents an opportunity for these workers, in order to seize 
it, they need to change their original projects or even attempt to ingratiate themselves 
with the new funding mechanisms.  
Although the Ministry of Culture claims that the creative industries project will 
make the development of cultural policy thrive because of the increasing budget, 
the diversity of cultural development does not really flourish through the extra 
public funding. It focuses more on one-off cultural events and festivals which 
could ‘prove’ that the achievement of cultural policy and the government money 
spent on culture goes to ‘worthwhile projects’ in a way the public can perceive. 
(Interviewee B3, independent stage director, artist) 
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The truth is that the Creative Industry Development Act has failed to accomplish 
its objectives. The new legislation extended protection of the law to people who 
want to do creative business but not for people who are doing cultural and 
creative works. (Interviewee B2) 
The outsourcing of cultural events and festivals is often held up to the public as a miracle 
driver of public service efficiency and innovation. The Ministry of Culture has to promote 
their policy achievements of the creative industries project. According to the studies 
(Wang, 2008; Wu & Wang, 2011), promoting cultural and creative events for the public 
via cultural festivals is one of the most common ways to meet the policy goal. Wang 
(2008) also found that there were 437 cultural festivals in Taiwan in one year (2016-17). 
It could be said that the government carries out the policymaking of the creative 
industries partially by putting on special and one-off events. The citizens, the audiences, 
and the media can easily perceive that something is happening through a festival, a big 
outdoor firework show, or a special exhibition. These extended cultural events are a 
singular phenomenon for promoting swarming consumption and the commodification of 
art and creativity. 
Some interviewees also mentioned the problems of the outsourcing creative parks project. 
They believe that the most derelict urban areas came to be was into blooming with artists’ 
studios, but now a ‘commercialised’ cultural landscape has replaced the former (see 
Chapter 7). Creative parks could be a fairly typical example of what the government has 
termed a ‘successful creative industries policy’. It could be a much-valued social and 
cultural space for the cultural workers and the citizens, following the original vison of 
the abandoned public spaces reuse policy. By contrast, during the creative industries 
policy project, it became more about market value and privatisation. For example, the 
outsourcing of public space was idled by the national sugar refineries and wineries in 
cities for decades. In the beginning, the organic cluster was formed by cultural workers 
in the abandoned space and the public sector only asked them for extremely cheap fees 
to reuse the space. However, the creative industries project might bring huge commercial 
interests through outsourcing the abandoned space for rebuilding creative parks. Market 
value and privatisation indirectly expelled the cultural cluster. The creative parks are not 
for the cultural workers but for the cultural consumers.  
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I believe that creative parks have been totally destroyed. Not one of them is a 
creative park. They are all amusement parks. Not one of them can provide 
practical, hands-on and interactive activities. Participants cannot learn, cannot 
experience anything. You pay for everything; then you can have something; 
without payment then there is nothing. (Interviewee B3) 
The key issue is the extent to which the creative parks are almost entirely 
commercialised for the ‘cultural’ customers and the creative product producers. 
The original purpose of the abandoned public spaces reuse policy was to provide 
cheap rent and empty public spaces for cultural workers. In the beginning, it 
was an extremely affordable space and the different exhibitions, performances, 
rehearsal spaces and studios were to be an organic cluster. However, the new 
creative policy changed the clustering of the cultural landmarks and events.  
Especially, we have experienced the very early period of these abandoned 
public spaces. You saw all kinds of cultural activities there. The alternative 
model cannot calculate the amount of the creative industry’s profit, but the fact 
is that these spaces were an important base for nurturing the creation and art 
activities. How can you calculate that? Actually, you cannot calculate the effect 
of that, but you need more space to foster creativity. (Interviewee B3) 
The cultural workers who have benefited from the abandoned public spaces reuse policy 
can compare the differences between the organic culture cluster and the creative park. 
However, in itself, a creative park is not objectionable from the perspective of most 
middle-class urban dwellers. They are actually satisfied with its location and service: a 
creative park is typically in the central location of a city and it provides more popular 
cultural and creative activities than the alternative, experimental and avant-garde ones. 
Shops and restaurants sell exquisite high-quality goods and foods. People experience 
cultural and creative events via consumption. In contrast, the cultural workers who do 
not develop any profitable creative business are expelled from the city centre.  
Everyone knows that the plight of the creative industries policy is because of 
the more ‘growth oriented’ intention but not the cultural-oriented purpose. The 
saddest thing is that even the Ministry of Culture totally echoes this interest-
oriented thought. It includes the fact that the new Department of Creative 
Industries was set up and follows the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Finally, the 
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National Development Fund for Creative Industries is occupied by a few people 
and their companies. (Interviewee B3) 
After the creative industries policy, some cultural workers feel that the limited public 
funding, cultural subsidies, and public resources are actually difficult to access. The 
cultural policy was only a creative industries policy.  
 
8.4 Immigrant cultural workers and their neoliberal Identity 
This section focuses on the immigrant cultural workers who work in China and believe 
that the Chinese market provides more potential opportunities for competitors. There are 
three different categories of immigrant cultural workers represented in my interviews. In 
addition to representing their own dynamic of neoliberalised identities, these 
interviewees also reflected the historical plight of the neoliberalised Taiwanese media 
market and policymaking. The first category of interviewees had working experience 
before the fully commercialised mainstream media system. They were primarily working 
in national TV stations, which occupied most of the market share and advertising 
revenues until the legalisation of the cable TV system (hundreds of cable channels) in 
the 1990s.  
It was a golden age of the Taiwanese broadcasting system before the media 
market fully opened. The TV ratings were super high and no matter what you 
produced, you could always easily be number one in the ratings. (Interviewee 
C1, ex-national TV station director, now works in China) 
However, the pressures caused by the legalisation of cable TV channels influenced 
competition for resources. From television’s start in the 1960s, Taiwan Television 
Enterprise [TTV, 台灣電視公司], the China Television Company [CTV, 中國電視公
司 ] and the Chinese Television Service [CTS, 中華電視公司 ], were primarily 
propaganda tools serving the demands of a one-party state (KMT government). In a sense, 
TV broadcasters were ‘accomplices’ of the State and legally permitted to make 
extortionate profits as the benefit for being such. This warped broadcasting system 
merged authoritarian political ideology and commercial interests. Martial law ended on 
15 July 1987. A sweeping privatisation of Taiwan’s media market ensued, in principle 
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forbidding political interference (or at least ownership). The jargon and ideology of the 
‘free market’ was all the rage with strong emphasis on the presumed benefits of 
liberalisation, globalisation and individualism. This situation persisted through the 1990s. 
The core challenge in Taiwan remains the need to overcome a complex combination of 
structural features that particularly include neoliberal media policy, political interference 
and the marginalised position of public service in Taiwan’s highly commercialised media 
market. Therefore, the two main reasons for these media workers leaving for the Chinese 
market are: 1) the opportunity to earn relatively higher salaries in Taiwan have decreased, 
and 2) moving for the higher than average salary in China should be relatively easy 
through a similar language and culture.  
We have to work 17 hours on average every day in the TV station. However, 
the wage didn’t increase after the media market fully opened. The TV 
advertising revenues declined seriously in the 1990s. Too much worry is being 
pumped into the atmosphere; it was naturally raising the idea of finding other 
opportunities. […] Sporadic TV producers have been to China for filming many 
times in the late 80s and early 90s, with good additional pay. Some of them were 
my supervisors while I was assistant director. Their experiences also 
encouraged me to work in China. (Interviewee C1, an ex-national TV station 
director, now works in China)  
This interviewee stated his intention to enter a new television market in China ‘naturally’. 
However, the political influence could be exerted under the cover of economic 
benefit/factor. For example, media workers who have worked during the lifting of martial 
law and the ban on political parties in 1980s cannot be expected to shed all their media 
responsibilities but keep their privileges.  
People were fighting for the freedom of expression; freedom of assembly and association 
and the political democratisation processes in the 1980s. However, the pace of media 
reform has stalled, and there have been notable. The deregulation of the media system 
from the one-party state was deemed to have passed certain tests regarding democratic 
performance. Although the general objectives of democratisation were almost achieved 
in the early 1990s, freedom was interpreted in the jargon of the free market; liberalism, 
globalisation and individualism became popularised in the same time. 
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Suddenly, these media workers were sandwiched between the two periods: from a high 
level of political control and a politically monopolised market to the collective 
expectation of the free market in the 1990s. They recognised that some of their 
advantages and privileges were fast disappearing from the workplace. In particular, the 
Taiwan presidential election in 2000 was a watershed which reflected a growing national 
consciousness in Taiwan. One of the interviewees claims that a space of absolute creative 
freedom was limited via the rising Taiwanese consciousness during the change in ruling 
party from the KMT (1949-2000) to the DPP (2000-08). However, the democratisation 
process in Taiwan was accelerated in the late 1980s and reflected a broad understanding 
of press freedom. It could be argued that both economic and political factors spurred 
these cultural workers to move to the media market in China.   
Firstly, the legalisation of the public broadcasting service (PBS) came too late to change 
the rapid deterioration of media democracy in the country in 1998. After almost ten years 
of arduous negotiations, PBS was finally launched. The mainstream media system had 
been driven by the political struggle and commercial interests for a long time. Until 1998, 
both politicians and the private sectors impeded the establishment of PBS, with political 
argument over the Public Television Act. There was disagreement over whether PBS 
should be ‘a national channel’ separated from KMT (Kuomintang) control – especially 
pointed because a new channel affiliated with the other party (Democratic Progressive 
Party, DPP) was launched. Moreover, lobbyists from private TV stations appealed for 
protection to secure their commercial interests from ‘unfair competition’. The cable TV 
sector was also involved; the system had become gradually popular since its start in the 
late 1970s, exerting significant pressure on the development of Taiwan’s neoliberalised 
media market. In the period of our analysis the cable market was monopolised by a few 
local private capital firms along with international private equity funds (Rawnsley, 2004, 
2011). The Public Television Act that was finally passed in 2009 was a watered-down 
set of ‘compromise agreements’.  
Secondly, global capitalists believe that there is an enormous potential market in China 
and are keen to keep at least some involvement there (Johnston, 2003; Watts, 2004). One 
such example is News Corp, which needs experienced media workers to produce 
programmes while they have a commitment to access the market officially. Rupert 
Murdoch’s purchase of STAR TV in 1992 indirectly reduced the risk for some Taiwanese 
media workers who were going to the Chinese media market. It could be argued that the 
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case of Murdoch’s media monopoly and its global expansion were part of the neoliberal 
process. However, in withdrawing from the fluctuating China market, Murdoch had spent 
over a 20-year investment in China, News Corp, which is one of the global media 
consortia that have negotiated with the Chinese government since the 1980s was defeated 
(Watts, 2004; Ramesh & Jha, 2006; Sweeney, 2010). Murdoch first invested 4m USD in 
the construction of a new hotel and media centre with CCTV in 1985. Later, he further 
strengthened cooperation with the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the 
Communist Party of China. With an interest in maintaining a good working relationship 
with China, Murdoch moved to Hong Kong in the 1990s. His purchase of STAR TV in 
1992 became a new platform for producing local TV programmes for Chinese audiences 
(Milmo, 2001).  
STAR TV founded a new satellite channel for ‘mainland China’ at that time; 
some Taiwanese workers simultaneously began to work in the new channel and 
became the core middle managers. Then, these middle leaders attempted to get 
more Taiwanese media workers to develop more new TV programmes here. I 
was one of the Taiwanese workers who were employed from the company. That 
was an important opportunity for me – that we don’t have to worry about finding 
the channel and the key person. (Interviewee C1)  
Around the late 1990s and early 2000s, these Taiwanese cultural workers went to China, 
which had higher pay and better job titles than in Taiwan. Experienced media workers, 
producers and creative directors, who spoke Chinese, were especially needed for the huge 
and preliminary opening market during the 1990s in China.  
When I was working in the TV station in Taiwan, in the final year, I could 
always hear that ‘someone has been to China’ and so on. Therefore, I was quite 
worried that I was going to miss the opportunity. If you cannot get the job 
vacancies earlier, then you have no chance to get better work in China. 
(Interviewee C1) 
I’ve heard that many people went to China. First were the media workers, then 
the CDs [creative directors] and finally the producers. You can strongly feel that 
is a huge market there and open to you. I had been there many times for filming 
in the late 1990s. When my friend asked me to start a new production house in 
China around 2004, I decided to move my whole family there immediately and 
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began the new business. (Interviewee C2, in senior advertising jobs over 15 
years in Taiwan, now works in China) 
The cultural workers who entered into the China market in the late 1990s actually had a 
nice salary and job in Taiwan. They saw the potential benefit from the emerging market 
and believed that the Taiwanese market would be marginalised politically and 
economically while the Chinese market was growing rapidly. The significant feature of 
these white-collar workers is that they could not wait to build a presence in the 
developing market, because it could take a decade or more to firmly ensure their 
advantages in the new market.  
The immigrant cultural workers in the second category, aged around 40-45, have a 
different working experience from that of the first category of workers. They began their 
careers around the time when the media market fully opened in the mid-1990s. A hundred 
cable TV channels were launched and there were numerous job vacancies. These 
interviewees had their first media job in the thriving domestic media market. However, 
they decided to go to China around 2010 and 2012, since the media market faced a 
recession in Taiwan. Some TV stations and newspapers had cut back on their staff and 
the average starting salary in media industries was less than it had been ten years earlier. 
Therefore, they both witnessed (and experienced) the deregulation of the media market 
in Taiwan in the 1990s and the results of that deregulation in the early 2000s.  
I felt that I should come here [China] and look around the environment three 
years ago. The media industry is in recession in Taiwan. Some of my 
photographer friends proposed grouping together to form a freelance 
photographer’s work team in China. However, it was very difficult to find the 
way going into the market in the beginning. I remember that we spent almost 
half to one year to wait for the first job. Now we could have 15 working days a 
month at most. Our salary in China now is only more than 1.5 times their salary 
in Taiwan. In the 1990s, the salary in China could be three to four times higher, 
but more and more Chinese media workers have learned techniques and are paid 
by a lower wage. Therefore, our advantage is less than ten years ago. You have 
to force yourself to learn more, know more and maintain a very high quality. 
(Interviewee C3, ex-TV photographer in Taiwan, now a freelance photographer 
in China) 
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After the deregulation of the broadcasting system, freelance workers were forced to 
undertake highly flexibilised risk. The third category of worker is aged 29-34, the young 
generation, who are sometimes signalling more ambition to conquer the international 
market and sometimes present that they have stronger neoliberal-selves to deal with the 
high-pressure work environment.  
I studied for a PR master’s degree in the UK and have worked in a foreign 
company in China for five years. […] I didn’t think this is a market in China. It 
is an international market. Many global enterprises and international capitalists 
come into this market rapidly. Of course, an atmosphere of stress and pressure 
shrouded the working atmosphere. But I have a nice salary, creative work, and 
an international perspective. I can work with the top global production teams, 
directors and international staff members every day. I am also planning to 
change my job next year for a better wage. (Interviewee C4, now works in a 
foreign advertising company in China) 
The interviewees mention the term ‘international’ many times. For example, they 
represented that ‘I work in an international city’, ‘I work with other international staff’, 
‘I have to deal with international affairs’ and so on. These work experiences demonstrate 
that they crave a sense of accomplishment and to govern with relative autonomy over 
their own work.  
I have a totally different kind of pressure in China. Some young people in 
Taiwan claim that the low wage and long working hours are their main pressure. 
[…] Taiwanese are failing to recognise its competitiveness problem. […] Our 
country is underlying a loss of competitiveness. I am here [China] worrying 
about winning each competition and to be the successful one. That is a real 
pressure. (Interviewee C4)  
I have worked in China for three years. This is my third job and I have three 
times more salary than my first job. I don’t have the loyalty for the enterprise. 
Why I leave my country and come here? Only for earning money. (Interviewee 
C5, works in an animation studio, now in China) 
The feature of self-enterprise is strongly represented in the interviews. They believe in 
the idea of individualism. This emphasis on the individual signals that the values of free 
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choice, freedom, personal agency and personal responsibility reflect the permeation of 
neoliberal ideology and practices into all aspects of society. This chapter represented a 
typical example, which continues communicating the ideology of individualism, the 
mandatory exercise of ‘free choice’ and the enterprise culture. These popular discourses 
are generally repeated through the mainstream media and the education system. As 
Verhaeghe (2014) underlines:  
A neoliberal meritocracy would have us believe that success depends on 
individual effort and talents, meaning responsibility lies entirely with the 
individual and authorities should give people as much freedom as possible to 
achieve this goal. For those who believe in the fairy-tale of unrestricted choice, 
self-government and self-management are the pre-eminent political messages, 
especially if they appear to promise freedom.  
For these neoliberal selves, it might be easier to accept and reinforce patterns of 
neoliberal rule while it can be expected to ensure personal rewards (Banks, 2007; 
Newsinger, 2004). Interestingly, immigrant cultural workers in China don’t really 
mention censorship and political issues. They believe that one day they will go back to 
Taiwan for a comfortable retirement. Therefore, the only issue for them now is making 
money. Such invisible censorship will deepen depoliticisation and their neoliberal 
identity for many immigrant cultural workers in China. All sensitive topics were avoided 
during the interviews, but a few interviewees sometimes strongly supported the Chinese 
government. For example, three interviewees (C1, C2 and C4) have said similar 
sentences: ‘the main reason of economic recession in Taiwan is because of a rise of 
Taiwanese political consciousnesses’.  Interviewee C1 implied that ‘the space of creative 
freedom was limited via the rising Taiwanese consciousness since 2000’. It touches on 
their personal political preferences with regards to China, driven by self-interest. 
Even some argue that is because of ‘different culture’ and people who are the new 
entrants should ‘do in Rome as the Romans do’. For example, they all have the similar 
experience of having to pay a large sum of secret sales commission at each job. Although 
they all noticed that such a situation would be unusual in Taiwan, they get used to doing 
it as part of the learning process.   
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8.5 Conclusion  
The chapter investigates the extent to which deregulatory communication policies and 
market-oriented cultural policies are influencing the cultural workers and the cultural 
landscape in Taiwan. The problem of neoliberal cultural and media policymaking in 
Taiwan is that the space for alternative value, such as public interest, non-profit, non-
commercial and public subsidies and funding were deliberately wiped out in the historical 
process. Banks (2017) criticises that creative economy repeats ‘the patterns of 
discrimination, misrecognition and inequality’. 
The creative economy is not only failing to provide the conditions that would 
allow ordinary people to enter the labour market and participate in the 
production of culture but also actively exacerbating social inequalities in work 
through its own structures and patterns of organisation. (p.145) 
These cultural workers were fully embedded in the neoliberal structure. In addition, 
people in different positions and working conditions have their own survival mechanism 
to face/accept/complain/question the neoliberalised market. Those of the younger 
generation working in the cultural industry face unstable jobs and wages; while 
experienced film workers and local cultural workers perceive them as in a new dilemma, 
in which decreasing state financial support and commercialised cultural policy has 
changed some of them. Furthermore, some are immigrant cultural workers in China who 
have embraced and pursued the neoliberal rules. The contextual embeddedness of the 
neoliberal dynamic illustrates a gradual accretion of neoliberalism, which has been 
verified by the ongoing practices of these cultural workers. 
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9                                                                         
Neoliberaliseation of Public Space- from Cultural 
Clusters to Creative Industries Park 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Harvey (2012) has demonstrated that ‘the whole neoliberal project over the last thirty 
years has been oriented towards privatization of control over the surplus’ (2012, p.23). 
For example, the neoliberal attitude to urban regeneration sold the idea that the only 
viable approach was the deregulation of the property market and the minimisation of 
governmental intervention in urban design and space – although the New Labour 
government extended some public facilities, such as the Millennium Dome and regional 
arts and cultural centres. However, most urban renewal projects were included in public-
private partnerships, ostensibly reducing public expenditure and increasing 
administrative efficiency. In fact, according to the neoliberal alliance (public-private 
partnerships), private enterprise not only undertook the contracted public expenditure 
projects, but also coordinated private development in cities (Harvey 2005). Low-priced 
land on the outskirts of cities was purchased by real estate companies at the same time as 
the influx of speculative investors. New Labour sought cooperation in a more vigorous 
public-private scheme, to privatise these public spaces. 
This chapter focus on the issue of neoliberalisation of public space in the process of 
developing a creative industries project in Taiwan. Two main examples – Huashan 1914 
Creative Park (華山 1914文化創意產業園區) and Songshan Cultural and Creative Park 
(松山文創園區) – are analysed in the next two sections. Huashan 1914 Creative Park 
was set up before the implementation of the Cultural and Creative Industries 
Development Act (CCIDA). It initially was a cultural cluster and gradually changed into 
a commercialised place. During this transition period, abandoned industrial sites in cities 
stand idle to be transformed into ‘creative parks’, which combine urban redevelopment, 
high value-added businesses, and the creative economy. The history of Huashan 1914 
Creative Park is the main case for representing the ideological and practical tensions 
between ‘a more communal creativity base’ and ‘a commercial creativity theme park’. In 
addition, the public-and-private partnership behind Huashan 1914 Creative Park funded 
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a rapid expansion of investment in creative businesses.  Furthermore, Songshan Cultural 
and Creative Park is another ‘successfully commercialised case’ which has been planned 
during the process of the legislative process relating to the CCIDA. After the declaration 
of the new act, the new Songshan Cultural and Creative Park was coming behind in 5 
years. In the second case, we can easily see that the public sector made a great 
compromise with the privatisation of public space. This is the result of ‘flexible’ public 
sector and private sector partnerships. It is an irresponsible reform and a neoliberalised 
creative industries policymaking.  
 
9.2 Commercialisation of public space: The Case of Huashan 1914 
Creative Park 
Before the implementation of the Cultural and Creative Industries Development Act 
(CCIDA), the cultural and creative industries policy was promoted for almost eight years; 
it gradually raised further questions about the legality of cultural and creative policy.  
After the first political party alternation in 2000, the new chair of the Council for Cultural 
Affairs officially announced Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse as an important cultural 
policy (Hsu, 2008). Over two years before the implementation of the cultural and creative 
industries project in Taiwan in 2002, the Council for Cultural Affairs was responsible for 
designing and implementing the Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse policy. Many state-
owned properties in cities, such as national breweries, sugar refineries, a tobacco factory, 
and railway warehouses, had been abandoned for many years. These buildings and 
factories were in a somewhat dilapidated condition but could be redeveloped, especially 
for arts and cultural activities. This policy was implemented to support artists, increase 
local participation (e.g. in arts and cultural activities) and achieve two main aims: firstly, 
heritage sites needed to be preserved and protected to transmit their historical memory 
and meaning to younger generations; secondly, the reuse of state-owned abandoned 
spaces for purposes such as local and regional galleries, art and local culture education, 
arts villages and artists’ studios, provided a public service for artists and local citizens 
and enabled the diversification of art and culture. However, the cultural policy of 
Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse was appropriated by the creative industries project and, 
through tax relief and a franchise agreement, fell prey to neoliberal logic which sought 
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to achieve precisely the opposite aims: transforming old industrial areas into creative 
industries parks to increase industrial efficiency and private profit. 
Huashan 1914 Creative Park (華山1914文化創意產業園區) is a representative example 
(or the first ‘successful’ case) of a CI project that illustrates the commercialisation of 
public space. The story of Huashan 1914 Creative Park began in 1914, when it was built 
as a sake winery during the period of Japanese rule. After the Kuomintang (KMT) 
government took over Taiwan in 1945 following World War II, the factory was renamed 
the National Taipei brewery and produced wine and beer until 1987. The brewery was 
moved to the satellite town of Linkou for several reasons, including the urban renewal 
project, water pollution and its central location in the city. 
However, because of the public property rights problem, the abandoned brewery was not 
used until 1997, when artists staged an alternative performance in the building and were 
arrested on a charge of illegal occupation of public property. This arrest astonished the 
artists’ community, which campaigned for the government to allow abandoned urban 
spaces to be reused for radical, public purposes, such as arts and culture villages and 
artists’ studios. In 1999, the government legalised the reuse of the Taipei brewery and 
released state-owned space for art exhibitions, performances and non-profit organisations 
(NPO). The Taipei brewery was renamed the Huashan Art and Culture Park (華山藝文
特區). In its early years, it hosted avant-garde, experimental and alternative arts, a noise 
festival and an independent creative and art market frequented by residents and young 
people on weekends. The image of the abandoned brewery was gradually transformed 
into that of a new arts and culture cluster in the city centre. 
Located in Taipei city centre, the space had been an abandoned brewery for 10 years up 
until the 1997 performance. Many cultural workers from different fields, such as visual 
arts, performance arts, architectural art, film art, and art education, demonstrated against 
the arrests and demanded that the government free up the space for displays of avant-
garde art. For example, they argued that rows of empty factory buildings could be better 
utilised by being transformed into performance spaces, exhibition venues and studios. 
Following official negotiations between different public sectors (such as the cultural 
sector and the National Property Administration) on reusing idle national factories, an 
organic movement flourished.   
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An active art organisation, the Association of Culture Environment Reform, was 
commissioned to operate the abandoned brewery, which was named Huashan Art and 
Culture Park under the terms of the 1999-2002 Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse policy. 
Initially, the public sector lacked specific guidelines for reusing such abandoned public 
spaces and did not actively promote the Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse policy. 
Independent cultural workers took advantage of this opportunity to promote the idea of 
public service-based cultural policymaking. Cultural workers and citizens played a 
central role in the promotion of these policies, with some communities and organisations 
forming organically during this early period.  
Cultural and creative industries policy in Taiwan was first invoked in the national 
Challenge 2008: Six-Year National Development Plan in 2002, which changed the 
trajectory of the Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse policy, slowly eroding its original 
intent to support the value of CI. Unsurprisingly, not only was the name of Huashan Art 
and Culture Park changed to Huashan 1914 Creative Park in 2005, but it was also placed 
under a new company, Taiwan Cultural-Creative Development Co. Ltd. (台灣文創發展
股份有限公司), in 2007. Under CCIP, this was accomplished through several public-
private partnerships: the Huashan OT (operate-transfer), ROT (rehabilitate-operate-
transfer) and BOT (build-operate-transfer) (華山創意文化園區文化創意產業引入空
間整建營運移轉計畫案). Under the BOT project concession agreement, large-scale 
reconstruction of infrastructure was undertaken for new operations.  
Huashan 1914 Creative Park still survives, but is heavily dependent on commercialised 
activities centred on the theme of consumption. Stealth neoliberalism is at play, hidden 
behind the bright, light, open displays and shiny, cool modern lifestyle products. Huashan 
1914 Creative Park is a cosy shopping mall providing cultural and creative products and 
experiences. To most visitors, the interior feels comfortable. The place is surprisingly 
tidy and bright; products are folded or hung neatly according to size and usage. Middle-
class and young residents of the big cities are not against life-style consumption and even 
enjoy it, as neoliberal ideology in an innocuous setting has been naturally accepted.  
The arts are not perceived as an embellishment, or worse, forsaken, in preference to 
economic functions. This means that ‘culture is a good business’ is an important slogan 
nowadays while the additional value of the creative economy is being calculated. CI 
policymakers consider the economic value of the arts and attempt to extract additional 
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benefits (such as urban renewal projects and an increased employment rate) from related 
policies by inserting clauses. The BOT contract mentions planning several places in the 
creative park for incubation facilities for CI, such as an alternative theatre and a 
children’s theatre. Although rental spaces are offered at low cost for arts and cultural 
organisations, this is not the main intent of the creative park. Its official statement 
explains that more profitable creative programmes are strongly supported in the hope that 
the creative park achieves break-even performance. The fundamental issue is that 
neoliberal legislation has altered the development of CI, and arts industries have been 
constrained by a lack of funds and attention. The Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse policy 
was representative of exemplary early cultural policy but was appropriated by new CIP 
passed in 2002, when the trajectories of CI and cultural policies were cast in a neoliberal 
mode. Legislators, policymakers and interest groups played crucial roles in the shaping 
of this neoliberal legalisation, the Cultural and Creative Industries Development Act 
(CCIDA). 
The problem of incongruous public space can seem much easier to solve through public 
and private sector cooperation and public resource/space outsourcing. The original 
purpose of Huashan Art and Culture Park was to support artists and cultural workers 
inexpensively, even offering free rent in exchange for them reusing unused public spaces, 
such as abandoned warehouses and factories. These spaces can accommodate a wide 
range of tastes, especially non-mainstream ones. Furthermore, the public sector allows 
for the required space to be reserved for alternative and avant-garde art under the 
Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse policy. Huashan Art and Culture Park was an organic 
culture cluster (see Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1). The transformation of a culture cluster with 
cultural workers and citizens into a ‘profitable’ creative zone as a creative shopping mall 
came about because of the concepts inherent in neoliberal cultural policy. The place acted 
as a means of outsourcing the promotion of a ‘creative economy’. This space still 
provides trendy and popular exhibitions and events, which are often held by private 
companies. Also, the area of Huashan Art and Culture Park is now filled with chic 
restaurants, bars and cafes. Consumption experiences are not cheap, but people rush to 
queue, take selfies, and check in to social media. Middle-class urban residents, especially 
the younger generation, ‘have adapted to and adopted – more privatized consumption 
spaces as a common public space’ (Zukin & Maguire, 2004, p.188). People now more 
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easily engage in commercially oriented cultural experiences and mainstream culture, 
rather than exploring cultural diversification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 9.1 Commercialisation of public spaces 
          
         Table9. 1 Commercialisation of public spaces 
Period Name Space use Policy Policy object 
1987-
1997 
National 
Taipei 
brewery 
Abandoned 
national 
factory 
  
1999-
2003 
Huashan Art 
and Culture 
Park 
Organic 
culture 
cluster 
 Abandoned 
Public 
Spaces 
Reuse policy 
(2000) 
Cultural producers 
and citizens 
2005- 
present 
Huashan 
1914 
Creative 
Park 
Creative 
shopping 
mall 
Cultural and 
Creative 
Industries 
policy (2002) 
Cultural consumers 
and neoliberal 
citizens   
 
  
Culture cluster: 
For artists, 
cultural 
producers, and 
citizens 
Commercialisation 
 
After creative 
industries policy  
Creative shopping 
mall:  
Posh consumption, 
lifestyle commodities, 
and new consumers 
Huashan 1914 Creative Park  Huashan Art and Culture Park 
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With regard to the creative parks issue, I analysed three primary documents: The 
Legislative Yuan’s official gazette Vol. 97 (26) (May 2008); The Legislative Yuan’s 
official gazette Vol. 98 (15) (March 2009); and the Public hearing of the CCIDA draft 
(May 2009). Several issues in the record elaborated the process of neoliberalisation. First, 
relying on the Abandoned Public Spaces Reuse policy, the legislators claimed that the 
Council of Cultural Affairs spent too much budget on the reconstruction of creative parks 
without significant successes. The suggestion from the legislators was to reduce the 
public expenditure and accelerate the industrialisation of creative industries. Second, the 
plan to ‘stimulate creative products consumption and investment’ needs more ambition, 
such as giving out cultural vouchers, giving investors huge tax breaks, and outsourcing 
and marketising the public sector. Third, legislators who are also local representatives 
put their political interest before the public interest through fighting for their local culture 
budgets. They simultaneously claimed that creative parks were non-profitable and should 
not take up public resources. Finally, the minority voices (against the commercialisation 
and marketisation) were not adopted in the public hearing. However, the interests of the 
creative industries representatives and deregulation of the public assets reuse were 
included in the draft. For example, a 2008 parliamentary Education and Culture 
Committee meeting (The Legislative Yuan’s official gazette, 2008, p.158-199) was held 
to review the specific effects of the implementation of creative industries policies. KMT 
legislators directly questioned the surplus and productivity of the creative industries and 
the performance indicators of the Council of Cultural Affairs and Industrial Development 
Bureau.11 They took a particular interest in funding for the reconstruction of the creative 
parks (five abandoned national breweries in Taipei, Hualien, Chiayi, Taichung and 
Tainan) and their impact, and in the effect of the policy during the first period (2002-8) 
of the creative industries project. Representatives of the cultural sector explained that 
most spending (70%) in the creative parks went towards ‘the incubators’, which were 
important in promoting creative industries (p.179). Overseas cases, such as Greenwich 
Village in New York, Cliff House in San Francisco and Kanazawa Citizens’ Art Centre 
(金沢市民芸術村) in Japan, were mentioned (p.179). One KMT legislator, Li-Yun Chao 
questioned the achievements of the creative industries project: 
                                            
11 The Council of Arts Affairs and Industrial Development Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs, were the 
government departments involved in the creative industries project from 2002. 
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These foreign cases are about ‘spending’ money, not about ‘earning’ money. 
[…] You [the Council of Cultural Affairs] do nothing more than repackage the 
policy of Abandoned Spaces Reuse for the creative parks, and they are 
absolutely different conceptions. […] It is impossible to earn money in the 
creative parks. Even after 10 or 20 years, do you have the confidence that you 
will be a valuable, profitable and surplus-producing industry? (p.180) 
The legislators and cultural sector representatives referred to different concepts. The 
legislators’ comments served only to muddy the issue further. The Council of Cultural 
Affairs’ original plan for redeveloping the creative parks was intended to consolidate the 
separate policies for the arts, culture and creative industries into a single one: the cultural 
and creative industries policy. This policy took on all the functions and responsibilities 
for this sector, but implementing cultural policy and creative industries policy requires 
different tools. The merger of the cultural and creative industries policies was not the 
only result of a lopsided, one-size-fits-all, policy structure. The Abandoned Spaces Reuse 
policy was the most acclaimed cultural policy during the early culture-localisation 
reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but has since degenerated into a 
commercialised policy favouring private enterprise over cultural workers, gradually 
losing the opportunity for reform.  
Both the KMT and DPP legislators opposed the typical cases presented to justify higher 
budgets for the reconstruction plans for creative parks for one main reason: these cases 
are good models but costly. They demanded an immediately profitable model for the 
creative industries project. Therefore, we can see that there was mutual misunderstanding 
between the legislators and cultural sector. For example, the three models cited have each 
resulted in different values and revenue. 
First, Greenwich Village was a centre for alternative, creative, avant-garde culture, which 
has attracted a cluster of bohemians and gave birth to the Beat generation. However, 
gentrification has utterly changed this area. In this now-posh neighbourhood, only a few 
landmarks of the bygone bohemian days remain for nostalgic visitors to view. The 1950s 
urban renewal project in New York drove many members of the emerging middle class 
to the less expensive housing in Greenwich Village. Residents who could not afford 
rising rents were forced to leave during this process of commercialisation and 
privatisation. Today, the gentrified Greenwich Village is regarded as having high value 
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for private-led redevelopment and builders. Second, the Cliff House, a private historical 
building constructed in 1863, has been reconstructed with public and private funding 
several times and became a top tourist attraction after being acquired by the National 
Park Service in 1977. In this case, the development of the tourism industry played a 
significant role in public funding.  
Clearly, Taiwanese legislators’ efforts to reduce public spending on the reconstruction 
reflected the neoliberal preference for austerity and short-term profits. The Taiwanese 
cultural sector believed that, in the long term, the reconstruction of creative parks would 
produce as much revenue and achieve the same success as the Cliff House. However, the 
Cliff House is not an incubation centre for creative industries but a famous tourist 
destination in a national park.  
The last case is the Kanazawa Citizens’ Art Centre in Japan, which is closer to the initial 
conception of creative parks. Kanazawa is a city whose historical buildings, castles, 
irrigation systems and districts have been preserved. The local government not only 
maintains the old facilities but also conserves traditional craftwork. A public allowance 
system supports the network of local craftsmen. Most public expenditures is directed 
towards encouraging members of younger generations to study craftwork at the 
Kanazawa College of Art (金沢美術工芸大学), providing internship opportunities for 
graduates and granting young artisans and artists three years of living expenses (€1,000 
EUR each month) to develop their own independent studios (Community Empowerment 
Network, Taipei, 2014). The Kanazawa Citizens’ Art Centre was a textile factory built 
in 1919 which the Kanazawa government bought in 1993 for tourism purposes. However, 
the final resolution was to create a ‘town of culture and art’. The textile factory became 
the Citizens’ Art Centre, and all the facilities (five warehouses and one office building) 
serve as spaces for performance, music and arts activities, exhibitions and rehearsals. 
It can be argued that these three cases are different. First, the unique, early atmosphere 
of Greenwich Village did not depend on an official project but was created by the 
inhabitants. The Cliff House was bought and reconstructed by the National Park Service 
and brought immediate benefits from a wave of tourists. The Kanazawa Citizen’s Art 
Centre was planned by local government, and although the local government might have 
spent more public revenues, this case provides the best model for personnel training and 
preservation programmes under the creative parks project. Second, Greenwich Village 
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has undergone rapid gentrification, welcoming middle-class residents, encouraging 
consumption and discouraging cultural diversification and minorities. The Cliff House 
primarily demonstrates the cooperation of the public and private sectors in the tourism 
industry. In the Kanazawa Citizens’ Art Centre, public funding for the arts and culture 
policy has been relatively well protected.  
The 2008 Education and Culture Committee meeting revealed the gaps in legislators’, 
the cultural sector’s and the Industrial Development Bureau’s understanding of what the 
creative industries are. Most of legislators’ questions for the cultural sector 
representatives focused on performance and standards, such as marketisation, 
effectiveness, economic growth rate, gross domestic product and private investment. For 
example, the legislators asked: ‘Why don’t you outsource all the creative parks?’ (The 
Legislative Yuan’s official gazette, 2008, p.167); ‘Which creative park is the most highly 
profitable’ (p.168); ‘The creative parks plan has already been promoted for four years. 
Why can’t we see the effect’ (p.169); ‘Why is the growth of the creative industries lower 
than the national economic growth rate’ (p.170). These ‘standards’ impose the neoliberal 
frame on creative industries policy, representing the economic rationale of neoliberal 
ideology in society and politics. In response to these neoliberal questions, cultural sector 
representatives presented statistical data on the annual turnover of the creative industries; 
numbers of events, festivals and lectures; international awards for design; total 
participants and audiences at each activity; new creative products developed; and 
amounts of funding and investment. The data showed that an excessive focus on the 
short-term effectiveness of creative industries projects shaped the political debate on 
terms favourable to parliament (The Legislative Yuan’s official gazette, 2008, 2009a, 
2009b). In particular, little of public expenditures and budgets were allocated to projects 
deemed to be less effective. Trivial annual statistics about the effectiveness of the creative 
industries project had to be provided to fuel the imaginations of members of parliament 
who questioned the use of public funds and demanded eye-catching results.  
In addition, cultural sector representatives explained that the performance of creative 
industries was weak during the initial stage due to flaws in the law (The Legislative 
Yuan’s official gazette, 2008, p.167). They believed that it would be easier to re-utilise 
public assets, such as creative parks, which had been limited under the old legal 
framework, to accelerate the development of the creative industries. Cultural sector 
representatives viewed the draft CCIDA as the solution to increase domestic demand, 
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boost the creative industries and manufacturing and stimulate consumption. They 
intended that the draft would create demand for the creative industries, particularly the 
performance and exhibition industries, and would link potential audiences to the creative 
industries market. Two articles granting tax credits were to play a pivotal role in 
supporting development by adding incentives for taxpayers to attend performances and 
exhibitions. For example, the costs of performances and exhibitions could be listed as a 
tax deduction of up to 240 GBP (12,000 NTD) per year per person, with the objective of 
encouraging arts appreciation (The Legislative Yuan’s official gazette, 2008, p.173). The 
Ministry of Finance opposed these articles, but the legislators supported the cultural 
sector in the fight for these concessions, sparking a debate that continued in public 
hearings for the draft of CCIDA until the law was enacted. 
9.3 Privatisation of public space: The Songshan Cultural and Creative 
Park 
The change in cultural policy resulted in corresponding changes in the CCIDA. The 
popularity of neoliberal ideology illustrates the sea change in creative industries policy 
since the 1990s. Legislators and cultural sector representatives believed that the new 
creative economy could compensate for losses in the manufacturing sector since the 
1990s. However, this trend alone does not capture the essence of cultural and creative 
industries policy. In the first section, the case of the Huashan 1914 Creative Park, which 
was exposed to the vicissitudes of government budgets, represented the neoliberal 
transition of the Abandoned Spaces Reuse policy, which was extremely vulnerable to the 
creative industries project and was made part of the profit-making reconstruction plan. 
The outcome of the Cultural and Creative Park within the creative industries project has 
been a disaster which has undermined the original policy for arts and cultural clusters. 
The cultural public space has been commercialised. After the neoliberal legislative 
process, privatisation of public space is becoming more serious. The Songshan Cultural 
and Creative Park (松山文創園區) is a significant example of this form of neoliberal 
policy, which has followed the rules of the CCIDA. Under the flag of the creative 
economy, the creative consortiums have disproportionately been allowed to contract for 
the use of public assets, such as creative parks, to carry out creative business. This case 
illustrates how the creative industries law has provided the fig leaf a few large private 
companies needed to legitimise the neoliberal ideology and discourse.  
  
202 
 
The old Songshan Tobacco Factory was founded in Taipei in 1937 during the period of 
Japanese rule. The 18 hectares of the factory site include several factory buildings amid 
dense thickets of trees and landscaped gardens. This was the first modernised tobacco 
factory in Taiwan and had been shut down since 1998. The factory was designated as 
part of Taipei’s cultural heritage in 2001, when the government promised to turn it over 
to the public. The site is an enormously valuable piece of land, both financially and 
symbolically. In the Taipei city centre, it could be a much-loved communal area among 
families, joggers, arts enthusiasts, hipsters and flâneurs for its historical heritage and 
green space. However, the utilities in this posh area were used as a source of income in 
a recession, especially for the government and developers.  
Initial plans were for the Songshan Tobacco Factory to become a new culture and sports 
park in 2007, supported by tax benefits and outsourcing. Its development was divided 
into three projects (Table 9.2): first, construction of the Taipei Dome Complex (台北大
巨蛋 ), scheduled to be in place for the 2017 Taipei Summer Universiade opening 
ceremonies; secondly, a heritage renovation; and thirdly construction of an imposing 
edifice for creative industries development. The opening of such important, valuable 
services to competition through the tendering of state-owned assets has aroused anger 
among citizens and civil society groups. For example, during the huge construction 
project for the Taipei Dome Complex, outsourcing developers inappropriately displaced 
thousands. The BOT model of urban redevelopment with public sponsorship and private 
profit has reinvented the meaning of public service. In addition, the Taipei Dome 
Complex was involved in a corruption scandal, over the use of substandard building 
materials and a dispute over environmental assessment in 2016.  
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Table 9.2 The areas of the Songshan Tobacco Factory 
the Songshan 
Tobacco 
Factory 
Taipei Dome 
Complex 
台北大巨蛋 
Songshan Cultural 
and Creative Park 
松山文創園區 
Taipei New 
Horizon 
台北文創大樓 
the structure new 
construction  
 
the heritage 
renovation 
new 
construction 
franchise private capital the Taipei culture 
foundation 
 
private capital 
purpose sports events 
concert 
exhibitions, creativity 
lab,  
 
all creative 
business and 
activities 
 
outsourced 
models 
BOT (Build-operate-transfer) 
 
In the second project, the government has responsibility for an 878m GBP (400m NTD) 
conservation and restoration plan for heritage sites. The main heritage buildings, 
including the factory and warehouses, have been renovated to host cultural activities and 
creative businesses. Outsourcing companies were guaranteed profits with lower risk, as 
these assets were held by the public sector (the Taipei Culture Foundation).  
Finally, the construction of the flagship creative industries base has been a highly 
profitable project in which public sector bodies have not outsourced risk. The new spaces 
have sufficient incentives to attract private investment in the creative park. Private 
investors have designed and constructed the building and enjoy 50-year leases to conduct 
creative and cultural businesses. Eighty per cent of the building is reserved for exhibitions, 
music, performances, film, broadcast television, advertising, design, publishing and 
creative living, while twenty per cent may be dedicated to the catering, telecoms and 
financial services industries. The financial services and telecoms industries were 
included in the contract for the flagship creative industries base not because they are part 
of the creative industries but because two outsourcing companies involved in banking 
and telecoms – Fubon Land Development (富邦建設) and Taiwan Mobile(台灣大哥大) 
– set up Taipei New Horizon (臺北文創開發股份有限公司), a company whose website 
describes its purposes:  
Providing a space for creative industries to be stationed in; offering multiple 
platforms for the close interactions between creators, platform operators, and 
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consumers; developing the R&D, production, distribution, promotion, and 
marketing of the creative industries to support the sustainability of creative 
industries. (‘Business Philosophy,’ n.d.) 
Taipei New Horizon is the first large-scale outsourcing under the creative industries 
policy. It obtained a concession agreement from Taipei City Hall in 2009, was under 
construction from 2010 to 2013 and opened in 2013. The new building is the first creative 
business shopping mall and boutique hotel, with some floors leased to small creative 
business studios. This usage and resource allocation has distorted the original objective 
of the flagship creative industries base. This BOT model has made the government the 
biggest landlord, and its main function is to lease these public asserts and allow 
consortiums to run creative businesses franchises (Table 9.3).  
    Table 9.3 The ecological chain of the flagship creative industries base 
 
 
Taipei New Horizon, as the new development company for culture and creativity which 
built and invested in the flagship creative industries base, can be considered the second 
landlord. It defrays its outlay through the calculation and payment of rents, royalties and 
feedback funds to the government. Taipei New Horizon leases spaces to: 1) Eslite 
Spectrum Corporation, which runs a creative shopping mall, art cinema and boutique 
hotel and, to some extent, is the third landlord; 2) creative studios and companies for 
office space; 3) and special event space. Some city councillors have pointed out that the 
rent is overly high for these individual creative industries studios, which allows these 
supposedly developing creative industries to achieve abnormally high profits for private 
capital.  
The Eslite Spectrum Corporation, which has a good reputation and cohesive brand image, 
was built from the best high-end chain bookstores in 1989. Since then, this company has 
1st landlord the Government: Taipei City Hall 
2nd landlord the Taipei New Horizon 
3rd landlord the Eslite Spectrum Corporation 
the lessee individual creative labourers, independent 
studios, and small business owners 
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successfully run elegant, minimalist eateries, fashionable shopping malls, stylish record 
shops, art cinemas and intellectual bookstores. Its brand image is intellectual, elegant, 
innovative and extremely popular. Therefore, the media have given favourable coverage 
to Eslite opening the new boutique hotel, eateries, mall, bookstore and cinema planned 
for the Songshan Cultural and Creative Park in 2013.  
Eslite became a listed company in January 2013. The mass media and commentators 
claimed that it would be a new force in the stock market after setting up the boutique 
hotel and creative shopping mall in the Songshan Cultural and Creative Park and would 
continue to deliver a strong performance in the cultural and creative industries market. 
Newspaper reports also estimated that its stocks would have high value and highlighted 
its significant revenue growth. As predicted, Eslite has benefited from the newly opened 
hotel and shopping mall. Its revenue increased 11.99% to 2.211bn NTD in the first eight 
months of 2013. Indeed, Eslite has encouraged increasing consumption of creative 
industries and has even increased home prices in the surrounding area, as reported by the 
mass media.  
Despite the impressive revenue growth, several problems emerged in the process of law-
making. First, the category of the creative industries has been questioned as incredibly, 
the term has been applied to include restaurants, wine bars, shopping malls, hotels, 
mobile and telecom services and banking. However, the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
claimed that adding the Eslite Bookstore (publishing) to the restaurant category could 
constitute a ‘creativity living industry,’ as listed in the LDCCI. As known, the creative 
industries policy encourages emerging creative companies to invest in creative industries 
through tax credits and subsidies. However, large creative businesses have easily found 
and exploited loopholes to acquire more private profit without supporting individual 
creative labourers and designers (Chen & You, 2015).  
Second, the landlord-tenant relationships among the government, Taipei New Horizon, 
Eslite Spectrum Corporation and individual creative labourers are built on a particular 
type of exploitation. To support the creative industries development, Taipei New Horizon 
has made the franchise agreement more affordable by granting preferential pricing for 
use of public assets. The symbiotic relationship between Taipei New Horizon and Eslite 
has allowed them to strengthen their reputation and image through high visitor numbers 
and breath-taking financial performance while exploiting individual creative labourers 
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by charging unreasonably high rents maintenance and service fees. New and small brands 
and creative businesses which cannot afford high rents have been indirectly forced to 
leave. The franchise agreement does not set clear restrictions and obligations for 
franchisors, allowing them to protect their business model at the expense of the rights of 
individual creative workers and designers. The results have been massive profits for 
private investors and capitalists but not for creative individuals (Chen & You, 2015).   
Finally, the purpose of the flagship creative industries base has become stylish 
consumption and experiences – as in the British creative industries project, where New 
Labour’s named ‘the creative industries’ as part of what, in effect, became a thinly veiled 
capitulation to the neoliberal project during the late 1990s and through the 2000s 
(McGuigan, 2016, p.19). McGuigan (2016) also mentions the meaning of cultural 
consumption in neoliberalised society.  
Seduction is the complement in the sphere of consumption to exploitation in the 
sphere of production. […] the commodity fetishism of mobile communications 
today exemplifies Williams’s concept of mobile privatisation as the epitome of 
socio-cultural experience under mature, that is, neoliberal, capitalism. (2016, 
p.39) 
Consumers’ desire to access these fancy creative experiences, rather than ownership of 
property, is the motivating force for them. In this sense, cultural consumption is 
paramount in the ‘transition from industrial to cultural capitalism’ (McGuigan, 2009, 
p.20). The BOT model of the creative park, particularly the building of the Taipei New 
Horizon, is a typical case of the market-oriented privatisation of public policy and 
resources. Tourists who visit this flagship creative industries base naturally accept the 
stylish shopping mall with attractive restaurants, art cinemas and the ornaments of 
performances and exhibitions. The wolf in sheep’s clothing, though, is still a wolf; a 
shopping mall dressed as a flagship creative industries base is still a shopping mall. This 
deep difference can be perceived by creative labourers but is difficult to see for 
consumers and visitors who feel high satisfaction in these comfortable, interesting 
surroundings. This situation demonstrates the massive neoliberal blind spot, in which 
commerce and consumers come first, and public interests and citizens come later.  
Furthermore, the government and consumers believe that BOT provides a good model 
for creative industries built on the rhetoric of effective private-public cooperation, 
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creative commodification and public spending cuts. However, the exploitation of creative 
workers who endure the pressure of flexible labour, unstable jobs, low pay and high rents 
is rationalised, and normal creative industries disappear under the neoliberal discourse. 
Basing the creative industries policy on such criteria as effectiveness, commercialisation, 
marketisation and the benefits of tourism ignores the original intent of the policy and 
leads to an oligopoly of creative industries. 
Some interviewees also mentioned the problems of the outsourcing creative parks project. 
They believe that the most derelict urban areas came to be was into blooming with artists’ 
studios, but now a ‘commercialised’ cultural landscape has replaced the former (see 
Chapter 7). Creative parks could be a fairly typical example of what the government has 
termed a ‘successful creative industries policy’. It could be a much-valued social and 
cultural space for the cultural workers and the citizens, following the original vison of 
the abandoned public spaces reuse policy. By contrast, during the creative industries 
policy project, it became more about market value and privatisation. For example, the 
outsourcing of public space was idled by the national sugar refineries and wineries in 
cities for decades. In the beginning, the organic cluster was formed by cultural workers 
in the abandoned space and the public sector only asked them for extremely cheap fees 
to reuse the space. However, the creative industries project might bring huge commercial 
interests through outsourcing the abandoned space for rebuilding creative parks. Market 
value and privatisation indirectly expelled the cultural cluster. The creative parks are not 
for the cultural workers but for the cultural consumers.  
I believe that creative parks have been totally destroyed. Not one of them is a 
creative park. They are all amusement parks. Not one of them can provide 
practical, hands-on and interactive activities. Participants cannot learn, cannot 
experience anything. You pay for everything; then you can have something; 
without payment then there is nothing. (Interviewee B3) 
The key issue is the extent to which the creative parks are almost entirely 
commercialised for the ‘cultural’ customers and the creative product producers. 
The original purpose of the abandoned public spaces reuse policy was to provide 
cheap rent and empty public spaces for cultural workers. In the beginning, it 
was an extremely affordable space and the different exhibitions, performances, 
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rehearsal spaces and studios were to be an organic cluster. However, the new 
creative policy changed the clustering of the cultural landmarks and events.  
Especially, we have experienced the very early period of these abandoned 
public spaces. You saw all kinds of cultural activities there. The alternative 
model cannot calculate the amount of the creative industry’s profit, but the fact 
is that these spaces were an important base for nurturing the creation and art 
activities. How can you calculate that? Actually, you cannot calculate the effect 
of that, but you need more space to foster creativity. (Interviewee B3) 
The cultural workers who have benefited from the abandoned public spaces reuse policy 
can compare the differences between the organic culture cluster and the creative park. 
However, in itself, a creative park is not objectionable from the perspective of most 
middle-class urban dwellers. They are actually satisfied with its location and service: a 
creative park is typically in the central location of a city and it provides more popular 
cultural and creative activities than the alternative, experimental and avant-garde ones. 
Shops and restaurants sell exquisite high-quality goods and foods. People experience 
cultural and creative events via consumption. In contrast, the cultural workers who do 
not develop any profitable creative business are expelled from the city centre.  
Everyone knows that the plight of the creative industries policy is because of 
the more ‘growth oriented’ intention but not the cultural-oriented purpose. The 
saddest thing is that even the Ministry of Culture totally echoes this interest-
oriented thought. It includes the fact that the new Department of Creative 
Industries was set up and follows the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Finally, the 
National Development Fund for Creative Industries is occupied by a few people 
and their companies. (Interviewee B3) 
After the creative industries policy, some cultural workers feel that the limited public 
funding, cultural subsidies, and public resources are actually difficult to access. The 
cultural policy was only a creative industries policy.  
Across these cases of neoliberal legislation – and new ones discovered at an alarming 
rate – the story is nearly always the same. The obsession with outsourcing public services 
is the main reason why the government can easily shift responsibility for building 
infrastructure, such as building the Taipei New Horizon, or providing a public service, 
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such as the flagship creative industries base, to private consortiums through BOT or 
public-private partnerships. The public sector likely could provide these services less 
expensively through borrowing directly. The challenge is for governments to strike a 
balance between keeping taxes low enough to attract investment and high enough to fund 
public services. This obstacle delayed the project and eventually led to user fees for the 
new public service and policy. In the new creative economy, art and cultural activities 
come in packaged commercial experiences, and the entry threshold is so high that 
individual creative workers can no longer play the game. To some degree, this situation 
seems to reflect neoliberal philosophy as the exploitation of labourers and the 
privatisation of public assets is driven entirely by the neoliberal legislation of the creative 
industries policy. Above all, neoliberalism harnesses such creative industries policies to 
support the interests of consortiums, finance and land development companies. It seeks 
not so much a free market, therefore, as a market free for powerful interests. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter is important as it bridges the gap between the intentions of policymakers 
and its delivery via frontline services. The two main examples – the impact of 
commercialisation on abandoned public space and the escalating phenomenon of the 
privatisation of the creative industries park – represent the neoliberal process in creative 
industries development. The history of Huashan 1914 Creative Park is the first case for 
representing the ideological and practical tensions between ‘a more communal creativity 
base’ and ‘a commercial creativity theme park’. In addition, the public-and-private 
partnership behind Huashan 1914 Creative Park funded a rapid expansion of investment 
in creative businesses. Furthermore, Songshan Cultural and Creative Park is another 
‘successfully commercialised case’ which was planned during the legislative process 
relating to the CCIDA. The new Songshan Cultural and Creative Park was just five years 
behind the declaration of the new Act. In the second case, we can easily see that the 
public sector made a great compromise with the privatisation of public space. The result 
of ‘flexible’ public sector and private sector partnerships explains the changes of the 
policymaking logic in the process. Firstly, Huashan 1914 Creative Park is 
commercialised, but the public sector still has to undertake its political responsibility for 
its performance before the new CCIDA. However, the new Songshan Cultural and 
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Creative Park followed the rules of the new CCIDA, taking more economic responsibility 
for their own increased profit. The transfer of responsibility for more efficient usage of 
public space had been taken for neoliberal reasons and should be reversed. 
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10                                                                                                  
Conclusion:  Beyond Neoliberal Reform: Cultural 
Industries and Public Benefit as Objectives for Cultural 
Policy 
we believe that these reforms [for a cultural democracy] will ultimately liberate our 
society from the logic of pure economic gain and instead, affirm culture's proper role as 
a social value that can in turn bring the benefits of creativity, community and joy into 
all aspects of our democratic life, from the grassroots into government, from childhood 
to old age. a society defined by this paradigm - of culture for all 
(Red pepper, Feb/Mar 2018, p.15) 
 10.1 Introduction and contribution 
In this final chapter, the outcome of neoliberal reform on culture and communication 
policies in a creative economy model is considered. As part of that consideration, the 
relationships of public interest and cultural and communication policies in a social 
democratic system are discussed. This chapter highlights the tug-of-war over creative 
industries policymaking and the real need for cultural policy in an increasingly 
hegemonic structure shaped by neoliberal cultural and media policy. 
I will show that my thesis is an original study and it makes a significant contribution to 
the current state of knowledge. Firstly, the research topic has not been studied before. 
My research examines the influence of neoliberalism on public policy in the 
communication and cultural industries in Taiwan. The problem is that the government 
celebrates its successful creative industry policy, but the problems of policymaking and 
its neoliberalised reform have not beendiscussed systematically in the literature. 
Therefore, there is a need to adopt critical political economy approaches in order to 
analyse the broader problem of communication and cultural policymaking.  
Secondly, my thesis explores the ‘importation’ of creative industries policy in the early 
period. In my research, details of the early development of policymaking were found and 
analysed. For example, many foreign experts, professionals, and domestic artists were 
invited to participate in several conferences and workshops, where British cultural policy 
and the new British creative industries were presented. I discovered these historical 
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materials and I elaborated the connection to the British model and its adoption in Taiwan 
in the very early period.  
Thirdly, this thesis examines the consequences of neoliberalised policymaking for the 
changes in Taiwan’s cultural landscape, including its increasingly secondary relationship 
to the media industries of mainland China, offering a new analysis of the problems of 
creative industries in Taiwan.  
This study has shown that the neoliberal discourse has significantly reformed Taiwan’s 
cultural landscape, in particular, during the transition period from 2004 to 2014, that 
helped to crystallise creative industries model policy formulation. The geographical 
context has significantly influenced Taiwan’s political, economic, and cultural 
development. In general terms, neoliberal reform in cultural and creative industries 
policymaking in Taiwan has failed to promote the public interest. The creative economy 
has exerted a disproportionate influence on the development of cultural policy discourse. 
The thesis reveals the complicated politics and the hyper-connected culture that has been 
built in the process of neoliberalised cultural policymaking, promoting the marketisation 
and potential commercialisation of culture. This critique raises the question of what kind 
of policy should be put in place instead? This thesis therefore also creates an opportunity 
for rethinking current cultural policymaking in Taiwan.  
Alternatives to a neoliberal approach are necessary for the future development of the arts 
and culture sector in Taiwan. Ostensibly, there seems no doubt that creative industries 
policy can be ‘successful’ and that the spectacular results of neoliberal reform can seem 
tantalisingly glamorous. In fact, the situation is more nuanced than it seems. According 
to the official data, creative industries generate employment and export income. For 
example, the news media never stop telling great stories about the contribution of creative 
industries to the UK economy (Conlan, 2016; Kampfner, 2017). The public sector 
celebrates the achievements of Britain’s creative industries – for nearly a decade the 
fastest-growing part of the economy. Although government statistics reveal success and 
growth in the creative industries, not every aspect of creative industries is thriving 
through this kind of neoliberal approach. Notably, the following problems remain: 
overworked creative labourers, unfair geographical spread, and the lack of diverse voices. 
Uncovering the above-mentioned problems could prevent erosion of public value 
through a new blueprint for creative industries policymaking. Additionally, Raymond 
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Williams’ ideas (1960) are still relevant to the aspiration for finding a more reasonable 
and equitable solution to new cultural policymaking:  
We can envisage a cultural organisation which would greatly extend the 
freedom of the cultural producers, by sensible application of public resources to 
cut out their present dependence on dominant but essentially functionless 
financial groups, and by forms of contract which while preserving responsibility 
in the spending of public money would give the producers control over their 
actual work. (p. 57) 
One objective of this dissertation has been to challenge mainstream thought in the realms 
of the creative industries. It is aimed at busting the myths about what they can do to 
promote diversity in a new cultural policymaking frame. Particularly, the new creative 
economy policy lacks any mechanism to deliver not only ‘an economic agenda’ but also 
‘a deep social and cultural relations purpose’ (British Council, n.d.). 
 
10.2 Summary 
The key conceptual lines of argument mainly follow the approach of the critical political 
economy of communication to analyse the neoliberal development of creative industries. 
For example, the intensification of neoliberalism, the exploitation of freelancers in 
cultural industries; neoliberal policies of media deregulation and the crisis of neoliberal 
cultural policymaking; higher education commodification; and commercialisation of 
cultural contents and cultural landscape. The critical political economy approach to 
communication is employed to analyse the neoliberal cultural landscape in which 
policymakers have operated in Taiwan. It provides the basis for this study and help to 
raise further research questions such as the need for an alternative cultural policy. 
The depth of cultural policy research has grown in the last decade. Many excellent studies 
have concentrated on critiques and alternative schemes within the creative industries’ 
controversies in Britain (e.g. Banks, 2007, 2017; Belfiore, 2012; Garnham, 2005; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2016; McGuigan, 2016; Oakley, 2011; Volkerling, 2001). Furthermore, 
the ideas and practices of creative economy/creative industries have been widely 
disseminated, for the past two decades busy infiltrating mainstream society. It is a body 
of opinion which believes, with good reason, that the embrace of creative economics 
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policy under neoliberalism was a controversial programme. Therefore, the importance of 
my research is that I elaborated the creative industries project adopted in Taiwan, and 
influenced by not only the British creative industries model but also by global 
neoliberalism. The controversies surrounding creative industries policies were analysed 
in my main chapters including an exploration of different approaches to rooting creative 
industries policies. More importantly – since the creative industries project was 
infiltrated by neoliberalism – the process and details have to be recorded for 
understanding the transition of cultural policymaking and the value of culture. We will 
need a root-and-branch reform of creative industries policy to ensure that the cultural 
sector is able to reflect a more advanced, nuanced and progressive understanding of the 
role of the culture and economy in our society. Finally, a new public value of common 
culture has to develop in the future.  
Cultural globalisation and its economic effects influence the trajectory of cultural 
policymaking. Marketisation and individualism became the dominant form of the 1980s, 
encouraging the public sector to invest in art and cultural markets (Chapters 4 and 3), 
marking the beginnings of a cultural shift (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015).  
The pendulum has swung concerning conceptions of public expenditure, private 
investment, and public-private partnerships in the development of creative industries 
policy. In a profound sense, the legislative process has forced Taiwanese cultural 
policymaking to adapt to the neoliberal terrain. Documentary analysis is therefore the 
primary research method (Chapter 2). The historical achievements detailed in 
government policy documents, manifestos and think-tank research reports have provided 
some important evidence regarding the neoliberalised process of cultural policymaking. 
I have reviewed the definition, history, and effects of neoliberalism through extensively 
reading or watching secondary sources, including academic textbooks, journals, 
newspapers, and documentaries. Therefore, an understanding of the development of 
cultural policy in the UK was crucial to understanding the dynamics of neoliberalism. 
The neoliberalisation trend in UK has been discussed, especially the supersession of the 
social-democratic model of support for culture by the creative industries agenda (Chapter 
3 and 4).  
‘The neoliberal premises of policy embedded by Thatcher remained intact, and the 
subsequent Conservative government continued to push privatisations in those areas 
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where it felt able to’ (Seymour, 2012). There was also nothing to prevent Labour from 
adapting to neoliberalism after Thatcherism had so comprehensively demolished the 
militant left and trade unions. New Labour presided over this neoliberal state of affairs 
for 13 years and continued fostering entrepreneurial culture (Seymour, 2012; McGuigan, 
2016, p.18). 
Even under a Labour government from 1997 to 2010, the longer term 
neoliberalisation of culture and policy was not interrupted for a moment. In fact, 
neoliberalism in the cultural field was advanced further. It is perfectly justifiable 
to describe the Blairite ‘New Labour’ project in general, and specifically in 
matters of culture and policy, as ‘neoliberal’. (McGuigan, 2016, p.67) 
The programme of creative industries unveiled a new economic-reductionist model for 
cultural policy. The Labour government not only launched its creative industries policy 
with a call to nurture ambition and talent for developing the new knowledge and 
information economy, but also earned praise for globally promoting and redefining the 
symbolic nomenclature of British culture (Chapter 4). This new cultural policy was 
regarded as a vast reservoir of potential opportunity in the emerging creative economy, 
managed through a new integrated department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 
and lottery-funded project grants. Furthermore, the funding and investment New Labour 
made were part of a wider regeneration scheme for public service reform. These practices 
siphoned state funding to the private sector in the name of effective public reform. 
Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015) argued that ‘New Labour did not invent economic rationales 
for funding the arts, but they embraced them whole-heartedly’ (p.62). It also means that 
the economic rationales in cultural policy had been gaining ground rapidly since the 
1980s, and this was a more significant development than anything New Labour did 
(Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015, p.185). The key aspects of the literatures I have studied are 
justified by my field research. The British conception of creative industries, for example, 
was grafted on to a new cultural and creative industries project in Taiwan. The 
construction of a creative economy had become an avowed policy goal of governments 
across the globe in early 2000s. The history of the Taiwanese creative industry 
policymaking process was explored via several governmental archives, newspapers and 
documentaries (Chapter 5). 
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We have witnessed similar scenes in Taiwan cultural policymaking. Huashan 1914 
Creative Park is a typical case of the market-oriented privatisation of public policy and 
public space (Chapter 7). Tourists who visit this flagship CI hub are naturally drawn to 
the stylish shopping mall with its attractive restaurants, art cinemas, and ornamental 
performances and exhibitions. Creative labourers perceive the tensions inherent in the 
privatisation of public space.  However, it is difficult for consumers and visitors, who 
feel great satisfaction in the comfortable, interesting surroundings, to be conscious of 
these tensions. This perceptual difference illustrates a massive neoliberal blind spot, 
where public interest becomes ‘commerce’, and citizens become ‘consumers’. 
Additionally, both the government and consumers come to believe that BOT (build-
operate-transfer) public-private partnerships represent a good model for CI production 
when they are conveyed with the rhetoric of effective private-public cooperation, creative 
commodification, and public spending cuts. The exploitation of creative workers, who 
endure the pressure of flexible labour, unstable jobs, low pay and high rents, is 
rationalised in the neoliberal development process (Chapter 8). Finally, the increasing 
availability of CI curricula and departments in universities, together with the 
marginalisation of Arts, Humanities, and Social Science departments, has accelerated and 
deepened the neoliberal process. Currently there are over 70 university departments and 
courses in Taiwan that focus on training more ‘creative labourers’ for the new market. 
However, most graduates are likely to enter a non-stable and deregulated flexible labour 
market upon graduation (Chapter 6).  
The obsession with outsourcing public services is the main reason that the government 
can easily shift responsibility for reconstructing infrastructure, or providing public 
services to private consortiums through BOT or public-private partnerships. The public 
sector could likely provide these services less expensively through direct borrowing 
(Chapters 6 and 7). The challenge for governments is to strike a balance between keeping 
taxes low enough to attract private investment and high enough to fund public services. 
This obstacle has delayed projects and eventually led to user fees for new public services 
and policies. In the new creative economy, art and cultural activities come in packaged 
commercial experiences, and the entry threshold is so high that individual creative 
workers can no longer play the game. To some degree, this situation reflects neoliberal 
philosophy. The exploitation of labourers and the privatisation of public assets, along 
with the financialisation of public subsidy and investment, and the commercialisation of 
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higher education, is driven entirely by neoliberal legislation in CIP (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
Market-oriented cultural policymaking is upheld by a deep attachment to the ‘efficiency’ 
of the private sector, and the ideology of individual choice and competitive exploitation, 
rather than collective social provision. Under neoliberalised creative industry policy, the 
content of cultural products tends to be homogenised, dumbed down, and oriented to 
mainstream culture at the expense of critical, experimental, and distinctively Taiwanese 
cultural products. Above all, neoliberalism ‘naturally’ gravitates towards increasing 
inequality.   
10.3 Evidence and limitations  
Despite an evolving research programme, the main claims made for neoliberal impacts 
in cultural policymaking are supported by the materials, analysis and studies gathered in 
this thesis. Like any carefully prepared research, its limitations are forthrightly presented.  
In my field research, I have designed in-depth qualitative interviews and documentary 
research. Firstly, the interviews with persons from diverse backgrounds (cultural public 
sector, creative business, independent artists, artist union, film and TV workers) have 
focused on how different agents practically prefigure, determine, evaluate and experience 
the creative industries policy. In addition, documentary work – on official annual reports, 
governmental meeting records, official data, and news reports – brings opportunities for 
wide analysis in historical context.  
The transcripts of the in-depth qualitative interviews and documentary research are the 
main resource that gave me an empirical basis on which to develop the interpretations 
and to understand them in the global neoliberal context. The interviews provided 
alternative perspectives and illuminated the dynamic tension between the agents’ 
situations and the neoliberalisation of cultural and media policies. As Murdock (2003) 
appeals that we researchers have to analyse the cultural production dynamic. 
Exploring the relationships between shifts in the array of available cultural 
forms, altered conditions of cultural production, and the reorganization of 
cultural careers, presents cultural analysis with its most testing challenge but 
also its best chance to construct a more comprehensive account of the changing 
relations between occupational biographies and cultural histories, creative 
practices and economic dynamics (p.35). 
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Thus, the changes in politics, the economy, society and cultural production conditions 
wrought by neoliberalism have been critically analysed in the historical and theoretical 
discourses.  
Interviews with each of these types serve different purposes. For example, the interviews 
with cultural sector officials concentrated on the policy design for the adoption of the 
British model and the balance between industrialisation and democratisation in cultural 
value. The interviews with staff members of the new creative industries corporations 
founded from 2002 to 2012 were focused on their views of cultural businesses and the 
relationship among the government cultural sector, new creative industries corporations 
and earlier cultural industry workers and artists (especially those who once had 
government subsidies but now must propose projects to companies which hold the 
creative industries funds). The interviews with cultural industry labourers, defined 
broadly, explored their opinions about their working conditions (e.g. neoliberalised self-
exploitation). Finally, the interviews of activists opposed to the commercialisation of 
cultural and media policy helps in understanding their complicated, sometimes 
contradictory intentions. The analysis of these different interviews reveals the dynamics 
of the agents’ cultural practices and values, which might sometimes oppose each other 
and sometimes temporarily collaborate. 
One limitation was that my fieldwork focussed on cultural workers from a limited range 
of cultural activity, including film and TV workers and people from the artists’ union. 
However, there are different cultural workers in other creative industries in Taiwan. For 
example, fashion designers, traditional craft workers and architects were not on my 
interview list. The choices I made during the research process were also following the 
analysed collection of second-hand materials such as news reports and governmental 
annual reports. These data show that creative industries project spent more funding on 
films and mass media industries (see Chapter 6) and building creative industries parks 
(see Chapter 7) in the early period. Therefore, the limitations could present potential for 
post-doctoral work to discover different creative labourers’ working conditions and the 
impact of these policies on them.  
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10.4 The need for an alternative cultural policy in a broader 
perspective   
The cultural landscape is not only an expression of cultural hegemony, but is also 
dynamic and heterogeneous. It could be said that the cultural landscape is co-constructed 
by the state (cultural policymakers), the civil society, cultural workers and the corporate 
sector. In particular, the practices of cultural production and cultural consumption 
(cultural industries), and the new forms of cultural economy (i.e. creative industries) have 
transformed this dynamic process. Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2004, p.5) argue that ‘the 
idea of cultural or creative industries might be regenerative’. ‘It was the result of changes 
in the cultural-industries landscape which were themselves in part the product of cultural 
policy shifts’. Hesmondhalgh (et al., 2015, p.193) explain how the British cultural 
landscape was threatened because in the reduction of public funding and, as of today, the 
cultural landscape has changed dramatically. The cultural landscape nowadays is not only 
being bulldozed by cuts, but its cultural benefits are being regarded as less important than 
economic gain. My study also found that the legislative process of CI policy (ch 6) and 
the expanded plan of creative industries (ch 7) focused on art’s and culture’s 
contributions to the innovation economy. Furthermore, the creative boom has contributed 
to an increasingly polarised individualistic cultural landscape, oriented to cultural 
consumption. ‘From this perspective, independents [cultural workers] are in the vanguard 
of casualisation, insecurity, and the accelerated turnover of personnel, rather than 
expressive diversity’ (Murdock, 2003, p.25). This view is consistent with the picture 
emerging from my empirical research. The Taiwanese cultural workers I interviewed 
were in different positions and working conditions have their own survival mechanism 
to face/accept/complain/question the neoliberalised market. Some of them were facing 
unstable jobs and wages and some experienced cultural workers embraced and pursued 
the neoliberal rules.  
 This ignores structural inequalities and the principle of diversity under the perspective 
of creative economy. Some people celebrate the creative economy boom in spite of the 
fact that public value – exceptional quality and diversity – was damaged. The British 
cultural landscape has undergone a complete neoliberal transformation in the past several 
decades. The growing neoliberal consensus is also helping to shape the new cultural 
landscape by focusing on the profit-making production of culture. 
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The neoliberal tide was a global phenomenon politically, economically and culturally. In 
the 1980s, the offensive ushered in the full-blown neoliberal model that has failed to 
deliver for the majority, generated inequality and insecurity on a huge scale, and 
imploded with such disastrous consequences (Milne, 2014). However, New Labour 
embraced the Thatcherite settlement through the ‘third way’. Throughout the process of 
neoliberalisation, the relationship between the state, cultural policies, cultural workers in 
cultural industries and the public (the audiences) underwent a dynamic process of 
historical change. Neoliberalised cultural and creative industries have eroded the public 
value of culture and media policies and changed the cultural landscape. Neoliberal 
rhetoric has become pivotal to the successful ‘common-sense’ of recent decades (Harvey, 
2005, p.39-42; Hall, 2011). It has not only infiltrated society but also penetrated the field 
of cultural policies globally.  
From British creative industries policymaking to the case of Taiwan, I am stressing the 
similarities in the neoliberalised process, to appeal to a more public-interest direction in 
cultural policymaking. In chapters 5 to 9, I have showed that Taiwan has also followed 
the similar policy path to the UK’s, with the same consequences – in particular the 
reorientation of cultural policy to profit making. My study found that the role of public 
sector changed as a result. For example, the public subsidy should ideally play a vital 
role in encouraging creative innovation by overcoming private-sector reluctance to invest 
in risky projects. However, the expanded creative industries project pushed the cultural 
policymaking to focus on being the most effective ways to boost economy or accelerating 
productivity, but this should arguably not be the only target for making a good cultural 
policy (ch7 & ch9). Art and culture improves not only national productivity, but also 
‘help to develop people's critical thinking, to cultivate creative problem solving and to 
communicate and express themselves effectively’ (Brown, 2013).  
Additionally, we question the dilemma that cultural policymaking nowadays has largely 
been superseded by an exclusively economic rationale. Furthermore, creative industries 
policies are deemed worthy of public support because they are of economic value 
(McGuigan, 2004).  
New public cultural policymaking should encourage diverse forms of culture, including 
experimental, critical, highbrow and local cultures. This is not necessarily in conflict with 
encouraging more commercial forms of culture, but under neoliberal cultural policy only 
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commercial forms are encouraged. In the UK, for example, the more recent developments 
in cultural policy demonstrate a similar dilemma looming. The Labour Party’s Report 
(2017 August) expounds the inequality and the class divide in the arts sector. Banks 
(2017) explains how the education system naturalised the inequality and the idea of 
‘natural talent’. It represents ‘an act of social manufacture – realised in processes of elite 
school selection and training: a process of recognition that tends to value and help 
reproduce the advantages of the already advantaged’ (p.79). 
Banks (2017) proposes the idea of ‘creative justice’ and it can be a new possibility to 
rethink this dilemma of neoliberalised creative economy nowadays, in particular, ‘the 
prevailing injustices within work and education in the cultural industries’ (p.159) have 
to be discussed by cultural workers, the active academics and the public sector. Banks 
also believes that ‘the need to raise con-sciousness of injustice and inequality, and to help 
advance the conversation about fairness and parity in cultural work’ (p.160). Furthermore, 
Red Pepper, the Raymond Williams Foundation and The World Transformed are 
producing a new manifesto for a cultural democracy and bringing a question: ‘how we 
can harness that power of culture to shape a truly transformative cultural policy’ (2018). 
The latest Red Pepper magazine (Feb/Mar 2018) provides the guide to understand the 
value of collective culture and the way for participation. It pictures a new perspective for 
a more democratic policy of culture and art. I have explained in my thesis that the removal 
of funding for small independent cultural producers who are not  oriented to commercial 
markets reduces opportunities for cultural democracy and participation (ch8). This active 
approach creates a radical new position for a new public cultural policymaking.  
a strong democracy is an inclusive democracy. it's a society where no one is 
invisible and every voice is heard. culture can be the preserve of the privileged 
few, as it has been, or instead it can be the building block that strengthens our 
democracy, celebrated as a basic human right, helping to create a world where 
all people are free to enjoy the benefits of self-expression, access to resources 
and community. our goal is to ensure that in our time it is the latter that prevails 
and that this transformative value, of culture for all, by all, comes to permeate 
all corners of our social lives and political institutions. (Red Pepper, Feb/Mar 
2018, p.14)  
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Appendix II. Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative 
Industries 
 
Date: 2010/2/3 
Ref. No.: Hua-Zong-Yi-Yi-Zi 09900022451 
Chapter 1 General Principle 
Article 1 This Act is enacted to foster the development of Cultural and Creative 
Industries, to establish a social environment with abundant culture and creativity, to 
utilize the technology and create researches and developments, to strengthen talent 
cultivation of the Cultural and Creative Industries, and to actively exploit the 
domestic and overseas market. 
The development of Cultural and Creative Industries shall proceed pursuant to the 
provisions in this Act. If there exists more favorable provisions than the content of 
this Act, the said provisions shall apply. 
Article 2 To promote the Cultural and Creative Industries, the Government shall 
strengthen artistic creation and cultural preservation, reinforce the combination of 
culture and technology, emphasize on a balance development between cities, counties 
and regions, value local characteristics, elevate the citizens’ capacity for cultural 
appreciation, and enhance the popularity of cultural art so to comply with the 
international trends. 
Article 3 The “Cultural and Creative Industries” referred to in this Act means the 
following industries that originate from creativity or accumulation of culture which 
through the formation and application of intellectual properties, possess potential 
capacities to create wealth and job opportunities, enhance the citizens’ capacity for 
arts, and elevate the citizens’ living environment: 
1. Visual art industry 
2. Music and performance art industry 
3. Cultural assets application and exhibition and performance facility industry 
4. Handicrafts industry 
5. Film industry 
6. Radio and television broadcast industry 
7. Publication industry 
8. Advertisement industry 
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9. Product design industry 
10. Visual communication design industry 
11. Designer fashion industry 
12. Architecture design industry 
13. Digital content industry 
14. Creativity living industry 
15. Popular music and cultural content industry 
16. Other industries as designated by the central Competent Authority. 
The content and scope of the industries in the preceding paragraph are to be stipulated 
by the central Competent Authority in consultation with the central relevant 
competent authorities. 
Article 4 The “Cultural and Creative Enterprise” referred to in this Act means a legal 
entity, partnership, sole proprietorship or individual engaging in Cultural and Creative 
Industries. 
Article 5 The “Competent Authority” referred to in this Act refers to the Council for 
Cultural Affairs of the Executive Yuan in the central government, the municipality 
government in municipalities, and county government in counties. 
Article 6 The central Competent Authority shall formulate a development policy for 
Cultural and Creative Industries and review and revise the policy every four years for 
the Executive Yuan’s approval so as to be the policy basis to promote the 
development of Cultural and Creative Industries. 
The central Competent Authority shall, in conjunction with the central authority in 
charge of the end enterprise concerned, establish a statistical scheme on the Cultural 
and Creative Industries and publish annual report on Cultural and Creative Industries 
every year. 
Article 7 To promote the development of the cultural and creative industry, the 
Government shall contribute to establish the Cultural and Creative Industry 
Development and Research Institute. The establishment rule thereof is to be stipulated 
otherwise. 
Article 8 The Government shall endeavor to develop Cultural and Creative 
Industries, and secure the relevant and necessary funds. 
Article 9 Certain portion of the National Development Fund shall be withdrawn to 
invest in Cultural and Creative Industries. The regulations governing the review and 
approval of the investment in the preceding paragraph, withdrawal scheme, 
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achievement index and the relevant matters are to be stipulated by the central 
Competent Authority in conjunction with the authority in charge of the end enterprise 
concerned. 
Article 10 The Government shall promote the concept that cultural creativity is 
valuable fully exploit and utilize cultural and creative assets, and further implement 
the related policies. 
When the economic utility of the expenditures spent by the Government on tangible 
or intangible cultural and creative assets exceeds two years, the amount of that 
expenditure shall be earmarked as an expense budget of capital items. 
Each central authority in charge of the end enterprise concerned shall stipulate 
varieties of incentive or measures of assistance to support public and private 
companies along with Cultural and Creative Enterprises, and to convert creative 
works and cultural and creative assets to actual production or application. 
Article 11 To nurture cultural and creative enterprise talents, the Government shall 
fully exploit and exercise the human resource of cultural creativities, integrate 
varieties of teaching and research resource, and encourage Cultural and Creative 
Industries to proceed with cooperation on research and talent cultivation between 
industries, government and academia. 
The Government may assist local governments, colleges and Cultural and Creative 
Enterprises to enrich cultural and creative talents, encourage the establishment of 
relevant developmental facility in respect of Cultural and Creative Industries, 
establish related courses, or proceed with creative experiments, creations, exhibitions 
and performances. 
 
Chapter 2 Assistance, Reward and Subsidy scheme 
Article 12 The Competent Authority and the central authority in charge of the end 
enterprise concerned may provide Cultural and Creative Enterprises with suitable 
assistances, rewards or subsidies in respect of: 
1. Formation of legal entity and relevant tax statement registration 
2. Creation or research and development of products or services 
3. Entrepreneurship and incubation 
4. Improvements on agency system in the Cultural and Creative Industry 
5. Circulation and application of intangible assets 
6. Upgrade of operation and management capacity 
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7. Application of information technology 
8. Cultivation of professional talents and recruitment of international talents 
9. Enhancement of investment and commercial participants 
10. Collaborative cooperation of enterprises 
11. Expansion of markets 
12. International cooperation and communication 
13. Participation in domestic and overseas competition 
14. Industry cluster 
15. Utilization of public real estates 
16. Collection of industry and market information 
17. Promotion and dissemination of fine cultural and creative products or services 
18. Protection and application of intellectual property rights 
19. Assistance of reviving cultural and creative products and services 
20. Other promotional matters on enhancing the development of Cultural and Creative 
Industries. 
The regulations regarding the subject, qualification, application scope, application 
procedure, review standard, revocation, abolishment of subsidy and other relevant 
matters of the assistances, rewards or subsidies indicated in the preceding paragraph 
are to be stipulated by the central authorities in charge of end enterprises concerned. 
Article 13 To elevate the citizens’ capacity for art and cultivate the popularities of 
cultural and creative activities, the Government shall provide schools which are below 
the senior high school level with artistic and cultural creativity appreciation courses 
and arrange for relevant educational activities. 
Article 14 To promote the consumption habits relating to arts and invigorate the 
Cultural and Creative Industries, the central Competent Authority may earmark 
budgets to subsidize students viewing and appreciation of artistic and cultural 
exhibition and performance, and issue and distribute tickets to artistic and cultural 
experience events. 
The target of the aforementioned subsidy and ticket distribution and the 
implementation regulations thereof are to be stipulated by the central Competent 
Authority. 
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Article 15 The Government shall encourage the Cultural and Creative Enterprises to 
provide original products or services at favorable prices so to develop domestic 
Cultural and Creative Industries, and the price difference between the original price 
and the favored one are to be subsidized by the central Competent Authority. 
The identification and subsidy regulations regarding the original products or services 
scope in the preceding paragraph are to be stipulated by the central Competent 
Authority. 
Article 16 The central authorities in charge of the end enterprises concerned may 
reward or subsidy the public to provide suitable space, set up each kind of creation, 
incubation and exhibition and performance facility for usage by the Cultural and 
Creative Enterprises. 
The reward or subsidy regulations in the preceding paragraph are to be stipulated by 
the central authorities in charge of the end enterprises concerned. 
Article 17 When the Government procures cultural and creative products or services 
via the method of public selection, the creativity and arts of the cultural and creative 
products or services may be included as part of the evaluation factors. 
Article 18 The competent authorities in charge of the stations or the relevant 
facilities of public transportation systems shall preserve certain percentage of 
advertisement space at the said stations or on the relevant facilities as priority space 
for cultural and creative products or services. The advertisement space shall be 
offered at a favorable price. The percentage and usage fee thereof are to be stipulated 
by the Competent Authority. 
Article 19 The central Competent Authority shall coordinate with the related 
governmental departments, financial institutions, and credit guarantee institutions to 
establish an investment, loan, and credit guarantee scheme for the Cultural and 
Creative Enterprises, and shall provide favorable measures to induce the infusion of 
private funds to support those Cultural and Creative Enterprises in various operational 
stages to acquire their needed funds. 
The Government shall encourage business enterprises to invest in Cultural and 
Creative Industries so to facilitate the cross-field communication in the areas of 
operation strategy and management experience. 
Article 20 To encourage Cultural and Creative Enterprises to establish their own 
brands and actively cultivate the international markets, the central relevant competent 
authorities in charge of end enterprises concerned may coordinate with each of their 
overseas offices to assist the Cultural and Creative Enterprises in establishing 
international brand image, attending reputable international exhibitions and 
performances, competitions, expositions, cultural arts festivals, etc., expanding the 
related international markets, and promoting sales. 
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Article 21 To foster the development of Cultural and Creative Industries, the 
Government may provide public cultural and creative assets that are under the custody 
and management of the Government, and such assets may include books, historical 
documentations, preserved cultural and historical relics or video and radio 
information, by leasing, authorizing or through other measures so long as it does not 
violate the relevant regulations on intellectual property right. 
The management authority that provides the public cultural and creative assets in 
accordance with the preceding paragraph shall create an inventory list on assets that 
are being provided to the public, and shall publicize the said inventory information in 
a suitable manner The management authority may preserve a portion of the benefits 
gained through its compliance with the first paragraph and spend it on management 
maintenance, technology research and development, and talent cultivation. Such 
expenditures are exempted from the restriction set forth in Article 7 of National 
Property Act and local government regulations on public property management.  
If public cultural and creative assets are utilized for non-profit purpose, the 
management authority may provide the user with favorable prices. The regulations or 
municipal rules regarding the lease, authorization, benefit preservation and other 
relevant matters of public cultural and creative assets are to be stipulated by the 
central authorities in charge of the end enterprises concerned, municipality or county 
(city) competent authorities. 
Article 22 To assist in securing locations for cultivating and supporting artistic 
creators and their exhibition and performance, and when the required real estate is 
publicly owned but not for public use, such real estate may be directly leased by the 
management authority in charge after the approval of the relevant competent 
authorities in charge of the end enterprises concerned. Such lease is to be exempted 
from the restriction stipulated in Article 42 of National Property Act and local 
government regulations on leasing methods of public property management. 
Article 23 For a pledge on copyright originated from the Cultural and Creative 
Industries, the establishment, transfer, alteration, extinguishment or disposition 
restriction on that pledge may be registered with the copyright competent authority. If 
the pledge is not registered, such pledge will not be a valid defense against any bona 
fide third party. The foregoing provision will not apply if the pledge is extinguished 
by reason of a merger, or is extinguished by the extinguishment of the copyright or 
the guaranteed credit right. 
Any person may apply to review the preceding content registered. The registration 
regulation in the preceding first paragraph and the review regulation in the preceding 
second paragraph are to be stipulated by the Competent Authority under the 
Copyright Act. 
The copyright competent authority may appoint private institutions or groups to deal 
with the matters stipulated in the preceding first and second paragraphs.  
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Article 24 If a copyright user uses its best effort but fails to obtain a valid 
authorization from the copyright owner due to either the identity or the location of the 
copyright owner being unknown, the user shall clarify the reason for its failure to 
obtain such valid authorization to the copyright competent authority. After the 
completion of an investigation conducted by the copyright competent authority and if 
as a result of the investigation the user has obtained the permission and authorization 
from the copyright competent authority, the user may utilize the work within the 
permitted scope if it has withdrawn the amount needed for usage remuneration. 
The copyright competent authority shall pronounce the authorization permission in 
the preceding paragraph with suitable method and publish it on the government 
report. 
The usage remuneration amount in the first paragraph shall be commensurate with the 
freely negotiated amount of reasonable and payable usage remuneration for a general 
work. 
A replica of cultural and creative products which is made by obtaining the 
authorization and permission in accordance with the first paragraph shall indicate the 
permission date, number and the qualification and scope of the permissible usage 
issued by the copyright competent authority. 
The regulations regarding the application of permission and calculation method of 
usage remuneration in the first paragraph and other matters which shall be complied 
with are to be stipulated by the Competent Authority under the Copyright Act. 
After obtaining the permitted authorization based on the first paragraph, if any 
inaccuracy on the application is found, the copyright competent authority shall revoke 
the permission. 
After obtaining the permitted authorization based on the first paragraph, if the user 
fails to utilize the work in compliance with the methods permitted by the copyright 
competent authority, the copyright competent authority shall rescind the permission. 
Article 25 The Government shall support in the establishment of cultural and 
creative villages, and shall as a priority assist core creative and independent workers 
to situate in the said villages. The Government shall, through the clustering effect by 
involving different groups, further promote the development of Cultural and Creative 
Enterprises. 
Chapter 3 Tax Incentives 
Article 26 If a profit-seeking enterprise contributes and donates for the reasons 
stipulated in the following and in an amount that is below NTD 10,000,000 or ten 
percent of the amount of its income, such contribution and donation may be 
considered as expenses or losses of the year of payment that are exempted from the 
restriction in 
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Sub-paragraph 2 of Article 36 of Income Tax Act: 
1. Purchasing products or services originated by domestic Cultural and Creative 
Enterprises, and donating to the students or minority groups through schools, 
departments or other groups. 
2. Cultural and creative activities held in distant regions. 
3. Donating Cultural and Creative Enterprises to establish an incubation center. 
4. Other matters identified by the central Competent Authority 
The implementation regulations in the preceding paragraph will be stipulated by the 
central Competent Authority and the central authorities in charge of the end 
enterprises concerned. 
Article 27 To enhance the creativity of Cultural and Creative Industries, companies 
may deduct or exempt from the payable tax by reason of their investment expense in 
research and development of cultural creativity and talent cultivation in accordance 
with relevant tax acts or other regulations. 
Article 28 If the machinery and equipment imported from abroad by a cultural and 
creative enterprise for its own use are not currently manufactured by local 
manufacturers as specifically verified by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, they shall 
be exempted from import duties. 
Chapter 4 Appended Provisions 
Article 29 The enforcement rules of this Act are to be stipulated by the central 
Competent Authority. 
Article 30 The effective date of this Act is to be stipulated by the Executive Yuan 
otherwise. 
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Appendix III.  New and Renamed Departments of Cultural and 
Creative Industries 
 
Department University Year Original Department 
Institute of Creative 
Industries Design 
National Cheng 
Kung University 
2006  
Inservice Bachelor 
Programme of Culture 
and Creative Industry 
National Chung 
Hsing University 
2011  
Master Programme of 
Sound and Music 
Innovative Technologies 
National Chiao Tung 
University 
2008  
Master Programme of 
Culture and creative 
design 
National Kaohsiung 
Normal University 
2012  
Department of Creative 
Design and Architecture 
National University 
of Kaohsiung 
2012  
Art and Creative 
Industries 
 
National Dong Hwa 
University 
2010  
Grad School & Dept. of 
Creative Design 
National Yunlin 
University of 
Science and 
Technology 
2006  
Cultural and Creative 
Industry 
 
National Kaohsiung 
University Applied 
Sciences 
Renamed 
in 2013 
Cultural Business 
Department (2002) 
Graduate School of 
Creative Industry 
Design 
National Taiwan 
University of Arts 
2009  
Bc. Dept. Prog. 
Aboriginal Cultural and 
Creative Industry. 
National United 
University 
2014  
Cultural and Creative 
Industries Management 
 
National Taipei 
University of 
Education 
 
Renamed 
in 2010 
Master Programme in 
Art Culture Industry 
Design and 
Management (2005)  
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Cultural Industry 
(2006) 
Merged with Art 
Culture Industry 
Design and 
Management (2008) 
Creative Design and 
Management 
 
National Taichung 
University of 
Education 
 
Renamed 
in 2012  
The Programme of 
Cultural and creative 
industries and 
development (2008) 
The Centre of 
Cultural and creative 
design (2009) 
MSc Management 
Creative and Cultural 
Industries (2014) 
Cultural and Creative 
Industries 
National Chin-Yi 
University of 
Technology 
Renamed 
in 2008 
Department of 
Cultural Business and 
Development (2007) 
Creative Product Design 
 (College of Design) 
National Taichung 
University of 
Science and 
Technology 
2012  
Cultural and Creative 
Industry 
National Pingtung 
University 
Renamed 
in 2010 
Taiwan Cultural 
Industries 
Management (2005) 
Merged with the 
Graduate Institute of 
Hakka Culture 
Studies (2006) 
Cultural Vocation 
Development 
National Taipei 
University of 
Technology  
2011  
 Bachelor Degree 
Programme of Art and 
Cultural Creation 
Fu Jen Catholic 
University 
2010  
Bachelor’s programme 
in Software Engineering 
and digital innovation 
applications 
Fu Jen Catholic 
University 
2012  
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Branding & Business 
Management for 
Fashion & Creative 
Industries Programme  
Chinese Culture 
University 
2010 This new programme 
was firstly set up in 
2011 which originally 
comes from History 
Department. Finally, it 
merged with the 
Extension, School of 
Continuing Education 
and became ‘the 
Continuing Education 
School of Creative 
Industries’  
Master Programme in 
Creative Design 
Feng Chia 
University 
2010  
Department of Creative 
Product Design 
I-Shou University 2011  
Graduate institute of 
creative industries, 
College of Management 
Shi Chien University 2012  
Cultural & Creative 
Enterprise Management 
 
Nan Hua University  
 
2012 Graduate institute in 
publishing (1997) 
Renamed to ‘MBA 
Graduate institute in 
publishing’ in 2003 
Merged to ‘Institute of 
Publishing & Cultural 
Enterprise 
Management Studie’ 
(2012) 
Department of creative 
product design 
Nan Hua University Renamed 
in 2011 
Department of 
Applied Arts and 
Design (2000) 
Set up Master 
programme in 2005 
 
Department of Cultural 
Creativity and Digital 
Media Design 
Lunghwa University 
of Science and 
Technology 
2012  
Bachelor’s degree 
programme in Creative 
Arts and design 
Chang Jung 
Christian University 
2011  
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Department of modern 
living and creative 
design 
Cheng Shiu 
University 
 
2010  
Bachelor Programme of 
Creative Industries 
Management 
Cheng Shiu 
University 
2013 College of 
Humanities and 
Social Sciences 
renamed to College 
of Life and Creativity 
in2011 
 
Department of art of 
creative design 
Hsuan Chuang 
University 
2010  
The Institute of Creative 
Design 
Chienkuo 
Technology 
University 
2011  
Degree Programme of 
Cultural Creative Design 
and Digital Integration 
Kao Yuan University 2011  
Graduate Institute of 
Cultural and Creative 
Industries 
Da Jen University 
 
 
2011  
Department of Creative 
Design 
St. John’s University 2012  
Creative Product Design Ling Tung University Renamed 
in 2014 
Department of 
Product Design and 
Technology 2006 
College of Creative 
Design 
Asia University 2007  
Department of Creative 
Product Design 
Asia University 2007  
Programme of Creative 
Industries & Digital Film 
KaiNan University 
 
Renamed 
in 2013 
Degree Programme 
of Creative Industries 
and Digital Integration 
(2009) 
Cultural Assets and 
Reinvention 
Fo Guang University 2008  
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Department of health 
and creative vegetarian 
science 
Fo Guang University 2013  
Department of Creative 
Product Design and 
Management 
Far East University 2010  
Department of Creative 
Product Design 
Tungnan University 
 
2012  
Cultural Creativity and 
Design 
 
Nan Kai University 
of Technology 
Renamed 
in 2010 
Cultural Business and 
Development (2006) 
the dept. of 
‘Multimedia Design’ 
with ‘Cultural 
Business and 
Development’ were 
integrated in 2010 
Department of Digital 
Living Innovation 
Nan Kai University 
of Technology 
2012 Department of 
Computer and 
Communication 
Engineering 
Department of 
Innovative Living Design 
Overseas Chinese 
University    
2010  
Culture Creativity 
 
Meiho University 
 
2012  
Department of Creative 
Public Communication 
Design 
TransWorld 
University 
2014  
Creative Product Design TransWorld 
University 
Renamed 
in 2012 
Product Design 
(2005) 
 
Arts, Crafts cultural and 
creative industries 
Taiwan Shoufu 
University 
Renamed 
in 2015 
Programme of 
Culture and Creative 
Industry (2014) were 
integrated to be the 
department of Arts, 
Crafts cultural and 
creative industries in 
2015 
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Department of Creative 
Fashion Design and 
Management 
Chung Chou 
University of 
Science and 
Technology 
2009  
Cultural Creativity and 
Tourism 
Hsing-Kuo College 
 
2014 The college was set 
up in 2000 and 
closed in Feb 2015.  
Undergraduate 
Programme of Creative 
Design 
 
Ta Hwa University 
of Science and 
Technology 
2013 
 
 
Graduate Institute of 
creative arts industries 
Wen Zao Ursuline 
university of 
Languages 
2007  
Degree Programme of 
Baking Innovation and 
Management 
Taipei City 
University of 
Science and 
Technology 
 
2013  
Department of Creative 
Fashion Design 
Taoyuan Innovation 
Institute of 
Technology 
2010  
Department of Creative 
Product Design 
De Lin Institute of 
Technology 
2012  
Department of Creative 
Product Design 
Nan Jeon University 
of Science and 
Technology 
2014  
Department of Creative 
Product and 
Technological 
Application 
Lan Yang Institute 
of technology 
2010  
Department of 
Innovations in Digital 
Living 
Lan Yang Institute 
of technology 
2008  
Department of 
Innovative Product 
Design 
LEE-MING Institute 
of Technology 
2011  
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Graduate Institute of 
Cultural and Creative 
Design 
Tung Fang Design 
Institute 
2007  
Creative Product Design Chungyu Institute of 
Technology 
Renamed 
in 2014 
Product Design 
(2010) 
Graduate Institute of 
Cultural & Creative 
Design 
Asia- Pacific 
Institute of Creativity 
2012 It renamed to Asia- 
Pacific Institute of 
Creativity in 2010 
Graduate Institute of 
Tea and Ceramic 
Asia- Pacific 
Institute of Creativity 
2013  
Ceramics and Creative 
Design 
Asia- Pacific 
Institute of Creativity 
2013  
Cultural Industries 
Programme  
In Graduate Programme 
of Design and Arts 
College 
Da-Yeh University 
 
2007  
Culture and creativity University of Kang 
Ning 
2008  
Institute of Culture 
Industry and Innovation 
Design 
Jinwen University of 
Science and 
Technology  
2011  
Department of cultural 
activities development 
Chia Nan University 
of Pharmacy & 
Science 
2004  
Department of cultural 
and creative industries 
Hung Kuang 
University 
2006  
cultural and creative 
design 
National Taitung 
College 
2010  
Source: (2013 CIAR p.177; Ministry of Culture 2013 p. 177; Ministry of 
Education website; the website of each university) 
 
